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Voorwoord
Bij het afscheid van mijn vorige baan kreeg ik een boek met de titel Op de tractor
naar de Zuidpool . Volgens de collega die het mij gaf was promoveren als vrouw
aan de economiefaculteit vergelijkbaar met een reis als vrouw alleen op een tractor
naar de Zuidpool. Hij had gelijk.
Maar gelukkig wist ik dat toen nog niet. Ik begon toen net als Manon Ossevoort,
het tractormeisje, aan het nastreven van een droom. Al toen ik afstudeerde in 1996,
had ik de droom om eens te promoveren. Alleen was het er tot 2007 nooit van
gekomen om die droom te realiseren. Ik had het al haast uitgesteld tot na mijn
pensioen. Maar toen kwam de vacature bij de Erasmus School of Economics voor het
Mature Talent Project. Een project voor vrouwen die na een jaar of tien werkervaring
weer terugwilden naar de wetenschap en binnen twee jaar wilden promoveren. Er
stond nog net niet bij Met drie kinderen en partner, wonende te Hillegom. Ajn,
het was op mijn lijf geschreven.
De afgelopen jaren ben ik op reis geweest door de wetenschap om mijn Zuidpool
te bereiken: Het proefschrift is af. Dat heb ik voor op Manon Ossevoort, die nog
steeds de Zuidpool niet heeft bereikt. Maar de weg naar mijn Zuidpool was als
de hare. Het was een tocht vol verrassingen, door (voormalig) oorlogsgebieden,
door de woestijn, door verlaten streken, rijke steden en door de sloppenwijken.
Of, om het in mijn termen uit te drukken, door de speltheorie, de econometrie, de
eenzaamheid van het wetenschappelijke werk, door de verrukking van het ontdekken
van nieuwe mechanismen, de vrijheid van het uitwerken van interessante ideeën, maar
ook langs marginale e¤ecten, interactietermen, multinomiale logistische regressie en
di¤erentiatie van integralen.
Een proefschrift is niet alleen een proeve van bekwaamheid, maar soms ook een
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beproeving. Keer op keer heb ik mezelf moeten bewijzen. Niet zo zeer ten opzichte
van de buitenwereld, maar vooral ten opzichte van mezelf. En dat viel niet altijd
mee. Ik ben me de afgelopen jaren meer bewust geworden van mijn beperkingen
en heb mijn zelfkennis vergroot. Ik leef op als ik met anderen samenwerk, maar
als ik lang alleen ploeter komen de twijfels over mijn kunnen haast verlammend
bovendrijven. Mijn energie laait op onder deadlines, maar als de deadlines ver weg
lijken, is mijn energie soms maar een klein waakvlammetje. Wetenschap vergt een
zekere monomanie, ik ben helaas niet monomaan. Ik heb regelmatig aan stoppen
gedacht, ware het niet dat ik slecht met iets stoppen kan.
Gelukkig was niet alles kommer en kwel op mijn reis door de wetenschap. Waar
Manon Ossevaart onderweg op haar tractor door Afrika allerlei nieuwe culturen
ontmoet, heb ik ook een nieuwe cultuur ontdekt op mijn reis: De wetenschappelijke
variant van de Homo Economicus. Een geval apart, zou ik een paar jaar geleden
hebben gezegd. Na jaren bij de Raad voor Werk en Inkomen te hebben gewerkt,
waar de collegas bekend en vertrouwd waren en dol op overleg, moest ik wennen aan
de specieke humor en de veel geringere sociale interactie op de faculteit. Inmiddels
zijn er veel nieuwe collegas bijgekomen, is de sociale interactie toegenomen en ben
ik gehecht geraakt aan de Homo Economicus van de Erasmus. Ook de jonge Homo
Economicus van de Erasmus, de studenten, heb ik in mijn hart gesloten. Niet alleen
bij de Erasmus ben ik op mijn reis door de wetenschap nieuwe, interessante mensen
tegengekomen, maar ook op de congressen in Neurenberg, Bristol en niet te vergeten
Barcelona.
Zoals een reis naar de Zuidpool niet kan zonder supportteam en thuisbasis, had ik
dit proefschrift niet kunnen schrijven zonder de steun van mijn collegas en familie.
De collegas van algemene economie ben ik dankbaar voor de steun en het vertrouwen
dat jullie de afgelopen tijd uitstraalden in de goede aoop van het project. Jullie
geloof daarin was soms groter dan het mijne. Alle Barcelonagangers wil ik be-
danken voor de saamhorigheid die ik daar heb ervaren. Alle Mature Talents voor
de uitwisseling van ervaringen en Suzanne in het bijzonder. Jij verdreef de eenza-
amheid in H8-34 en gaf het goede voorbeeld door gewoon aan te pakken. Josse wil
ik bedanken voor alle keren dat hij mij iets over economie en Scientic Workplace
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heeft uitgelegd. Otto, bedankt voor het vertrouwen in de toekomst.
Ik wil Robert bedanken, omdat je de beste promotor was die ik me had kunnen
wensen. We werden op basis van één van de vier onderzoeksideeën die ik had aan
elkaar gekoppeld. Dat idee vormde de basis voor de rest van onze samenwerking.
Een samenwerking die ons overigens door Philip Hans Franses min of meer werd
opgedrongen, maar wonderwel is uitgepakt. Wat niet wegneemt, dat ik je af en toe
heb vervloekt. Maar niet zo vaak. Meer nog heb ik met bewondering en verwon-
dering gekeken hoe zon jong iemand zon vakvolwassen wetenschapper kan zijn. Je
hebt me het belang laten zien van goede ideeën, van het houden van focus bij de
uitwerking daarvan, van het gebruik van goede methoden, van unieke data en van
het uiteindelijk vlot, maar zorgvuldig opschrijven van het resultaat. Ik heb veel van
je geleerd en dat was, naast het schrijven van een proefschrift, mijn doel toen ik
het warme bad van de Raad voor Werk en Inkomen verliet. Ik ben je niet alleen
dankbaar voor alles wat je me geleerd hebt, maar minstens evenzeer voor alle keren
dat je me uit de put hebt getrokken en het optimisme dat je uitstraalde over de
afronding van het proefschrift.
Erik, Lene, Ko en Rik, de afgelopen jaren was ik vaak druk en afwezig. Ik hoop
er de komende tijd weer meer voor jullie te zijn. Hoewel je het natuurlijk nooit weet
met mij, want stilzitten is niet mijn sterkste kant. Maar een proefschrift schrijf ik
niet nog eens. Dat beloof ik. Ik hoop dat jullie vandaag trots op mij kunnen zijn en
onthouden dat niets onmogelijk is als je het echt wilt. Pa en ma, jullie houden nooit
op met voor mij te zorgen en klaar te staan wanneer dat nodig is. Ik hoop dat het
nooit andersom hoeft te zijn, maar mochten jullie mijn hulp of steun nodig hebben,
dan zal ik er zijn. Ik heb een grote schuld in te lossen in deze. Annemiek, buurvrouw
Wortman, dank voor de steun en het steeds uitleggen waarom een theoretisch model
uitwerken toch zinvol kan zijn. Tenslotte Yvonne, mijn beste vriendin sinds mijn
veertiende. Jij hebt me altijd gesteund, ondanks dat je een andere reis gemaakt hebt
de afgelopen jaren en diepere dalen gezien hebt dan ik. Ik ben onnoemelijk trots op
je.
Dan is mijn laatste woord gericht aan de wetenschap. Mijn doel was om te
promoveren en dat heb ik bereikt. Maar het is niet het einde van mijn reis door de
viii
wetenschap. Halverwege het promotietraject had ik het niet verwacht, maar ik wil
nog niet weg. Ik wil verder. Er is nog veel te leren, er zijn nog veel nieuwe ideeën
niet bedacht, nog steeds ideeën die verder uitgewerkt moeten worden en onderzoeken
om af te ronden. Bovendien heb ik zo langzamerhand mijn plek gevonden. Waar ik
hiervoor een beleidsmedewerker was met interesse voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek,
ben ik nu een wetenschapper met interesse voor beleid. Het doel is hetzelfde, beter
beleid door beter onderzoek. Mijn positie is echter veranderd. Ik ben een Erasmus
Homo Economicus geworden.
Margaretha Buurman
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation, aim, and scope
The existence and e¤ects of public service motivation (PSM), or altruism, among
bureaucrats, is a well-debated topic among economists and administrative scientists
(see e.g. Perry and Hondeghem 2008a, Besley and Ghatak 2005, Francois 2000
and 2007). However, the debate about motivation of public sector workers and its
e¤ects on the quality and quantity of public services is not restricted to academia.
Many journalists, politicians, and common civilians discuss this issue in the media,
parliament, and the streets. The reasons for this lively debate is twofold. First of
all, public sector workers are usually paid through taxes. Taxpayers want value for
money. A second reason for the public interest in the motivation of bureaucrats and
its e¤ects, is that the public, as the clients of public services, encounters the merits
and demerits of the e¤orts provided by public sector workers. All the more, since the
public often has few alternative providers to choose from. Welfare recipients have no
other option than to ask their municipality for benets. Children attending primary
schools can often only choose from a few neighbouring schools. Crime victims go to
their local police o¢ cer and the injured go to the nearest hospital.
The people employed at public agencies inuence the nature, quality, and quan-
tity of the services provided. And by doing so, public sector workers are sometimes
able to make a di¤erence in peoples lives. A caseworker can inuence the life of a
welfare recipient by deciding to help him search for a job or sanction him for not
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searching enough. The teacher inuences the accomplishments of the pupils en-
trusted to his care by giving extra attention to the ones in dire need of help. Nurses
can make the injured feel more at ease. Although the services provided are also
inuenced by the availability of budgets, agency rules, and levels of discretion as-
signed to the individuals working in those bureaucracies, many scholars conjecture
that the motivation of public sector workers is important for performance in the
public sector. Examples are Francois (2000) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), who
study the e¤ects of motivation on e¤ort provision and selection into the public sector
using theoretical models. In addition, a number of empirical studies provide some
(albeit modest) evidence for the e¤ects of motivation on (self-reported) performance
in the public sector. See Brewer (2008), Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise (2009), and
Petrovsky (2009) for overviews.
Although motivation is an important element inuencing the performance of
public sector workers, not all public sector workers will be motivated by the same
aspects of public sector work nor to the same extent. This di¤erence in motivation
and its consequences is the central focus of this thesis. The rst part of the the-
sis explores the variation in motivation between private and public sector workers
and analyzes the factors that inuence di¤erences in motivation within these two
sectors. The second part of this thesis studies a particular aspect of public sector
workersmotivation, namely the motivation towards clients, and its e¤ects on al-
location decisions and the sorting into street-level bureaucracy. Furthermore, we
study theoretically the consequences of the introduction of incentives for allocation
and sorting decisions. The lessons learned can be applied to optimize public sector
personnel policies.
The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes
some main insights from the literature and discusses the research gaps this thesis
attempts to ll. Section 3 reviews the di¤erent forms of altruism or public service
motivation in more depth. Finally, section 4 sketches an overview of the thesis.
1.2 Relation to the literature 3
1.2 Relation to the literature
If motivation is key for the quantity and quality of public services provided, the
rst question to ask is whether public service motivation or altruism among public
sector workers indeed exists. Many, many studies in public administration and more
and more studies in economics look at di¤erences in motivation among bureaucrats
using stated preferences or stated behaviour. That is, the researchers use answers
to questions on the importance of certain job aspects (e.g. useful to society as in
Lewis and Frank 2002), by observing di¤erences in job satisfaction among public
and private sector employees (e.g. Georgellis and Tabvuma 2010), by analyzing
the di¤erences in claimed donations to charity or volunteer work among public and
private sector employees (e.g. Houston 2006) or the stated levels of unpaid overtime
(Gregg et al. 2008). These studies, as well as Perry et al. (2009) in their overview
of the public service motivation (PSM) literature, in general conclude that the levels
of PSM among public sector workers are higher than among private sector workers.
Public service motivation is, however, not the only reason to seek employment in
the public sector. Other motivations, such as for example balance between time to
spend with the family and at work, are important as well (Leijsink and Steijn 2008).
Another highly relevant issue is whether public sector employees are also more risk-
averse than private sector employees. Many claim that since job security is higher
and pay is less variable in the public sector, people who are very risk averse sort into
the public sector. Introducing pay-for-performance might therefore have di¤erent
e¤ects in the public sector than in the private sector. Although the evidence from
studies using stated preferences (see e.g. Rainey 1982, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000,
and Lewis and Frank 2002) is mixed, studies using stated behaviour (Bellante and
Link 1981, Hartog et al. 2002, Guiso and Paiella 2008, Roszkowski and Grable 2009)
show that public sector workers are generally less risk tolerant than private sector
workers. While the use of stated preferences and stated behaviour is valuable in
itself and shows correlation with observed behaviour (Dohmen et al. 2009), it is also
known to su¤er from disadvantages as memory lapses, judgmental errors, socially
desirable responses, and common source bias, as mentioned by Brewer (2008: 141-
142). Therefore, we use revealed preferences data to add to the existing body of
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knowledge on the di¤erences between private and public sector employeesaltruism
and risk aversion in the rst part of this thesis.
The second part of this thesis studies the di¤erences in motivation among em-
ployees within the public sector and the consequences thereof for sorting within the
public sector. In the studies mentioned above, most of the attention is focused on
the di¤erences in motivation between public and private sector employees. However,
the public sector is a large sector which entails many di¤erent kinds of activities.
Public sector work diverges from pen-pushers at ministries to nurses in hospitals,
from secretaries behind desks to teachers in front of classes. Thus sorting based
on di¤erences in motivation may not be restricted to a choice between a public or
private sector job, but might also apply to choices between di¤erent kinds of jobs
within the public sector. Although the topic of public service motivation is well
debated, relatively little attention has been paid, especially in economics, towards
this last issue. Prendergast (2007) is one of the rst economists to take interest in
the subject why some public sector workers, as for instance social workers, seem
biased towards clients, whereas others, as policemen or tax o¢ cers, often seem bi-
ased against clients. His model predicts that the sorting into bureaucracy tends to
be bifurcated, that is, agencies employ bureaucrats with very high and very low
levels of pro-client motivation.
However, sorting might not be restricted to sorting over occupations as teaching,
policing and casework. It could also occur within those occupations. This could
be due to di¤erences in missions between employers, as for instance in Besley and
Ghatak (2005), or due to di¤erences in clientele. The job of a teacher in an inner
city school might di¤er immensely from the job of a teacher in a suburbal school due
to di¤erences in pupil population. This is exactly the research gap we try to ll in
the second part of this thesis. We focus our attention hereby on a specic type of
public sector employee: The street-level bureaucrat. That is, the employees dealing
with clients, pupils, and other citizens on a day-to-day basis. Thus, teachers, nurses,
caseworkers, and policemen. They often have a dual task of helping clients on the
one hand and sanctioning them on the other. Furthermore, by the nature of their job
they have a lot of discretion when performing their duties. This leads us to study a
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new angle in this eld of research: The consequences of motivation for the allocations
made by street-level bureaucrats, whereas others, as for example Prendergast (2007)
and Brekke and Nyborg (2008), focus on the consequences for e¤ort provision and
sorting. We assume that street-level bureaucrats care for the clients they encounter,
but not all to the same extent (see e.g. Lipsky 1980). This altruistic concern a¤ects
their job choice and also the allocation decisions they take on the job. Sorting and
behaviour are also inuenced by incentives provided by the organization. Francois
(2007) looks into the relation between incentives, e¤ort provision, and sorting. He
shows, theoretically, that introducing pay-for-performance in the public sector can
have a detrimental e¤ect on its productivity, because people with a lower motivation
will now apply for the job as well and push aside the highly motivated workers who
donate labour voluntarily (see also Delfgaauw and Dur 2007). However, the e¤ect
of incentives on allocation decisions and sorting has not been studied by economists
up to this moment. Our research therefore provides additional theoretical insights
on this subject.
O¤ course, motivation is not the only factor inuencing performance or sort-
ing. Another important factor is ability. Although research on the consequences
of di¤erences in motivation on e¤ort provision and sorting of employees into the
public sector is growing (e.g. Besley and Ghatak 2005, Prendergast 2007, Francois
2007, Brekke and Nyborg 2008, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008), relatively little research
takes ability into account as well. Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) show that returns to
ability are higher in the private sector, due to the existence of an observable public
sector motivation which represses public sector wages. Therefore, the most capable
managers self-select into the private sector. A natural way to continue this strand
of research would be to look into the consequences of unobservable motivation and
observable ability for sorting within the public sector. This is exactly what we do in
the last chapter of this thesis, when studying the e¤ects of the sorting of motivated
teachers into inner city schools, both theoretically and empirically.
6 Introduction
1.3 Motivation for public sector work
Before we give an overview of the research in the rest of this thesis, we rst take a
closer look into the concept of motivation. Motivation is according to the Longman
dictionary of contemporary English (2008) an eagerness or willingness to do some-
thing without being told or forced to do it. Motivation can be distinguished into
extrinsic motivation, that is a motivation coming from outside, as for instance
motivation provided by nancial incentives or opportunities for promotion, and in-
trinsic motivation, as a part of the nature or character of someone or something
(Longman 2008). People can be intrinsically motivated to carry out a task, because
they enjoy doing so or care for the results achieved. The motivation of people to
sort into the public sector can be divided along the same lines.
Perry and Hondeghem (2008b: 3) make a useful distinction. First, they allow for
the existence of public sector motivation, that is, more extrinsic reasons to sort into
the public sector, as for instance the possibilities public sector work o¤ers to combine
having children with a job, job security, social benets, education and the social
status of being a public servant. This as opposed to public service motivation,
which appeals to the concept of intrinsic motivation. Perry and Wise (1990: 368)
dene public service motivation as an individuals predisposition to respond to
motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations.
Perry (1996: 20) argues that this concept has four underlying dimensions, namely
attraction to public policy making, commitment to the public interest, compassion,
and self-sacrice The rst dimension could be regarded as a particular form of
intrinsic motivation, namely the motivation to carry out the job itself. That is,
the motivation stems from what you do, not particularly for whom or why you are
doing it. The three latter dimensions of public service motivation appeal more to
the concept of altruism, frequently used in economics.
Altruism is the wish to help others without immediate benets to oneself. Or to
put it more formally, altruism is a preference for the good of some other people in
itself, and it also denotes acting in favour of this good for this motive(Kolm 2006:
8). Altruism is a very broad concept. A rst distinction that we can make is based on
the subject of altruism. Some people might be altruistic towards everybody, needy or
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not, while others might only help the ones in dire need or people to whom they have
feelings of empathy, compassion or sympathy. Thus, altruism can be directed to all
people in society, but also to the group of people one feels most connected to, such as
family, friends and acquaintances (see also Baron et al. 2009, Kolm 2006). A second
distinction is between pure and impure altruism. Purely altruistic or output-oriented
altruistic people care for the level of giving to other people, regardless if they donate
themselves or others do so. Impurely altruistic people enjoy giving in itself. That
is, they enjoy the warm-glowof giving (Andreoni 1989, Francois and Vlassopoulos
2008). Or, in a work context, they enjoy exerting e¤ort in for instance the public
sector, even though they realize that, when they would quit their job, others would
replace them leaving the total amount of public services provided constant. Impure
altruism gives rise to non-pecuniary benets from working in the public sector and
relates to the concept of action-oriented altruism as introduced by Francois and
Vlassopoulos (2008). The di¤erences between a purely altruistic public servant and
an impurely altruistic public servant is, that the rst only considers employment
in the public sector when the contributions of others would be below his own level
of contributions. For instance, when he has a higher ability to deliver services or
exerts more e¤ort than the others. Then, by working in the public sector he could
add something extra to the public good produced, as he prefers more of the public
good to less. Impurely altruistic workers would consider public sector employment,
because of the sheer love of the work they do in the public sector. As soon as the
non-pecuniary benets of this involvement in public sector work and the pecuniary
benets are above the outside option utility, the impurely altruistic employee would
select into the public sector. This could imply that even when there are more
capable employees available, the impurely altruistic employee would prefer to do the
job himself, because of the non-pecuniary benets it renders him.
A nal distinction among the di¤erent forms of altruism worth mentioning here,
is between altruism as the sheer care for another persons well-being by taking his
utility into account and more paternalistic forms of altruism. This paternalism
implies that a public servant does not take the utility a client derives from receiving
a good into account, but that the public servant derives utility of the allocation itself
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of a particular good or service to the client.
All the di¤erent forms and aspects of altruism can coexist next to each other.
That is, some public sector employees might be motivated by purely altruistic mo-
tives, while others mainly enjoy the warm-glow of exerting e¤ort in the public sector,
and some are motivated by both.
1.4 Overview of the thesis
The di¤erence in motivation among employees in the public domain and the con-
sequences thereof is the central theme of this thesis. The rst part of this thesis,
chapter two, focuses on the di¤erence in motivation between private and public sec-
tor workers empirically. The second part of this thesis comprises chapter three and
four and studies the e¤ects of altruistic feelings towards clients among street-level
bureaucrats, both theoretically and empirically.
In the rst part of this thesis, chapter two, we assess whether public sector
employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than
employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed
rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale survey were o¤ered
a substantial reward and could choose between a widely redeemable gift certicate,
a lottery ticket, or making a donation to a charity. The rst question we answer is
whether public sector employees are less likely to choose the risky option (lottery)
and more likely to choose the pro-social option (charity) rather than the safe and
selsh option (gift certicate) than private sector workers. Second, we examine
whether the inclination to donate to charity depends on an employees tenure in
the public or private sector as to get some insight in whether working in the public
sector leads employees to adapt to a public service ethic or that the more altruistic
people are more likely to self-select into the public sector. Third, using the reward-
question, we only get an indication of peoples marginal willingness to make risky
and altruistic choices. However, there might be a di¤erence between the marginal
willingness and average willingness to make those choices. If people already take
many risks during working hours or have an insecure income, they might not be so
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willing to choose the risky option at the margin. Or if people donate much labour
to the public cause, they might be less willing to choose to donate to charity at the
margin. We cannot test this hypothesis for the risky choice, since we do not have
any additional information about the level of risk employees take at work. However,
we do have an indication about the labour donations people make by using a survey
question which asks whether people consider their salary to be su¢ cient for the work
that they do.
In the second part of this thesis we look into the di¤erences in motivation towards
clients among public servants. Chapter three develops a model of street-level bu-
reaucrats who di¤er in their client-oriented altruism and have a dual task of helping
some clients and sanctioning others. The dual nature of the job implies that it is not
straightforward what kind of people should optimally be hired by such street-level
bureaucracies. While the helping aspect of the job makes altruistic or client-oriented
people the ideal candidates, these people are likely to take clientsinterests too much
into account when encountering clients who should be sanctioned. In addition to this
normative issue of what would be optimal candidates, the positive issue of what kind
of people nd a career in a street-level bureaucracy actually worthwhile is perhaps
even more important. While assessment centers and talented HR managers may
give agencies a glimpse of job applicantsmotivations, their true motivations often
remain hidden, implying that agencies should use other, more implicit instruments
to promote self-selection of the most desired types of workers. These may include
paying low base salaries and o¤ering bonuses for good performance.
This chapter studies these issues by developing a model of a street-level bureau-
cracy, such as an employment agency, which serves di¤erent types of clients, some
of which are in need of help (willing but unable clients) and others who should be
sanctioned (non-willing clients). In addition, there exists a group of clients who
should neither be helped nor sanctioned (willing and able clients). The agency hires
bureaucrats whose task is to meet clients, assess their type, and allocate either help,
no help, or a sanction. Bureaucrats are hired from a pool of potential job appli-
cants who di¤er in their altruism towards clients they meet, ranging from complete
indi¤erence to highly altruistic. The agency cannot observe job applicantstypes.
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However, it can a¤ect the sorting of job applicants by its personnel policy. We
start with a simple case where bureaucrats are paid at wages to see which alloca-
tions they make and which types of agents sort into bureaucracy. Next, we analyse
what happens when pay-for-performance is introduced. Furthermore, we look at the
consequences of di¤erences in client composition for the sorting of bureaucrats.
Chapter four presents a di¤erent model to explain the sorting of another group
of street-level bureaucrats: The sorting of teachers into underprivileged schools.
Teachers in the model di¤er in observable ability, as for instance education and ex-
perience, and in unobservable motivation to work with underprivileged children. It is
not clear beforehand which types of teachers will be hired by inner city or underpriv-
ileged schools. These schools might hire teachers who combine high motivation and
low ability. However, other combinations of ability and motivation among inner city
school teachers are possible as well. In this chapter we rst come up with empirical
predictions based on the analysis of the sorting model. Next, we test these predic-
tions empirically using unique Dutch survey data on the motivation and ability of
teachers, where ability is measured by years of experience and level of education and
intrinsic motivation is measured using questionnaire items on motivation towards
pupils.
Chapter ve provides a summary of the results, conclusions, and directions for
future research.
Chapter 2
Public Sector Employees: Risk
Averse and Altruistic?
Joint with Robert Dur and Seth van den Bossche
2.1 Introduction
It is often argued that preferences and work motivations of public sector employees
di¤er from those of private sector employees. Some of these di¤erences stem from
sectoral di¤erences in the nature of jobs. Many jobs in the public sector involve help-
ing people in need or contributing to society at large, rendering these jobs attractive
to people who have a strong willingness to serve others or the public interest.1 An-
other, less honorable motivation for seeking a job in the public sector is avoidance
of risk. In most countries, employers in the public sector o¤er higher job security
and less volatile wage compensation than employers in the private sector (Clark and
Postel-Vinay 2009, Bonin et al. 2007). As a result, highly risk-averse people may
nd it attractive to opt for a job in the public sector (Bellante and Link 1981).
This chapter employs a unique dataset to assess whether public sector employees
1See the large literature in public administration on public service motivation(e.g. Perry and
Wise 1990, Perry 1996, Rainey and Steinbauer 1999, Wright 2001) and several recent theoretical
studies in economics (e.g. Dixit 2001, Besley and Gathak 2005, Francois 2007, Delfgaauw and
Dur 2008). Perry et al. (2009) and Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) provide overviews of these
literatures.
12 Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?
have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than people
employed in the private sector. In contrast to previous empirical studies, we ex-
plore revealed preferences rather than stated preferences. Our data come from a
questionnaire held in 2000 covering more than 3000 employees in The Netherlands.
Upon completing the questionnaire, each participant was o¤ered a reward worth
25 guilders (11,34 euro; about 15% of daily disposable household income in 2000).
Participants could choose between receiving a widely redeemable gift certicate, re-
ceiving a national lottery ticket, or donating the reward to a charity of their choice.
We hypothesize that, as compared to private sector employees, public sector em-
ployees more likely choose to donate to charity (the safe and pro-social choice) and
less likely choose the lottery ticket (the risky choice) rather than choose the gift
certicate (the safe and selsh choice).
Our results lend strong support to the hypothesis that public sector employees
are more risk averse than private sector employees. People holding a public sector job
are much less likely to choose the lottery ticket rather than the gift certicate. This
holds both before and after controlling for income, gender, age, and several other
observable characteristics. The di¤erence is substantial: Our estimation results
imply that the odds for a public sector worker of choosing the lottery ticket rather
than the gift certicate are 0.68 times the odds for a private sector worker.
We nd only weak evidence for the hypothesis that public sector employees more
likely choose the pro-social option of donating to charity rather than choose the
selsh option of taking the gift certicate. On the contrary, our analysis reveals that,
after controlling for observable individual characteristics, public sector employees are
signicantly less likely to donate to charity. The odds for a public sector worker of
donating his reward to charity rather than taking the gift certicate are 0.74 times
the odds for a private sector worker. Behind this average gure is a remarkable
relation between inclinations to donate to charity and employees tenure in a public
sector organization. Employees who have just started a job in the public sector are
more likely than their private sector counterparts to donate to charity rather than
to take the gift certicate. However, within a few years, this di¤erence disappears
and later on even reverses. Importantly, we nd no tenure e¤ects for private sector
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workers inclination to donate to charity, nor does tenure a¤ect the likelihood of
choosing the risky option in either of the sectors. Moreover, the tenure e¤ect for
public sector workers inclination to donate to charity remains intact when we allow
for public-sector specic age e¤ects.
This tenure e¤ect is well in line with the observations made by Blau (1960: 347,
348) in his study of case workers in a public welfare agency. He nds that the at-
titudes of most new case workers toward clients were strongly positive, if somewhat
sentimental and idealistic (...) the new case worker was typically full of sympathy
for clientsproblems. But as he encountered clients who blamed him personally for
not helping them enough, even though agency procedure limited him, and clients
met his trusting attitude by cheating and lying, the newcomer tended to experience
a reality shock(...) This disillusioning experience might make a worker bitter and
callous, or induce him to leave the job, and even those who did not have either
of these extreme reactions tended to change their orientation to clients. In sum,
experience increased the case workers ability to serve recipients but decreased his
interest in doing so.(Blau 1960: 359). Likewise, Van Maanen (1975) reports swift
declines in motivation among police recruits during their rst year in a big-city
department, which are partly accounted for by more pessimistic beliefs about the
likelihood of receiving favorable responses from the community to working espe-
cially hard. Similar ndings are reported by De Cooman et al. (2009) using data
from a repeated survey among Flemish teachers who just started their professional
career. They nd that, within two years time, work values became somewhat less
ideological and more self-oriented.Further, teachers attached greater importance
to extrinsic values, including rewards, security, career, and recognition, and less
importance to altruistic values including social service, though these changes were
relatively small.(p. 105-106)2
It is important to note that our analysis gives an indication of peoples marginal
willingness to accept risk and to make charitable contributions; it does not reveal
peoples overall risk aversion or pro-social attitude. The two need not coincide.
For instance, employees in the private sector may generally be more risk tolerant
2Similar patterns have been observed among volunteers, see Tschirhart et al. (2001) and
references therein.
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than public sector employees, but exhibit more risk averse behavior at the margin
because in their professional life they are already exposed to more risk than public
sector employees. Likewise, public sector employees may be less willing to donate
their reward to charity as they already serve the public interest in their professional
life on a day-to-day basis. Unfortunately, we lack data on how much risk people
face and how much they contribute to the public interest in daily life. However,
we do nd some indirect evidence for the idea that public sector employees less
likely donate to charity because they feel they already contribute a lot to society
at work. One of the questions in the survey asked people whether they consider
their salary to be su¢ cient for the work that they do. People responding negatively
to this question less likely donate their reward to charity rather than take the gift
certicate. Importantly, this e¤ect is signicantly stronger for employees in the
public sector, both statistically and economically (the e¤ect is twice as large). This
suggests that public sector employees consider the contributions they make on the job
as a substitute for making charitable donations. Feeling underpaid explains a large
part of the average di¤erence between pro-social inclinations in the sectors. This
is partly due to the stronger e¤ect of feeling underpaid on public sector employees
likelihood to donate. Further, a much larger fraction of employees in the public
sector feel that they are underpaid (56% in the public sector as compared to 42%
in the private sector). Comparing dissatised employees in the public and private
sector, we nd no signicant di¤erence in the early stages of the career, while later on
public sector employees are signicantly less likely to donate. Satised public sector
employees signicantly more often choose to donate in the early stage of their career,
while later on there is no signicant di¤erence with their private sector counterparts.
Although we can only assess peoples risk and pro-social attitude at the margin,
we do think our results are of great relevance for recent debates about remunera-
tion of employees in the public sector (see, e.g., Burgess and Ratto 2003, National
Commission on the Public Service 2003, OECD 2005a and 2008). First, measur-
ing tolerance for additional risk of public sector employees gives some indication of
the e¤ects of introducing or strengthening pay-for-performance for workers in the
public sector. Making employeespay more dependent of their performance usually
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increases the risks employees face, as their performance not only depends on their
e¤ort, but also on random events. Our results suggest that public sector employees
have a stronger distaste for taking risks than their counterparts in the private sec-
tor, implying that (with the current workforce) pay-for-performance is a more costly
instrument to induce e¤ort in the public sector than in the private sector. Sec-
ond, measuring pro-social inclinations at the margin gives an idea about how much
society can rely on public sector employeesaltruistic motivations when additional
helping opportunities arise. Our results give rise to some pessimism: Many public
sector employees feel that they are underpaid relative to the contributions that they
make, which makes them hesitant to provide further contributions.
We proceed as follows. The next section briey describes earlier studies on di¤er-
ences in preferences and motivations between public and private sector employees.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5
concludes.
2.2 Related literature
A rich literature in public administration and a growing number of studies in eco-
nomics have examined di¤erences in preferences and motivations between public and
private sector employees. Existing empirical studies can be divided into two groups:
Those that use stated preferences or motivations (e.g., by asking respondents how
important job security or helping other people is to them) and those that infer prefer-
ences and motivations from stated behavior (e.g., self-reported donations to charity,
self-reported purchase of insurance, stated willingness to pay for a hypothetical lot-
tery, et cetera). Our study is the rst using revealed preferences data rather than
stated preferences data; that is, we use data on what people actually do, not on what
they say they do or what they claim is important to them. This has some clear and
well-known advantages. In particular, stated preferences data may be vulnerable to
self-stereotyping, self-serving biases, lack of attention by respondents, and strategic
motives (Roszkowski and Grable 2007, Dohmen et al. 2009). For instance, it has
been shown that in experiments with hypothetical payments subjects appear more
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generous and more risk-preferring than when real money is at stake (Camerer and
Hogarth 1999).
Most studies comparing public and private sector workers have assessed in how
far public sector workers have a particular willingness to serve the public interest,
to help others, and to make personal sacrices in order to do so. For instance,
Rainey (1982) and Lewis and Frank (2002) nd that public sector workers more
often rate work attributes such as Useful to societyand Help others as (very)
important (see also Kilpatrick et al. 1964, Buchanan 1975, Crewson 1997, Houston
2000, and Steijn 2008 among others). Houston (2006) uses data on self-reported
pro-social behavior, such as volunteering, donating blood, and making charitable
contributions. He nds that nonprot and public sector employees are more likely
to report being a volunteer and blood donor, while no such relation is found for
charitable contributions. Likewise, Brewer (2003) shows that public sector employees
report higher levels of participation in nonpolitical civic a¤airs. Recently, Gregg et
al. (2009) exploit British panel data and nd that individuals who are more inclined
to donate labor (as measured by stated unpaid overtime) select into the non-prot
sector.
Other studies have examined whether public and private sector workers di¤er
in risk preferences. Studies using stated preferences about job security nd mixed
evidence (see e.g. Rainey 1982, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000, and Lewis and Frank
2002). By contrast, Bellante and Link (1981) use answers to questions like the
condition and insurance of cars owned, the use of seat belts, the extent of medical
coverage, and smoking and drinking habits to construct a measure of risk aversion.
They nd that, thus dened, risk-averse people are more likely to be employed in
the public sector than in the private sector. Likewise, Roszkowski and Grable (2009)
use data on clients of nancial planners who had completed a test of nancial risk
tolerance. They nd that public sector employees score signicantly lower than
private sector employees, even after controlling for a rich set of observables. Similar
results are obtained by Hartog et al. (2002) for The Netherlands and by Guiso and
Paiella (2008) for Italy using large-scale survey data on peoples willingness to pay
for a hypothetical lottery and for a hypothetical risky security, respectively. Several
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recent papers in economics have added to this body of evidence using the 2004 wave
of the German Socio-Economic Panel data, which contains questions on peoples
attitude towards risk-taking. Bonin et al. (2007) show that working in the public
sector implies a signicantly lower earnings risk than working in the private sector
and that individuals who are less risk tolerant more likely end up working in an
occupation with low earnings risk. Using the same data, Luechinger et al. (2007)
and Pfeifer (2008) directly estimate the e¤ect of self-reported risk attitude on sector
of employment and report similar ndings: People who are less willing to take risk
are more likely to be found in the public sector.
2.3 Data and empirical strategy
We use data from the TNO Work Situation Survey (TAS), a Dutch survey devel-
oped by TNO (an independent research organization, partly funded by the Dutch
government) in cooperation with the Ministry of Social A¤airs and Employment.
The survey was conducted in 2000 among about 8000 employees and self-employed
persons in all sectors of the economy. The response rate was 53%, resulting in 4334
respondents (see Smulders et al. 2001 and Bakhuys Roozenboom et al. 2007).3 The
survey includes a rich set of demographic variables and data on a wide range of
work-related topics, such as employment conditions, pay, hours worked, job and pay
satisfaction, attitude towards work, intention to leave, job security, health-related
issues, and workplace characteristics.
Our key variable of interest is the type of reward chosen by the respondents
for completing the survey (see Appendix A for the exact question and possible
answers).4 Respondents could choose between receiving a widely redeemable gift
certicate, receiving a national lottery ticket, or donating the reward to a charity of
their choice. All types of reward had the same face value: 25 guilders (11.34 euro),
3See for more information in English: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/ na-
tional/countries/netherlands2005_6_tas.htm
4The survey was repeated in 2002 and 2004. We do not use these data in our analysis because
in 2002 the data-collecting company did not report data on our key variable and in 2004 the reward
for respondents was substantially lower and di¤ered between completing the internet questionnaire
(10 euros) and the written questionnaire (7,50 euros).
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about 15% of daily disposable household income in 2000.5
Since respondents indicated their main economic sector in the survey, but not
whether their organization belongs to the public or private sector, we recoded the
main economic sectors into public or private, using a data le we obtained on request
from Statistics Netherlands. The sectors thus included in the public sector are ed-
ucation, hospitals, nursing homes, welfare work, and central and local government.
Four economic sectors contain a substantial mix of private and public organizations;
we omit these sectors from our analyses.6 Furthermore, we conne ourselves to em-
ployees, leaving out the self-employed, owners of rms, and (unpaid) family workers.
We also restrict the sample to respondents between 20 and 64 years of age, because
there are very few respondents under 20 years of age and 65 is the regular Dutch
retirement age. These selections leave us with a sample of 3126 respondents.
Our empirical strategy is to examine whether an otherwise comparable respon-
dent di¤ers in his choice of reward depending on the sector of employment. If public
sector workers are more altruistic and more risk averse at the margin, we should nd
that public sector workers are more likely to donate the reward to charity and less
likely to choose the lottery ticket rather than to opt for the gift certicate. Since our
dependent variable has three potential categorical outcomes (lottery ticket, charity,
gift certicate) we analyze our data using a multinomial logistic regression model.
We take gift certicate as our reference category, as this is the safe and selsh alter-
native.7
Obviously, the choice of the reward does not only depend on a respondents risk
5As can be seen from Appendix A, donating to charity is the only option where the respondent
remains completely anonymous, which is potentially worrisome. However, the research organiza-
tion and data-collecting company are both well-known and trusted companies in the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the research is not conducted on behalf of their employers, but on behalf of the Min-
istry of Social A¤airs and TNO. Thus, it is not very likely that many respondents worried about
their anonymity when choosing their reward.
6These four sectors are: Other type of industry (which also comprises workers in sheltered
employment), other type of transport and communication (which includes public transport), other
type of healthcare (among others general practitioners and midwifes) and culture, sports, and
recreation.
7We also ran multinomial probit regressions as well as binary logistic regressions (grouping
charity and gift certicate as the safe options; grouping gift certicate and lottery as the selsh
options; taking only the gift certicate as the selsh option, dropping the lottery ticket; and taking
only the gift certicate as the safe option, dropping the charity). All these models produced results
similar to the multinomial logistic regression model and are for brevity not reported.
2.3 Data and empirical strategy 19
preferences and pro-social attitude, but also on other characteristics such as income.
People with a low income may be more likely to choose the gift certicate, as this
could be exchanged for basic necessities such as food or clothing. Therefore, we
control for net monthly income in the regression analyses, as well as for whether
the respondent is the breadwinner of his household. Since our categorical income
measure is somewhat crude, especially in the highest category, we also add man-
agerial position to our analysis. This is likely to pick up some additional income
e¤ects. Moreover, we include the following demographic controls: Age, sex, region,
education, marital status, and the number of children living at the home.
An important issue is whether public and private sector employees had di¤erent
attitudes before they sorted into their sector of employment or changed their atti-
tudes afterwards. To account for such tenure e¤ects, we add employees tenure at
the organization and interact it with the employees sector of employment.8 Finally,
we check whether feelings of underpayment a¤ect employees choice of reward using
the question Is your salary su¢ cient for the work that you do?and we also interact
this variable with the employees sector of employment.
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of our subsample. Some interesting
di¤erences between public and private sector employees are visible. First of all, pri-
vate sector employees choose the lottery ticket (48%) more often than public sector
employees (36%). Public sector employees on the other hand choose to donate to
charity (23%) somewhat more often than private sector employees (21%). Further,
there are substantial di¤erences in socio-demographic variables. Public sector work-
ers are slightly older on average than private sector employees, 44 versus 42 years
old, and are far more often female, 42% versus 18%. Public sector employees are
(therefore) also less likely to be the breadwinner in the household than private sector
employees (67% versus 79%). The majority of public sector employees completed
higher vocational education or university studies (66%), against only a minority of
private sector employees (36%). Nevertheless, the di¤erences in income are not that
large.
8Unfortunately, we lack data on respondents sectoral tenure.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs
Public
Sector
Private
Sector Total
Reward: 3126
Gift certificate 41.0% 31.3% 34.3%
Lottery ticket 35.7% 48.1% 44.2%
Charity 23.3% 20.7% 21.5%
Sex: Male (%) 3122 57.6% 82.4% 74.8%
Age:
Mean (years) 3126 44.2 41.9 42.6
Standard Deviation (8.8) (9.3) (9.2)
Education: 3058
No education attended/finished 0.2% 0.6% 0.5%
Primary school 0.7% 2.8% 2.2%
Lower secondary school 6.2% 21.4% 16.6%
Intermediate secondary school or intermediate
vocational training 26.9% 39.6% 35.6%
Higher secondary school or higher vocational
training 50.7% 28.2% 35.2%
(Post-) University 15.2% 7.5% 9.9%
Net monthly income: 2997
Less than fl. 500,- 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
fl.  500,- until fl. 1000,- 1.9% 1.5% 1.6%
fl. 1000,- until fl. 1500,- 3.8% 3.0% 3.3%
fl. 1500,- until fl. 2000,- 7.4% 4.4% 5.4%
fl. 2000,- until fl. 2500,- 11.8% 9.9% 10.5%
fl. 2500,- until fl. 3000,- 14.3% 19.3% 17.7%
fl. 3000,- until fl. 3500,- 16.6% 18.4% 17.8%
fl. 3500,- until fl. 4000,- 13.6% 15.0% 14.5%
fl. 4000,- until fl. 5000,- 19.7% 15.7% 17.0%
fl. 5000,- until fl. 6000,- 5.6% 6.2% 6.0%
fl. 6000,- or more 4.7% 5.9% 5.5%
Breadwinner: Yes (%) 3105 67% 79% 76%
Marital Status: 3125
Married/cohabitating without children living at
home 25.9% 25.0% 25.3%
Married/cohabitating with children living at home 53.5% 59.9% 58.0%
Single parent 6.0% 2.2% 3.4%
Single 14.6% 12.8% 13.4%
Number of children living at home
Mean 3125 1.2 1.2 1.2
Standard Deviation 1.2 1.1 1.2
(Continued on the next page)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (continued)
Variable Obs
Public
Sector
Private
Sector Total
Managerial position/employer?: 3113
No 69.8% 62.1% 64.5%
1-4 employees 10.3% 16.7% 14.7%
5-9 employees 5.5% 9.3% 8.2%
10-19 employees 6.2% 5.4% 5.7%
20-49 employees 4.8% 4.0% 4.2%
50 employees 3.4% 2.5% 2.8%
Province: 3126
Groningen 5.0% 3.1% 3.7%
Friesland 4.1% 4.3% 4.3%
Drenthe 4.5% 4.2% 4.3%
Overijssel 6.9% 7.4% 7.3%
Gelderland 12.5% 12.4% 12.4%
Utrecht 3.0% 3.9% 3.6%
Noord Holland 15.2% 16.8% 16.3%
Zuid Holland 23.6% 23.4% 23.4%
Zeeland 3.1% 2.4% 2.6%
Noord Brabant 12.3% 13.3% 13.0%
Limburg 7.8% 7.2% 7.4%
Flevoland 2.0% 1.6% 1.7%
Tenure:
Mean (years) 3098 13.8 11.8 12.4
Standard Deviation (10.1) (10.3) (10.3)
Salary sufficient for the work you do? : Yes (%) 2887 44.5% 58.3% 53.9%
Total number of observations 966 2160 3126
Note : Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the unweighted subsample used in our regression analysis.
There is, however, a large di¤erence in the answers to the question Is your salary
su¢ cient for the work you do?. Less than half of public sector employees answers
this question in the a¢ rmative (44%), while more than half of the private sector
employees is satised with their salary (58%). Finally, tenure among public sector
employees in our sample is also longer than that of private sector employees, 13.8
versus 11.8 years.
2.4 Results
Table 2 reports the results of our multinomial logistic regression analyses.9 In model
1 we take up the public sector dummy as the sole explanatory variable. Public sector
9For ease of presentation, we treated managerial position, income, and education as continuous
variables in table 2. We also ran regressions using the ordinal categories of these variables. This
gave nearly the same results at the same signicance levels.
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employees are, as expected, signicantly less likely than private sector employees to
choose the lottery ticket rather than the gift certicate. However, in contrast to
our expectations, public sector employees are also less likely than private sector
employees to opt for a donation to charity rather than for the gift certicate.10 This
e¤ect, however, is not signicant and relatively small. Model 1 only explains little
variation in the choice of reward. Although it does ne in predicting the choice of the
lottery ticket, it performs extremely poor in predicting the choice of the charity. As
we noticed in the previous section, there are many more di¤erences between public
and private sector employees than just sector of employment. Therefore, we add
several controls in model 2.
Remarkably, model 2 shows results quite close to model 1: Compared to private
sector employees, public sector employees are 0.74 times as likely to choose the
charity rather than the gift certicate. This time, the e¤ect is signicant at the 5%-
level. Public sector employees are also signicantly less likely to choose the lottery
ticket over the gift certicate, as in the previous model. Our estimation results imply
that the odds for a public sector worker of choosing the lottery ticket rather than
the gift certicate are 0.68 times the odds for a private sector worker.
The choice for the lottery ticket is signicantly related to some of the demographic
variables. Women are less likely to choose the lottery ticket over the gift certicate,
as are employees with a higher level of education. Couples with children living at
home are more likely to choose the lottery ticket than singles. However, the larger
the number of children, the less likely employees choose the lottery ticket. Finally,
income and other variables a¤ecting peoples budget do not really matter.11 Income
does, however, matter for donating to charity. All budget-related variables show that
as peoples budget increases, the odds of choosing the charity over the gift certicate
increase as well. A higher income or higher managerial position increases the odds
of choosing the charity over the gift certicate signicantly, as does not being the
10The multinomial logitistic regression assumes that the odds ratio between two choices is in-
dependent of the other alternatives. Hence the di¤erence with table 1. We also estimated a
multinomial probit model, which relaxes the independence restrictions. Results are similar to
those of the multinomial logitistic regressions reported here.
11The results for the control variables are close to those of Hartog et al. (2002) and Dohmen et
al. (2009), except for the e¤ect of education, which is positive in these earlier studies.
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breadwinner. Furthermore, some of the demographic variables also have an e¤ect.
Couples with children living at home are less likely to choose the charity over the
gift certicate than singles, although this e¤ect is only signicant at the 10%-level.
Older employees are more likely to choose the charity over the gift certicate, as are
employees with a higher level of education.12 Lastly, note that the t of model 2 is
substantially better than that of the previous model.13
Model 3 examines whether and if so how public sector workers risk and pro-
social attitudes develop during their career. As we discussed in the Introduction,
several earlier studies have found that altruistic motivations decline with tenure
among public sector employees (Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975, and Cooman et al.
2009). We therefore add to model 2 employees tenure at the organization as well
as tenure interacted with the employees sector, and similarly for tenure squared
to allow for nonlinear e¤ects.14 Tenure does not a¤ect the chances of taking the
lottery ticket rather than the gift certicate in either of the sectors. Figure 1a
plots the point-estimates of the combined public sector dummies against tenure.
Clearly, public sector employees are signicantly more risk averse than private sector
employees for almost all levels of tenure and there is no clear pattern in this di¤erence
over peoples tenure. However, we do nd strong tenure di¤erences for public sector
employees in the odds of taking the charity rather than the gift certicate, while
there is no such tenure e¤ect for private sector employees. Figure 1b, which is again
based on the estimation results of model 3, shows that at the start of their careers,
public sector employees are more likely to donate to charity rather than take the
gift certicate than their private sector counterparts, although this is e¤ect is not
signicant. After a few years, this (insignicant) positive e¤ect has disappeared and
12Houston (2006) reports similar ndings for these socio-demographic variables, except for gen-
der. He obtains a signicant positive e¤ect of being female on the odds of donating to charity,
whereas we nd a negative, but not signicant e¤ect.
13We included ethnic minority, rm size, and age squared as additional controls in previous
regressions. However, as those variables had no signicant e¤ect, we left them out of our nal
regressions.
14We also ran regressions including interaction terms of age and public sector so as to rule out
that any possible tenure e¤ects are actually driven by respondents age. The interaction e¤ect with
age was never signicant, nor did it change the e¤ects and signicance of tenure. Obviously, since
our data are cross-sectional, we can not completely rule out that tenure e¤ects are intertwined with
cohort and selection e¤ects.
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even reverses. Indeed, during the main part of their careers, public sector employees
are signicantly less likely to donate to charity than private sector employees.
One of the reasons for a negative e¤ect of tenure on pro-social inclinations of
public sector employees might be that their tenure-wage prole is atter than that of
private sector employees, which may give rise to growing feelings of underpayment.
We control for these feelings of underpayment using the variable Is your salary
su¢ cient for the work that you do? and its interaction with the public sector
dummy. We are particularly interested in whether public sector employeeslikelihood
of donating to charity is more strongly a¤ected by feelings of underpayment than
that of private sector employees. This would support the idea that donations to
charity and contributions to society at the workplace are considered as substitutes
by public sector employees.
Model 4 shows no signicant e¤ect of feeling underpaid on the odds of choosing
the lottery ticket over the gift certicate. The other coe¢ cients explaining the
choice of the lottery over the gift certicate are not much a¤ected. Figure 2a plots
the point-estimates of the combined public sector dummies for employees who think
their salary is su¢ cient for the work they do. During the main part of their career
public sector employees are signicantly less likely to choose the lottery ticket over
the gift certicate than private sector employees. This pattern is almost identical
for employees who do feel underpaid, as we can see in gure 2b.
We nd striking e¤ects of feelings of underpayment on the odds of choosing
the charity over the gift certicate. Employees who feel underpaid are signicantly
less likely to donate to charity, and particularly so in the public sector. The odds
for a dissatised employee of donating his reward to charity rather than taking
the gift certicate are 0.68 and 0.41 times the odds for a satised employee, in
respectively the private and public sector.15 As is clear from table 2, this di¤erence
between private and public sector workers is also statistically signicant. We thus
nd a clear indication that public sector employees consider donations to charity
as a substitute for their job-related net contribution to society. Further, it can be
seen from table 2 that among the satised employees, public sector employees are
15The odds for the public sector can easily be computed using the estimated coe¢ cients in table
2.
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signicantly more likely to donate than private sector employees at the start of their
career. However, as before, within a few years this e¤ect disappears, see gure
2c. Figure 2d plots the point estimates of the public sector dummy for dissatised
employees. Clearly, among these employees, there is no signicant di¤erence in pro-
social inclinations between public and private sector employees at the start of their
career. As tenure increases, public sector employees become less and less inclined
to donate to charity. After about seven years, the di¤erence becomes statistically
signicant. Comparing gures 1b, 2c, and 2d, it follows that controlling for feelings of
underpayment hardly a¤ects the tenure prole in public sector employees inclination
to donate to charity. Inspection of the data shows that, somewhat surprisingly, there
is no clear relationship between feelings of underpayment and tenure. Hence, other
factors seem to play a role here, e.g. Blau (1960)s disillusionment e¤ect, which we
discussed in the Introduction.
26 Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?
Table 2: Results of multinomial logistic regression
Lottery ticket #
B exp B B exp B
Public Sector -.568*** 0.567 -.379*** .684
(.089) (.102)
Female -.543*** 0.581
(.138)
Age (years) .008 1.008
(.005)
Education -.129** .879
(.055)
Income .025 1.025
(.030)
Breadwinner (1=No) .116 1.123
(.132)
Marital Status:
- Married/cohabitating without children living at home .257 1.293
(.167)
- Married/cohabitating with children living at home .497** 1.644
(.194)
- Single parent -.044 .957
(.299)
- Single 0a .
Children living at home (number) -.215*** .807
(.065)
Managerial position .053 1.055
(.037)
Regional Dummies No Yes
Tenure
Tenure_Squared
Tenure*Public Sector
Tenure_Squared*Public Sector
Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No)
Public Sector*Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No)
Intercept .430*** .248
(.049) (.468)
% Correct Predicted Lottery 75.1% 76.0%
(Continued on the next page)
Model 1 Model 2
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Table 2: Results of multinomial logistic regression (continued)
Lottery ticket #
B exp B B exp B
Public Sector -.507** .602 -.431*  .650
(.209) (.244)
Female -.546*** .580 -.570***  .566
(.139) (.145)
Age (years) .013** 1.013 .016** 1.016
(.006) (.006)
Education -.147*** .863 -.144** .865
(.057) (.059)
Income .030 1.030 .026 1.026
(.031) (.033)
Breadwinner (1=No) .116 1.123 .173 1.189
(.133) (.139)
Marital Status:
- Married/cohabitating without children living at home 0.262 1.299 .253 1.288
(.168) (.176)
- Married/cohabitating with children living at home .515*** 1.673 .457** 1.580
(.195) (.203)
- Single parent -.064 .938 -.158 .854
(.303) (.313)
- Single 0a . 0a .
Children living at home (number) -216*** .806 -.204*** .815
(.066) ( .068)
Managerial position .053 1.055 .049 1.050
(.037) (.039)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Tenure -.016 .984 -.014 .986
(.017) (.018)
Tenure_Squared .000 1.000 .000 1.000
(.001) (.001)
Tenure*Public Sector .020 1.020 .002 1.002
(.031) (.032)
Tenure_Squared*Public Sector .000 1.000 .000 1.000
(.001) (.001)
Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No) -.057 .944
(.116)
Public Sector*Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No) .029 1.030
(.199)
Intercept .193 -.041
(.482) (.511)
% Correct Predicted Lottery 76.2% 74.0%
(Continued on the next page)
Model 3 Model 4
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Table 2: Results of multinomial logistic regression (continued)
Charity#
B exp B B exp B
Public Sector -.153 .858 -.297** .743
(.103) (.121)
Female -.178 .837
(.160)
Age (years) .026*** 1.026
(.006)
Education .138** 1.148
(.070)
Income .178*** 1.195
(.037)
Breadwinner (1=No) .431*** 1.539
(.156)
Marital Status:
- Married/cohabitating without children living at home -.070 .932
(.192)
- Married/cohabitating with children living at home -.405* .667
(-.229)
- Single parent -.192 .825
(.338)
- Single 0a .
Children living at home (number) -.066 .936
(.076)
Managerial position .095** 1.099
(.042)
Regional Dummies No Yes
Tenure
Tenure_Squared
Tenure*Public Sector
Tenure_Squared*Public Sector
Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No)
Public Sector*Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No)
Intercept -.412*** -2.916
(.061) (.544)
% Correct Predicted Charity 0 18.1%
(continued on the next page)
Nagelkerke R2 .016 .116
McFadden  R2 .007 .051
Likelihood Ratio Test Final Model, Chi-Square (df) 43.9(2)*** 312.3(44)***
Pearson Chi-Square (df) 0(0)*** 5692(5664)
Deviance Chi-Square (df) 0(0)*** 5739(5664)
% Correct Predicted without model 44.2% 44.6%
% Correct Predicted with model 45.9% 49.3%
Total number of observations 3126 2898
Note: cell entries are the unstandardized parameter estimates (B) and odds ratios (exp B).
 Standarderrors are in parentheses. Regression results based on the unweighted subsample.
#Base Outcome = Gift Certificate
*=signicant at 10%-level, **=significant at 5%-level, ***=significant at 1%-level.
a= Base Category
Model 1 Model 2
2.4 Results 29
Table 2: Results of multinomial logistic regression (continued)
Charity#
B exp B B exp B
Public Sector .230 1.258 .568** 1.764
(.236) (.268)
Female -.175 .839 -.248 .780
(.162) (.170)
Age (years) .029*** 1.029 .031*** 1.031
(.007) (.008)
Education .146** 1.157 .143* 1.153
(.071) (.074)
Income .187*** 1.206 .149*** 1.161
(.038) ( .040)
Breadwinner (1=No) .432*** 1.541 .473*** 1.604
(157) (.164)
Marital Status:
- Married/cohabitating without children living at home -.063 .939 -.031 .969
(.193) (.203)
- Married/cohabitating with children living at home -.371 .690 -.360 .698
(.231) (.239)
- Single parent -.188 .829 -.340 .712
(.341) (.361)
- Single 0a . 0a .
Children living at home (number) -.070 .933 -.060 .942
(.077) (.079)
Managerial position .091** 1.095 .101** 1.106
(.042) (.044)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Tenure -.001 .999 .002 1.002
(.021) (.022)
Tenure_Squared .000 1.000 .000 1.000
(001) (.001)
Tenure*Public Sector -.075** .928 -.087** .917
(.036) (.037)
Tenure_Squared*Public Sector .002 1.002 .002* 1.002
(.001) (.001)
Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No) -.392*** .676
(.148)
Public Sector*Salary sufficient for work you do? (1=No) -.497** .609
(.237)
Intercept -3.158*** -2.799***
.560 (.587)
% Correct Predicted Charity 19.7% 25.2%
Nagelkerke R2 .123 .140
McFadden  R2 .054 .062
Likelihood Ratio Test Final Model, Chi-Square (df) 328.5(52)*** 349.7(56)***
Pearson Chi-Square (df) 5737(5686) 5325(5262)
Deviance Chi-Square (df) 5747(5686) 5302(5262)
% Correct Predicted without model 44.6% 44.0%
% Correct Predicted with model 49.7% 49.7%
Total number of observations 2873 2662
Note: cell entries are the unstandardized parameter estimates (B) and odds ratios (exp B).
 Standarderrors are in parentheses. Regression results based on the unweighted subsample.
#Base Outcome = Gift Certificate
*=signicant at 10%-level, **=significant at 5%-level, ***=significant at 1%-level.
a= Base Category
Model 3 Model 4
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Figure 1a: Point Estimate Dummy Public for Lottery Ticket
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
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Figure 1b: Point Estimate Dummy Public for Charity
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Tenure (years)
Figure 2a: Point Estimate Dummy Public for Lottery Ticket
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
Employees satisfied salary/work
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Figure 2b: Point Estimate Dummy Public for Lottery Ticket
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
Employees dissatisfied salary/work
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Figure 2c: Point Estimate Dummy Public for Charity
 (vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
Employees satisfied salary/work
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Tenure (years)
Figure 2d: Point Estimate Dummy Public for Charity
(vs Gift Certificate) ± 2*SE
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2.5 Concluding remarks
Summarizing, we have found clear support for the hypothesis that public sector em-
ployees are more risk averse than private sector employees. However, in contrast to
our expectations, we have also found that public sector employees are on average
less inclined to make charitable contributions than private sector employees. This
e¤ect is partly due to the fact that many more people in the public sector feel un-
derpaid. Moreover, we have found that feelings of underpayment have much larger
repercussions for the odds of donating to charity in the public sector than in the
private sector, suggesting that public sector employees consider the contributions
they make on the job as a substitute for charitable donations. Our ndings suggest
that many public sector employees feel that they already donate a lot to society by
exerting e¤ort on the job for relatively little pay and, therefore, are less willing to
make any further contributions than their private sector counterparts. Lastly, we
have found a clear e¤ect of tenure on pro-social inclinations in the public sector,
which arises independently of feelings of dissatisfaction about pay. As public sector
employeestenure increases, they become less and less inclined to make charitable
contributions, while there is no tenure e¤ect for private sector employees. Such
evolution of preferences for public sector employees is well in line with studies by
Blau (1960), Van Maanen (1975), and De Cooman et al. (2009) documenting swift
declines in altruistic motivations with tenure among public sector employees. All
of these studies are about a specic group of bureaucrats, namely the street-level
bureaucrats. However, the e¤ect of tenure is not restricted to this group. Further
analysis of our data shows that we clearly observe an e¤ect of tenure among street-
level bureaucrats as well as pen-pushing bureaucrats, although the e¤ect of tenure
is somewhat less strong in magnitude and signicance among the latter. We do
notice a di¤erence, however, in the e¤ects of feeling underpaid among both groups.
Dissatisfaction with pay has no stronger e¤ect on the tendency among pen-pushing
bureaucrats to donate to charity than on private sector workers. However, it does
have a larger e¤ect among street-level bureaucrats than among private sector work-
ers. Furthermore, street-level bureaucrats much more often encounter feelings of
underpayment than private sector workers or pen-pushing bureaucrats. Therefore
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pen-pushing bureaucrats, dissatised or not, are much more likely to donate to char-
ity rather than to take the gift certicate than private sector workers at the start of
their career. Street-level bureaucrats are not signicantly more likely to donate to
charity at the start of their career than private sector workers.
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Final question of the survey:
Below you can indicate if you would like to receive a gift certicate or a state
lottery ticket (without jackpot). When you choose for one of these options we need
your name and address. You can also choose a charity, in that case we donate f. 25,-
(11,34 euro) for every completed questionnaire to one of the organizations below. If
you choose to donate to charity you do not need to ll out a name and address.
1 Gift certicate (f 25,-) Name:
2 Lottery ticket Address :
Postal code and Place :
Charity:
3 Amnesty International 8 Wilhelmina Foundation
4 Unicef 9 Hart Foundation
5 Ronald McDonald House Charities 10 Animal protection
6 War Child 11 Greenpeace
7 Carnation Foundation
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

Chapter 3
Incentives and the Sorting of
Altruistic Agents into Street-Level
Bureaucracies
Joint with Robert Dur
3.1 Introduction
Street-level bureaucrats often have the dual task of helping some clients while dis-
ciplining others. Caseworkers are a case in point. On the one hand, their job is
to allocate employment services and give job search assistance to clients who are
willing but unable to nd a job. On the other hand, they are supposed to sanction
clients who rather live on a benet than work from 9 to 5.1
The dual nature of the job implies that it is not straightforward what kind of
people should optimally be hired by such street-level bureaucracies. While the help-
ing aspect of the job makes altruistic or client-oriented people the ideal candidates,
these people are likely to take clientsinterests too much into account when encoun-
1Other examples of street-level bureaucrats with such dual tasks easily come to mind. For
instance, teachersmain task is to help students learn, but from time to time their job also involves
expelling disruptive students from the classroom. Soldiers taking part in peacekeeping missions
often engage in both humanitarian activities and combat. And police o¢ cers both help and sanction
people.
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tering clients who should be sanctioned. In addition to this normative issue of what
would be optimal candidates, the positive issue of what kind of people nd a career
in a street-level bureaucracy actually worthwhile is perhaps even more important.
While assessment centers and talented HR managers may give agencies a glimpse
of job applicantsmotivations, their true motivations often remain hidden, implying
that agencies should use other, more implicit instruments to promote self-selection
of the most desired types of workers. These may include paying low base salaries
and o¤ering bonuses for good performance.
This chapter studies these issues by developing a model of a street-level bureau-
cracy that serves di¤erent types of clients, some of which are in need of help (willing
but unable clients) and others who should be sanctioned (non-willing clients). In
addition, there exists a group of clients who should neither be helped nor sanctioned
(willing and able clients). The agency hires bureaucrats whose task is to meet
clients, assess their type, and allocate either help, no help, or a sanction. Bureau-
crats are hired from a pool of potential job applicants who di¤er in their altruism
towards clients they meet, ranging from complete indi¤erence to highly altruistic.
The agency cannot observe job applicantstypes. However, it can a¤ect the sorting
of job applicants by its personnel policy. We study two di¤erent settings which are
often observed in practice: 1) the bureaucracy pays a base salary only; 2) on top of
the base salary, the bureaucracy o¤ers agents bonus pay or non-pecuniary rewards
for good performance (or, equivalently, gives penalties for bad performance). We
obtain the following results.
First, when bureaucratscompensation consists of a base salary only, the bureau-
cratsdecisions are in line with the agencys preferences, except for the allocations
to non-willing clients. Thus, willing and unable clients receive help while willing
and able clients get no help. However, as bureaucrats are (weakly) altruistic to-
wards clients, bureaucrats do not sanction non-willing clients, but allocate no help
instead. The most altruistic types among the potential job applicants self-select
into the bureaucracy. Besides the base salary, the attractiveness of the job depends
on the composition of the client population. In particular, the job becomes more
attractive, and hence the base salary can be lower, when there are more clients in
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need of help. If the agency has monopsony power, we show that it can be optimal
to hire fewer agents than necessary to serve all clients, so as to reduce salary costs.
Our model thus o¤ers an explanation for why street-level bureaucracies are often
plagued by limited resources and an overload of clients, as observed by e.g. Lipsky
(1980).
Second, bonus pay (or non-pecuniary rewards) for good performance induces the
least altruistic among the hired bureaucrats to sanction non-willing clients. Gen-
erally, it is optimal for the agency to set bonus pay such that it induces only part
of the bureaucrats to sanction: Some bureaucrats care so much about the feelings
of non-willing clients that it is too costly to induce those bureaucrats to impose
sanctions. Besides a¤ecting bureaucratsdecisions, we show that bonus pay can be
used by the agency to extract rents from the most altruistic bureaucrats. Since these
bureaucrats do not sanction, a rise in bonus pay increases their income by less than
the income of bureaucrats who do sanction. Optimal bonus pay is therefore higher
than the value of sanctioning for the agency.
Third, the e¤ect of pay-for-performance on the sorting of agents into bureaucracy
crucially depends on whether the expected joys of helping the willing and unable
clients exceed the expected sorrows of sanctioning non-willing clients. If the client
population consists mainly of people in need of help, and the willing clientsbenet
from help is high relative to the unwilling clientspain of sanctions, there is still
self-selection of the most altruistic types into the job. If this condition does not
hold, the only way through which the agency can make sure that at least some of its
agents sanction non-willing clients is by o¤ering a combination of base salary and
bonus pay that is more generous than the agentsoutside option. As a result, there is
sorting from both the top and the bottom of the altruism distribution, with highly
altruistic agents choosing no sanction for the non-willing clients and earning low
income and agents with a low level of altruism imposing sanctions and earning high
bonus pay. When the bureaucracy values sanctions for non-willing clients su¢ ciently,
the bureaucracy optimally sets personnel policy such that it only hires agents from
the bottom of the altruism distribution. We thus show that bonus pay can have a
profound impact on the type of workers self-selecting into street-level bureaucracies.
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We proceed as follows. The next section describes how our research relates to
the literature and discusses some stylized facts about the motivation of caseworkers,
which we take as the leading example in our research. Section 3 describes the model.
Section 4 analyzes the simple case where bureaucracies pay at wages. Next, section
5 studies the implications of pay-for-performance. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Related literature and some stylized facts
Our research contributes to a recent literature in economics on incentives and work-
ersmotivation in the public sector (Francois, 2000 and 2007, Dixit, 2002, Glazer,
2004, Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Prendergast, 2007, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008 and
2009, Brekke and Nyborg 2008, and Vlassopoulos 2008). Francois and Vlassopoulos
(2008) provide a survey of this literature. Closest to our research is Prendergast
(2007) who studies sorting of purely altruistic agents into a street-level bureaucracy
and shows that, generally, both the most and least desired types self-select into bu-
reaucracy. There are four key di¤erences between his paper and our research. First,
we focus on jobs which involve a dual task of helping some clients and sanction-
ing others. Second, Prendergast (2007) focuses on e¤ort provision of the agents,
assuming that agents cannot lie about the clients type. In contrast, we assume
that agents information about clients type does not involve e¤ort cost and is soft,
giving discretion to the agent in his allocation decision. Third, while in Prendergast
(2007) bureaucrats earn at wages, we allow bureaucracies to use incentives. Last,
we assume that agents are impurely altruistic in the sense that they only care about
clients they meet and we abstract from hostile agents. We discuss the implications
of these last two assumptions along the way.
There is abundant evidence that a substantial part of people working in street-
level bureaucracies are concerned about clients. Lipsky (1980: 72) observes that
Those who recruit themselves for public service work are attracted to some degree
by the prospect that their lives will gain meaning through helping others.More
recently, Le Grand (2003: 38) concludes that a part of public service employees
(the act relevant knightsin his terms), are motivated by the need to perform the
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helping acts themselves. Other recent empirical studies showing that public sector
workers often have a strong intrinsic motivation to help clients include Edmonds et
al. (2002) and Frank and Lewis (2004).
Caseworkers are perhaps the clearest example of street-level bureaucrats with
dual tasks (helping some clients while sanctioning others). There is a rich empirical
literature studying the motives and client-orientation of caseworkers. Blau (1960:
347) studies the attitude towards clients of personnel in a public welfare agency
and concludes that Most persons who took a job in the welfare agency were partly
motivated by an interest in working with and helping poor people. They tended
to look forward to establishing a warm, although not intimate, relationship with
deserving and grateful clients, and considered the case worker as the agent of society
who extended a helping and trusting hand to its unfortunate members.Marston et
al. (2005: 146) provide strong evidence for client-advocacy in a Danish employment
project. They cite a bureaucrat as saying that: How am I supposed to activate
people who are running around in the streets without a homeI cant (...) but I
need to give them a temporary place to stayor do something for them.Heckman
et al. (1996: 2) nd that caseworkers in a US job-training program have a strong
desire to aid the least well o¤.Lastly, Considine (2000: 290) nds that Australian
caseworkers do not like to sanction clients: They found it o¤-putting to subject
job-seekers to the framing of highly legalistic agreements in their rst weeks.They
also saw sanctioning as a last resort which implied a breakdown in their service
and thus a loss of face for them and their agency.
However, not all street-level bureaucrats and caseworkers have such warm feel-
ings towards clients. Hernandez et al. (2003: 15-16) interviewed participants to
vocational rehabilitation programs. While 21% of the participants report having a
counselor who is committed, 29% nd their counselor unresponsive, particularly
when they failed to return telephone calls and follow through with specic tasks
that were discussed during appointments (for example, o¤ering but never provid-
ing job placement services).Using Swiss survey data, Behncke et al. (2007: 8-9)
also nd striking di¤erences between caseworkersattitudes towards clients. In their
sample, 52% of caseworkers state that the wishes of the unemployed should be
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satised. However, 9% of caseworkers assign placements in jobs and active labour
market programmes independent of the wishes of the unemployed. Lastly, Blau
(1960: 347) notices that a few of the caseworkers in his study were motivated by
considerations such as a desire to dominate people.
3.3 The model
Our model revolves around a principal (the benet administration or public employ-
ment service) with S clients (unemployed workers or people on social benets). The
principal hires an endogenous number of agents (casemanagers or caseworkers) to
serve these clients. The task of an agent is to meet clients and to allocate to each
of them either an employment service, a sanction; or no help at all. Employment
services can consist of schooling, job search assistance, assessments et cetera. A
sanction can be a pecuniary penalty, but also a non-pecuniary penalty, for instance
workfare where the client is obliged to do production work. For convenience, we
normalize the number of clients each agent meets to one.
In what follows, we describe the possible allocations and associated payo¤s to
the principal, agents, and clients, which are summarized in table 3.1.
Principal The principals preferred allocation depends on the clients type. Clients
di¤er in two respects: Their motivation and their ability to nd a job. For conve-
nience, we assume that clients belong to either one of the following four types.2 The
rst type of clients, denoted by l, is willing to work, but not able to nd a job with-
out help. They need assistance in the form of employment services to improve their
labor skills or to increase the e¤ectiveness of their job search e¤ort. When a client of
type l receives employment services, the principals payo¤Up increases by b  c > 0,
where b represents the gains from clients nding a job and leaving welfare with a
higher probability, and c stands for the costs of the employment services. Without
help, the willing but unable clients would not likely nd a job, leaving the principal
a payo¤ we normalize to zero. Giving them a sanction is considered to be unfair
2Our labelling of clients resembles the ones mentioned in e.g. Marston et al. (2005: 149), Sol
et al. (2007: 21), and Bunt et al. (2008: 37).
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by the principal. The principal would receive some kind of payment z: The money
collected from the penalty, the production value of the client under workfare, or
possible positive e¤ects of sanctions on the probability of leaving welfare and nding
a job (see for instance Van den Berg et al., 2004). However, the principal loses x
(well-being) from the wrongful treatment of the willing client. The principals net
payo¤ from this allocation is assumed to be negative, z   x < 0.
The second type of clients, denoted by m, is willing and able to nd a job. The
best decision for the principal would be not to help those clients resulting in a payo¤
we normalize to zero. Giving them employment services would entail costs, but does
not help them to nd a job faster, resulting in a payo¤ of  c < 0 for the principal.
A sanction would be considered unfair, implying a payo¤ of z x < 0, as is the case
for the rst type of clients.
The third type of clients is able to nd a job, but not willing to do so. The fourth
type of clients is neither willing, nor able to nd a job. We label these last two types
by their common denominator: The non-willing, n. According to the principal they
should all receive a punitive sanction for misbehavior, resulting in a payo¤ z > 0.3
Allocating them employment services is a waste of money,  c < 0:4 Allocating no
help to them leaves the principal a payo¤ normalized to zero.
The principal knows the distribution of clientstypes, but does not know the type
of each individual client. He needs agents to sort this out for him and allocate the
right service to his clients. The principal has a monopoly in supplying allocations:
Clients cannot choose who monitors their job search behavior. The principal pays
each agent a base salary w, which lowers the principals payo¤. Further, the principal
may use incentives which are discussed below. Hiring agents to make allocations is
only optimal when the principals utility from doing so is equal to or higher than the
principals reservation utility, that is allocating all clients the same treatment. We
assume throughout that the principal always nds it worthwhile to hire a strictly
3In addition to the monetary payo¤ of imposing a sanction, there could be some feelings of
satisfaction or justication that a non-willing client gets punished. To save on notation, we ignore
these potential benets.
4Although this might seem a strong assumption, relaxing it does not change our results much
as long as the non-willing clients dislike employment services or as long as a sanction should be
allocated as well.
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positive number of agents. The principal hires agents from a pool of R heterogenous
individuals which is su¢ ciently large (R > S) so that the principal is never supply-
constrained. Further, the principal is a monopsonist in the labor market for agents.
This assumption only plays a role in the subsections where we derive the number
of agents the principal wants to hire. We shall also discuss what happens when the
principal has no monopsony power; that is, competes with other bureaucracies for
agents.
Clients Clients are fully informed about their own willingness and ability to nd
a job. The utility of a client, Uc, depends on his type and on the allocation made
to him. Like the principals payo¤, we normalize clientspayo¤ to zero in case they
receive no help. All clients dislike sanctions: These give them a negative payo¤,
 v < 0: Because willing and unable clients like to have a job and need help to nd
it, they appreciate employment services. This gives them a positive payo¤, k > 0.
Willing and able clients are indi¤erent between receiving employment services and
no help.5 Non-willing clients prefer receiving no help and enjoying their leisure
time to participating in employment services, which gives them a negative payo¤
 g. Receiving employment services is, however, preferred to getting a sanction,
 v <  g < 0.
There are L > 0 willing and unable clients, M > 0 willing and able clients,
and N > 0 non-willing clients. The total number of allocations, denoted by Q;
is endogenously determined by the principal (through his decision on the number
of agents he wishes to hire), but cannot exceed the total number of clients, Q 
L+M +N = S.
Agents As soon as an agent meets a client, he knows the clients type. Hence,
investigating a client does not involve cost of e¤ort and, when the agent allocates
a service or sanction, he is always fully informed about the clients willingness and
5If the willing and able clients strictly prefer no help to participating in employment services,
our results do not change. If they strictly prefer participating in employment services to receiving
no help, there is an additional incentive problem, but our main arguments remain una¤ected. In
this case, the clientsand principals preferences di¤er in two respects instead of one.
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Table 3.1: Payo¤ to principal, client and agent of di¤erent allocations
Clients type Allocation Payo¤
Principal Client Agent
Willing, unable l Sanction z   x  w  v w   jv
No help  w 0 w
Employment
services
b  c  w k w + jk
Willing, able m Sanction z   x  w  v w   jv
No help  w 0 w
Employment
services
 c  w 0 w
Non-willing n Sanction z   w  v w   jv
No help  w 0 w
Employment
services
 c  w  g w   jg
ability to work.6 Agents utility Ua depends rst of all on his base salary w (see table
3.1). Second, the agent may be altruistic towards the client he meets. This is rep-
resented by jUc, where j measures agent js altruism towards his client, and Uc is
the utility of the client the agent meets. Since agents only have altruistic feelings to-
wards clients they meet, they are impurely altruistic or have warm glowpreferences
in the sense of Andreoni (1989, 1995). We assume that for any j, 0  j   < 1,7
and that in the population of potential agents the altruism parameter  is distrib-
uted according to the cumulative distribution function
R 
0
f () d. Importantly, an
agents altruism is private knowledge. Altruistic agents take into account how their
allocation decisions a¤ect clientswelfare. Without signicant loss of generality, we
assume that whenever the agent is indi¤erent between allocations, the agent gives
priority to what the client prefers. When the client is also indi¤erent, the agent
decides to allocate what the principal prefers. The agent will only accept the job
as a caseworker when his expected utility from doing so is equal to or above his
reservation utility, A:
6We thus abstract from the issue of how much e¤ort an agent exerts to determine the correct
allocation which is central in Prendergast (2007).
7We also discuss along the way what would happen when some agents have negative, hostile
feelings towards their clients (j < 0), as in Prendergast (2007).
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Incentives As we shall see, the principals and agentspreferences are not always
in line. Hence, the principal may want to use incentives. For simplicity, we shall
restrict attention to the following simple incentive scheme: The principal pays the
agent a bonus, denoted by , for each correct allocation, and does not overrule wrong
allocations. For instance, we can think of a bonus for job placements when correct
decisions lead to maximum job placements. Overruling is not possible, because when
the principal observes the outcome, time has passed and the allocation has already
been put into e¤ect. The same holds when agents are rewarded for not deviating
too much from a benchmark. The bonus for the agents can take a pecuniary or non-
pecuniary form; for convenience, we shall speak of pecuniary bonuses henceforth.8
Timing The principal o¤ers a contract, describing the base salary and bonus.
Each agent decides whether or not to take the job. Then, each agent who took the
job meets a client and takes a decision about the allocation. Lastly, the clients,
principals and agentspayo¤s are realized.
3.4 Flat wages
We start by analyzing the case where the principal gives no incentives ( = 0) and
just pays a base salary w.9 We solve the game by backward induction and start by
agentsdecisions on allocations.
3.4.1 Which allocations do agents make?
The principals and agentspreferences align when agents meet clients who are will-
ing to work. When meeting a client who is willing but unable, agents allocate
employment services, because this gives these agents a payo¤ of w + jk, which is
8It is straightforward to show that bonuses for correct decisions and penalties for wrong deci-
sions (such as layo¤ in case of bad performance evaluations) yield equivalent results.
9A practical example of this is discussed by Riccuci and Lurie (2001: 34), who conclude that
there are neither carrots nor sticks to motivate the workers in the social welfare o¢ ces in
Texas, Michigan and Georgia. Even though these o¢ ces use performance measures, workers said
that all front-line welfare workers are likely to receive the same performance ratings(Riccuci and
Lurie, 2001: 35).
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higher than the payo¤ of allocating a sanction, w   jv, or allocating no help, w:
When meeting a client who is willing and able, agentspayo¤ of allocating no help
is w, which is equal to the payo¤ of giving employment services and higher than the
payo¤ of sanctioning, w jv. Whenever an agent is indi¤erent between allocations,
he makes the allocation the client prefers. And if the client is indi¤erent too, the
agent takes the decision the principal prefers. In this case: No help. However, when
meeting a non-willing client, the principal would prefer that agents allocate a sanc-
tion, but the agents allocate no help instead, resulting in a payo¤ of w: This payo¤
is higher than when they impose a sanction, w   jv, or give employment services,
w jg, because these allocations harm non-willing clients. So, the agentsdecisions
are not fully in line with those desired by the principal: Agents are not willing to
sanction the non-willing clients, as the agents want to avoid the negative feelings
they get from imposing sanctions on clients. Instead, they allocate no help to these
clients.
3.4.2 Which agents take the job?
An agent takes the job when his expected utility from taking the job is higher than
or equal to his outside option utility, EUa  A. Using our previous results on agents
allocation decisions, the expected utility for agent j from taking the job is
EUa = w +
Lkj
L+M +N
: (3.1)
That is, the agent enjoys his base salary and, with probability L
L+M+N
; helps a
willing and unable client, which raises his utility by kj. The agent derives no such
additional utility when encountering a willing and able client or when encountering
a non-willing client because, as we have seen, the agent will allocate these clients no
help. Since Lk > 0, the participation constraint can be written as:
j  e =   A  w  Lk
L+M +N
 1
: (3.2)
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We can distinguish three cases for the threshold level of agents altruism e. First,e > . In this case, nobody is willing to take the job. Second, if e  0, then the
whole labor force is willing to apply. In the third and most interesting case where
0 < e  ; only agents with a su¢ ciently high level of altruism are willing to take
the job. We focus on this third case.10 Notice that this implies that A   w > 0:
The base salary does not make up for foregoing the outside option. The reason is
that the job gives agents an opportunity to help willing but unable clients, which
increases altruistic agentsutility.
The self-selection of the agents is a¤ected by the composition of the client pop-
ulation, the quality of employment services and sanction policy, and the principals
personnel policy. We discuss the inuence of these aspects in turn.
Client population The higher the number of willing and unable clients, the more
attractive the job becomes for altruistic agents, because there are a lot of clients
needing employment services and thus a big chance of getting the warm feelings of
helping them. So even for agents with a relatively low level of altruism j, the job
becomes interesting:
@e
@L
=
 k   A  w (M +N)
(Lk) 2
< 0.
The higher the number of willing and able clients, the less interesting the job be-
comes. These clients need no help. Thus there are lower expected benets from
helping clients to compensate for the low-paying job:
@e
@M
=
A  w
Lk
> 0.
The same holds for the number of non-willing clients. Because the agents do not
impose sanctions, the agents avoid the negative feelings this would evoke for the
clients and thus themselves. But they do not get positive feelings of helping clients
either. When there are more of these non-willing clients, less people are willing to
10When we would allow for agents with j < 0 (hostile agents), we would get a result similar to
Prendergast (2007). That is, agents from both ends of the spectrum, with very positive and very
negative attitudes to clients, take the job. The latter would impose sanctions on all types of clients
as they enjoy making people worse o¤.
3.4 Flat wages 47
take the job:
@e
@N
=
A  w
Lk
> 0.
Employment services and sanction policy The employment services o¤ered
by the bureaucracy can be more or less attractive to clients. Clients, for example,
often like employment services where they themselves can have a say. The more
attractive the employment services for clients, the more interesting the job becomes
for agents:
@e
@k
=
 L   A  w (L+M +N)
(Lk) 2
< 0.
Making the sanction policy more or less erce has no e¤ect in the at-wage case,
because agents do not impose sanctions anyway:
@e
@v
= 0.
Personnel policy The principal in this case has a simple personnel policy: He
only o¤ers a base salary, w: Raising this salary makes the job attractive to a larger
number of agents:
@e
@w
=
  (L+M +N)
Lk
< 0: (3.3)
3.4.3 Optimal personnel policy
We have seen that agents are willing to take the job when they are su¢ ciently
altruistic; more precisely, when condition (3.2) holds: But how many agents does
the principal want to hire? Recall that each agent makes one allocation. Using
equation (3.2), the total number of allocations can be written as Q = R
R e f () d.
Further, using our results on agentsallocation choices in section 3.4.1, the principals
expected payo¤of hiring an agent is L
L+M+N
(b c) w. Hiring an agent increases the
number of employment services allocated to willing and unable clients, but comes
at the cost of paying the base salary. The principals optimization problem can thus
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be written as
max
w

(b  c)L
L+M +N
  w

R
Z 
e f () d;
where e is described by equation (3.2). The rst-order condition describing the
optimal base salary is:
@EUp
@w
=

(b  c)L
L+M +N
  w

Rf(e)  Lk
L+M +N
 1
 R
Z 
e f()d = 0: (3.4)
The condition shows us that by raising the base salary the principal attracts a
number of additional agents, Rf(e)  Lk
L+M+N
 1
. This raises the principals expected
payo¤as these agents allocate employment services to the willing and unable clients,
and lowers his payo¤ by the salary he has to pay them
h
(b c)L
L+M+N
  w
i
: Raising the
base salary also implies that the principal has to pay higher salaries to all agents he
hires, which costs  R R e f () d. In the optimum, the principal equates these mar-
ginal benets and costs or, if the resulting number of potential allocations exceeds
the number of clients, hires S agents. Importantly, the principal may optimally
choose to hire too few agents to serve all clients. This stems from the principals
monopsony power: To attract more agents, he must increase all agentsbase salary,
which may not make up for the payo¤ resulting from an increase in allocations.
Hence, insu¢ cient sta¢ ng and an overload of clients may be an optimal choice.
If the principal lacks monopsony power, either all or none of the clients would be
served, depending on whether the market wage is lower or higher than the expected
payo¤ of an allocation.
3.5 Pay-for-performance
As we have seen in the previous section the principal and agentspreferences are not
always in line: Agents do not sanction non-willing clients. Can the principal change
the behavior of the agents and at what cost? In this section we investigate what
happens when the principal rewards agents with a bonus  > 0 for each correct
allocation made, without overruling the agentsallocations when a wrong decision
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has been detected.11 As discussed in section 3.3, an example of such an incentive
scheme is making agents pay dependent of his clientslabor market performances.12
3.5.1 Which allocations do agents make?
Agentsallocations to the willing and unable clients (employment services) and to
the willing and able clients (no help) were already in line with the preferences of the
principal in the at-wage case studied above. Pay-for-performance does not change
the agentsallocations to these clients; it only increases the payo¤ to the agents of
making this allocation by : However, when the agent meets a non-willing client,
bonus pay may induce an agent to impose a sanction rather than to allocate no help.
His payo¤ of sanctioning becomes w+  jv, while the payo¤ of allocating no help
remains w and the payo¤ of allocating employment services remains w jg: Hence,
if the bonus  is high enough, the payo¤ of sanctioning is higher than the payo¤ of
allocating no help. More specically, an agent will give non-willing clients a sanction
when his level of altruism is lower than the threshold level:
j < b = =v. (3.5)
When j  b = =v; the agents decision is not a¤ected by the bonus: He allocates
no help to the non-willing clients, because the bonus does not compensate for the
negative feelings the agent experiences when sanctioning a non-willing client.
3.5.2 Which agents take the job?
As before, an agent applies for the job when his expected utility from the job is
higher than his outside option utility, EUa  A. We need to distinguish two groups
11Alternatively, the principal may give a bonus only when an agent imposes a sanction. This
incentive scheme, however, induces some agents to sanction not only non-willing clients, but also
the willing and able clients, which is costly to the principal. Restricting the bonus for correct
allocations to a bonus for correct sanctions only does not a¤ect any of the main results; it merely
leads to an increase in the base salary as the agentsexpected bonus pay goes down.
12Klerman et al. (2005: 129) observe such individual rewards for caseworkers in California, as
does Weissman (1997: 37) in Los Angeles County and Burgess et al. (2004) in Jobcentre Plus in
the UK. For example, caseworkers having more than 10 job placements in the preceding month got
rewards such as free movie tickets or banners with their name on it.
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of agents: Those that sanction non-willing clients and those that do not.
The agent does not sanction

j  b = =v The agents expected utility,
equation (3.1), changes into:
EUa = w +
(L+M)
L+M +N
+
Ljk
L+M +N
 A;
implying the following participation constraint:
j  e =  A  w   (L+M)
(L+M +N)

Lk
L+M +N
 1
: (3.6)
Compared to the case of at wages, the participation constraint has changed in only
one way: The agent earns a bonus  for the allocations to willing clients (L +M):
All comparative statics have the same sign as in the absence of bonuses, except for
the e¤ect of a higher number of willing and able clients:
@e
@M
=
A  w   
Lk
? 0:
While, as before, a higher number of willing and able clients reduces the expected
non-pecuniary payo¤s from the job, pay-for-performance implies that it now in-
creases the expected pecuniary payo¤s. Hence, the number of agents willing to take
the job may now increase or decrease with the number of willing and able clients.
Further, note that an increase in the bonus makes the job more attractive:
@e
@
=
  (L+M)
Lk
< 0:
This e¤ect is smaller than that of raising the base salary (which is again given by
(3.3)), because agents who do not sanction only receive the bonus when encountering
willing clients. As we shall see, this has important implications for the optimal level
of the bonus.
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The agent sanctions

j < b = =v Expected utility of agents who optimally
decide to sanction non-willing clients reads:
EUa = w +  +
j (Lk  Nv)
L+M +N
 A,
implying the following participation constraint:
if Lk  Nv > 0, then j  ee =   A  w     Lk  Nv
(L+M +N)
 1
; (3.7)
if Lk  Nv < 0, then j  ee =   A  w     Lk  Nv
(L+M +N)
 1
: (3.8)
First, consider the case where Lk  Nv > 0. That is, given that an agent sanctions
non-willing clients, the job brings higher expected joys of helping the willing and
unable clients than expected sorrows of sanctioning the non-willing clients. Then, as
before, only agents with a su¢ ciently high level of altruism are willing to apply for
the job, ee  j  . Compared to agents who do not sanction, pecuniary payo¤s are
higher, because the agent gets a bonus for every allocation he makes. Non-pecuniary
payo¤s are lower, however, because the agent su¤ers a loss when sanctioning non-
willing clients. As before, the principal pays less than agents outside option utility 
w +  < A

, for otherwise all agents in the economy would apply for the job.
Next, consider the case where Lk Nv < 0. It is easy to see that in this case, if
the expected pecuniary payo¤s are smaller than the outside option utility, w+ < A,
only agents with hostile feelings j <
ee < 0 would be willing to apply. However, we
have assumed j  0 for any j, and so if the principal wants to attract agents who
choose to sanction non-willing clients, he must o¤er w +   A: Agents interested
in a job like this are the ones with low levels of altruism, those that do not care too
much about the clientsfeelings, 0  j  ee, as described by (3.8).
The comparative static results are similar to those derived above with two ex-
ceptions. First, raising the bonus has the same e¤ect as raising the base salary,
because agents who sanction receive bonuses for all allocations they make, rendering
the base salary and bonus pay perfect substitutes:
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if Lk  Nv > 0; then @
ee
@w
=
@
ee
@
=
  (L+M +N)
Lk  Nv < 0;
if Lk  Nv < 0; then @
ee
@w
=
@
ee
@
=
  (L+M +N)
Lk  Nv > 0:
Although the signs are opposite in the two cases, the interpretation is the same:
Raising the bonus or base salary attracts more agents, in the rst case from the top
and in the second case from the bottom of the altruism distribution (see (3.7) and
(3.8)). Second, making the sanction policy more harsh (raising v) makes agents less
willing to apply for the job:
@
ee
@v
=
N
 
A  w    (L+M +N)
(Lk  Nv) 2 ;
which is positive if w +  < A and negative if w +  > A, both implying that fewer
agents apply. In the rst case, some agents from the top no longer apply, while in
the second case some agents from the bottom are no longer interested in taking the
job (see (3.7) and (3.8)).
3.5.3 Optimal personnel policy
By setting the base salary w and the bonus , the principal determines the number
of agents that will be hired as well as a¤ects their allocation decisions. Following the
analysis in the previous subsection, there are two cases that need to be distinguished:
The case where the expected non-pecuniary payo¤s of the job for agents willing
to sanction are positive, Lk   Nv > 0, and the case where these are negative,
Lk  Nv < 0.
Non-pecuniary payo¤s positive when agents sanction (Lk  Nv > 0) In
this case, the job is mainly a job of helping needy people getting a better chance
on the labor market, even for agents who sanction non-willing clients. Hence, as we
have seen, the job is particularly attractive to altruistic agents. Using our results on
the allocations agents make (section 3.5.1) and which agents take the job (section
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3.5.2), we know that, if the principal decides to induce at least part of the agents
to sanction non-willing clients, R
R b f()d allocations will be made by agents who
are willing to take the job but not willing to sanction, and R
R bee f()d allocations
will be made by agents who are willing to take the job and sanction non-willing
clients. The resulting expected payo¤s to the principal of these two groups of agents
are respectively
h
(b c)L
L+M+N
  w   (L+M)
L+M+N
i
and
h
(b c)L+zN
L+M+N
  w   
i
per agent. The
principals optimization problem can thus be written as:
max
w;

(b  c)L
L+M +N
  w   (L+M)
L+M +N

R
Z 
b f () d+ (3.9)
(b  c)L+ zN
L+M +N
  w   

R
Z b
ee f () d
where b is described by (3.5) and ee by (3.7). It is easy to verify that the participation
constraint of agents who do not sanction, described by (3.6), is not binding, unlessb  e: In the latter case, the bonus is too low to induce any agents to sanction
non-willing clients and, hence, the optimization problem is the same as in the case
of at wages, which we studied in the previous section. If b > e, the rst-order
conditions for the optimal base salary and bonus are:
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Raising the base salary w has the same e¤ects as in the case of at wages, except that
the additional agents sanction non-willing clients (which raises the marginal benets)
and need to be paid bonuses (which reduces the marginal benets). Furthermore, as
before, when raising the base salary, the principal has to pay a higher salary to all
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agents, which is reected by the last term of (3.10). Due to this monopsony e¤ect,
the principal may again optimally choose to hire too few agents to serve all clients.
Raising the bonus  has three e¤ects. Firstly, it induces Rf(b) 1
v
agents to sanc-
tion and receive a bonus rather than allocate no help to non-willing clients. This
results in a total increase of the principals payo¤ described by the rst term in
(3.11): The principal gains z from each additional sanction to non-willing clients
at the cost of paying an additional bonus . Secondly, as for the base salary, by
raising the bonus the principal attracts additional agents willing to sanction, which
is reected by the second term in (3.11). Notice that this term is identical to the
rst term in (3.10), which reiterates our result above that raising the base salary or
the bonus have the same e¤ect on recruitment of agents willing to sanction. Lastly,
the marginal costs of raising the bonus are described by the last two terms of (3.11):
Agents are compensated better for correct decisions.
In the optimum the principal equates the marginal benets and costs of raising
the bonus and of raising the base salary. Combining the rst-order conditions gives:
(   z) f(
b)
v
=
Z 
b f()d;
which implies that the optimal bonus  exceeds the value to the principal of sanc-
tioning a non-willing client (z). The intuition follows. By raising the bonus, some
additional agents are induced to impose sanctions, which raises the principals payo¤
by (   z), as discussed above. Hence, it is optimal for the principal to raise the
bonus at least to the point where the bonus equals the value to the principal of sanc-
tioning non-willing clients. This echoes the familiar result that, with risk-neutral
agents, optimal bonus pay equals the full marginal product. However, there is an ad-
ditional benet of raising the bonus. Recall that an increase in the bonus enables the
principal to reduce the base salary by the same amount without losing any agents,
because the bonus and base salary are perfect substitutes for the marginal agents.
Expected wage compensation for agents who do not sanction decreases, however.
They bear the full loss of the reduction in the base salary, but gain only partly from
the increase in the bonus as they do not sanction. Raising the bonus thus enables the
principal to extract rents from the agents who do not sanction non-willing clients.
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In the optimum, the bonus therefore exceeds the principals value of sanctioning
non-willing clients.13 Nevertheless, if  is su¢ ciently high, the optimal bonus does
not induce all agents to sanction non-willing clients. The principal simply nds it
too costly to induce highly altruistic agents to impose sanctions.
Non-pecuniary payo¤s negative when agents sanction (Lk  Nv < 0) In
this case, the job is mainly about disciplining instead of helping clients for agents
who nd it optimal to impose sanctions on non-willing clients. As we have seen
in section 3.5.2, in order to induce at least some of the agents to sanction non-
willing clients, the total pecuniary payo¤s of the job for these agents must at least
be equal to the outside option utility, w +   A, implying that some agents from
the bottom of the altruism distribution sort into the agency. Using our previous
results on which allocations agents make (section 3.5.1) and who will take the job
(section 3.5.2), we know that R
R ee
0
f () d allocations are made by agents willing to
sanction and R
R e f () d allocations are made by agents not willing to sanction.14
The principals optimization problem can thus be written as:
max
w;

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
R
Z ee
0
f () d+ (3.12)
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13Obviously, more sophisticated separating contracts may enable the principal to extract even
more rents from the altruistic agents. We leave an analysis of this for future research. Note also
that rent extraction can only occur when the principal has monopsony power. When there are
many identical principals, competition rules out rent extraction, and the optimal bonus  is equal
to the principals value of sanctioning a non-willing client (z).
14Using (3.5), (3.6), and (3.8), it is easy to verify that in all cases where the principal hires
neither all nor none of the potential agents, it holds that ee < b < e. In other words, none of the
agents hired from the top of the altruism distribution sanction, while all agents hired from the
bottom do sanction non-willing clients. Hence, the incentive constraint (3.5) is redundant.
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where e is described by (3.6) and ee by (3.8). The rst-order conditions are:
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The rst term in (3.13) shows that, as before, by raising the base salary w; the
principal attracts more agents who are willing to sanction. However, in this case,
he also attracts more agents who are not willing to sanction, resulting in additional
payo¤s described by the second term of (3.13). Furthermore, the principal has to
pay a higher salary to all agents, described by the third and fourth term in (3.13),
which can lead to the same monopsony result for the optimal number of allocations
as before: Too few agents to serve all clients. The rst two terms in (3.14) show that
by raising the bonus, the number of agents willing to sanction as well as the number
of agents not willing to sanction increase. Finally, the last two terms of (3.14)
describe the increase in bonus paid to all hired agents. Combining the rst-order
conditions and rewriting gives:
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Clearly, in the optimum, the principal hires agents from the top and the bottom
of the altruism distribution until the expected gains from hiring additional agents
from each group are equal to the increase in rents he has to leave to this group
of agents. Highly altruistic agents do not sanction non-willing clients and are paid
low income and agents with low altruism sanction and earn high bonus pay. Hence,
when the non-pecuniary payo¤s of the job are negative for agents who sanction,
pay-for-performance has a profound e¤ect on the sorting of agents. While in the
case of at wages, only the most altruistic types opt for the job, with pay-for-
performance sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution results.
When the value to the principal of sanctioning non-willing clients, z, is su¢ ciently
high, it may even be optimal for the principal to hire agents from the bottom of
the altruism distribution only. The same holds when  (the most altruistic agents
degree of altruism) is su¢ ciently low. In these cases, the benets of hiring the most
altruistic agents (low wage costs) do not compensate for the costs (that some non-
willing clients do not get a sanction). However, the opposite may also be the case.
When the value of sanctioning is su¢ ciently low or when there is su¢ cient mass
of highly altruistic agents, the principal does not nd it worthwhile to o¤er high
pecuniary payo¤s so as to attract agents who are willing to sanction. This results
in sorting of the most altruistic types only, as in the case of at wages.
3.6 Concluding remarks
We have studied the e¤ects of pay-for-performance in street-level bureaucracies
where agents have the dual task of helping some clients while disciplining others.
Our theoretical work has some clear predictions which can be tested in future empir-
ical research, e.g. using data such as those used by Behncke et al. (2007) combined
with data on how agents are compensated. In particular, our study suggests that
pay-for-performance can have important e¤ects on the self-selection of agents into
street-level bureaucracies. While organizations paying at wages are predicted to be
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attractive mainly to highly altruistic (or client-oriented) types, organizations using
pay-for-performance are also (and sometimes only) attractive to agents who have
a neutral stance towards clients. Further, our analysis predicts that understa¢ ng
(as measured by, e.g., unexplained di¤erences in caseloads per agent, see Bloom
et al. (2003)) is related to the degree of competition between agencies and to the
composition of their client population. More specically, our results suggest that
bureaucracies facing less competition in the labor market for agents are more likely
understa¤ed, and the more so when their clients more likely qualify for help or a
sanction.
While we have focussed on pay-for-performance as a means to align the agents
and principals interests, there are of course several other ways to do so. We discuss
three of these alternatives here. A rst alternative is to monitor (a part of) the
agents allocations before they are put into e¤ect and to punish and overrule an
agent when a wrong allocation is detected (see e.g. Van der Veen 1990). In an
earlier draft of this chapter, we explored this case. If the agent only cares about the
e¤ects on the clients welfare of his own decisions and not those by the principal, the
results are similar to the case of pay-for-performance studied above. However, some
results change when we assume that the agent, once he has met the client, cares also
about how clients are a¤ected by later decisions taken by the principal. Then, like
bonus pay, monitoring induces part of the bureaucrats with lower levels of altruism to
sanction non-willing clients. But when the monitoring rate is su¢ ciently high, there
are further consequences for sorting: Sorting into the job from the bottom of the
altruism distribution only, even by agents not willing to sanction. The reason is that,
with a high monitoring rate, the agency is likely to overrule the bureaucrat when
observing that the bureaucrat has not imposed a sanction on non-willing clients.
When the bureaucrats sorrows of these sanctions are larger than the joys of helping
others, the job is no longer attractive to altruistic people and the agency needs to
o¤er a relatively high wage to attract people who will all be little concerned about
clientswelfare.
A second alternative way of aligning the principal and agents interests is to
advise the agent on what allocation to make using a statistical assignment program
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which uses data on clientscharacteristics (proling). Many countries use such a
procedure (see OECD, 2007, Black et al., 2003, Rosholm et al., 2004). One reason
to introduce proling is to avoid casemanagersbias. Or, as Bell and Orr (2002: 281)
put it, to promote that identical persons will get the same treatment, regardless
of who their caseworker might be. Proling constrains agentsroom for discretion
if the agency penalizes agents for diverting too often from the advised allocations.
This can be considered as a special case of monitoring and is thus likely to lead to
the same results as described in the previous paragraph.
A third alternative is to use clients complaints to nd out when a wrongful
decision has been taken by an agent. However, complaints would be uninformative in
our model, because agents do not sanction willing clients. The only clients who would
complain about sanctions are non-willing clients, who are sanctioned deservedly. All
other allocations are in line with the clientspreferences. No complaints are to be
expected in those cases. Complaints, however, are informative in models where
agents need to exert e¤ort to make a correct allocation, as studied by Prendergast
(2007).
We have abstracted from any private costs to agents of sanctioning clients, like
for example physical threats, lots of paperwork, or the chance to become engaged
in the legal process of sanctions and appeal (see e.g. Considine 2000). Such private
costs would make agents even less willing to sanction non-willing clients. To induce
agents to impose sanctions, the bonus would need to compensate agents for these
private costs in addition to the sorrows arising from agentsaltruism towards clients.
We have assumed that agents di¤er in their altruism towards their clients, but
that each agents level of altruism is the same towards all of his clients. Thus,
we assumed that agents do not discriminate against some clients. But as Lipsky
(1980: 108) observes: some clients simply evoke workerssympathy or hostility (...)
workers may be inclined to give the underdog a breakor may favour clients with
similar ethnic backgrounds, as when racial or ethnic favoritism prevails in discrim-
inatory decision making.These feelings can impact agentsallocation decisions in
important ways. Feelings of reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Fong et al., 2006,
and Fong, 2007) can also play a role. People tend to treat friendly and deserving
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people better than hostile and undeserving people. In our model, reciprocity could
imply that agents treat willing clients more favorably than non-willing clients, thus
improving the alignment of the principals and agents interests. However, these
reciprocal feelings are in practice not likely to be strong enough to achieve perfect
alignment, which is also clear from the empirical literature discussed in section 2.
Lastly, an agents altruism does not need to be stable over time. As Blau (1960:
347-348) notices the attitudes of most new case workers toward clients were strongly
positive, if somewhat sentimental and idealistic (...) But as he encountered clients
who blamed him personally for not helping them enough (...) and clients met his
trusting attitude by cheating and lying, the newcomer tended to experience a reality
shock(...) This disillusioning experience might make a worker bitter and callous,
or induce him to leave the job, and even those who did not have either of these
extreme reactions tended to change their orientation to clients.This is clearly an
interesting topic for future research.
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3.A Notation
 A = agents outside option utility
 L = number of willing and unable clients (type l).
 M = number of willing and able clients (type m).
 N = number of non-willing clients (type n).
 Q = number of allocations
 R = number of potential agents
 S = number of clients
 Ua = agents utility function
 Uc = clients utility function
 Up = principals utility function
 b = principals benet when a willing and unable client receives employment
services
 c = principals cost when a client receives employment services
 f() = density function of agentstypes
 g = non-willing clients cost of employment services
 k = willing and unable clients benet of employment services
 v = clients cost of a sanction
 w = agents base salary
 z = principals benet when a non-willing client receives a sanction
 z   x = principals net benet when a willing client receives a sanction
  = bonus for making a correct allocation
  = agents level of altruism towards clients

Chapter 4
The Sorting of Motivated Teachers
into Inner City Schools
Did you get close to giving up?
No, I love teaching. I mean, I truly, truly love to teach.
Ed Burns1
4.1 Introduction
Teaching in an inner city school is a hard job. Or as Ed Burns  a former inner
city teacher says: Psychologically, theres no way to prepare for it. The closest
preparation I think I had was when I went to Vietnam in the infantry. (..) You get
a class of 35 kids, of which ve or six are thugs  what the DSM calls oppositionally
deant children. So theyre ghting and disruptive and cursing you like sailors.2
However, despite the violence, the disruptive students, and hard working conditions,
1Writer and Producer Ed Burns in a interview with HBO about his experience as a teacher
in Baltimores inner city. He used this experience in season four of the television series The Wire
(http://www.hbo.com/the-wire/inside#/the-wire/inside/interviews/interview/ed-burns.html).
2Ibid. DSM refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which psy-
chiatrists use to classify mental disorders.
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some teachers seem to have a preference for working in those inner city schools,
because they simply nd working with underprivileged students more forlling. As
Ed Burns puts it: I used to stay at the school for chess club in a computer room,
and some of the kids would come up for lunch. When theyre really close, when you
can really interact with them, theyre wonderful, vibrant human beings.3 Jacob is
another example of a motivated teacher. He prefers to work in a secondary vocational
training school in one of Amsterdams worst neighbourhoods instead of working in
a whitepre-university college, where pupils hardly need their teacher (Jurgens
2004).
Although some motivated teachers are willing to take a job in an inner city
school, many teachers probably prefer working in the suburbs, in the neighbourhood
of their own homes with pupils resembling themselves. As a New York City teacher
says about teachers working in tougher schools: God bless them  I personally
could not do what theyre doing. I know of teachers who have been assaulted in
those schools. They certainly deserve more money, but they also deserve security
(Farkas et al. 2000: 21). Inner city schools are indeed well-known for their problems
with sta¢ ng their school appropriately, not only quantitatively, but qualitatively as
well. Those schools often have teachers without the appropriate certication, who
are underqualied and less-experienced. In the words of Ed Burns: In a place like
Baltimore, most schools start the school year short of teachers. So, if youve got two
arms, two legs and two eyes, theyre begging for you.4
Since teachers di¤er in their motivation and ability, it is not clear beforehand
which types of teachers will be hired by inner city or underprivileged schools. These
schools might indeed hire the teachers who combine the high motivation and low
ability of the teachers mentioned above. However, other combinations of ability
and motivation among inner city school teachers are also possible. In this chapter
I formally study the sorting of teachers into inner city schools. First, I develop
a theoretical sorting model with unobservable teacher motivation and observable
teacher ability. Second, I test the models empirical predictions using unique Dutch
survey data on the motivation and ability of teachers.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
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Teachers in the model di¤er in observable ability, as for instance education and
experience, and in unobservable motivation to work with underprivileged children.
Teachers derive utility from working with underprivileged children, because they can
make a di¤erence in the lives of those children, whereas the impact on the life of a
privileged child is much smaller. Privileged children have well-educated parents who
can help and support them. Even when these parents do not have enough time to
help the children themselves, they will have enough money to spend on extra lessons.
However, there are also costs of teaching underprivileged children, as for example a
higher chance of getting assaulted. For su¢ ciently highly motivated teachers, the
benets of teaching in an inner city school outweigh the costs.
Schools in my model di¤er in only one respect: The percentage of underprivileged
children attending their school, which is either high or low. The schools o¤er the
same at base salary to all teachers, which resembles the situation in The Nether-
lands, as well as in many other OECD countries (OECD 2005b), where wages are
determined at a central level and there is little exibility in wage-setting at the
school level. Sorting in this context crucially depends on the supply of teachers of
the di¤erent types versus the number of positions the privileged and underprivileged
school have. Two di¤erent cases can be distuinguished: 1) The case with more highly
motivated teachers than positions at the underprivileged school, impying low or in-
termediate costs of working with the underprivileged 2) The case with less highly
motivated teachers than positions at the underprivileged school, implying relatively
high costs of working with the underprivileged. I obtain the following results.
First, when there are many highly motivated teachers, the underprivileged school
is in a luxurious position. It will hire the candidates with on average the highest
ability. Whether or not it is also able to hire the candidates with the highest moti-
vation depends on the costs of working with underprivileged children. When those
costs are intermediate, teachers with a relatively high motivation prefer to work at
the underprivileged school and this school will hire the most able among them. The
privileged school hires the remaining teachers to ll all its positions. When the costs
of working with the underprivileged are su¢ ciently low, all teachers prefer to work
at the underprivileged school. Then teachers do not self-select based on motivation.
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Since motivation is unobservable, the underprivileged school can only select teach-
ers on the basis of ability. This may be costly for underprivileged schools, when
motivation is more important for improving a students results than ability. Thus,
surprisingly, low costs of working at an underprivileged school can lead to a lower
expected payo¤ for those schools compared to a situation with intermediate costs of
working at an underprivileged school.
Second, when there are few highly motivated teachers compared to the number of
positions at the underprivileged school, the underprivileged school has little choice
in candidates. Therefore, the teachers hired by the underprivileged school have on
average lower ability than those at the privileged school. The sorting on motivation
again crucially depends on the costs of working with the underprivileged. When the
costs of working at the underprivileged school are su¢ ciently high, all teachers prefer
to work at the privileged school. Since no sorting on motivation will take place, the
underprivileged school faces its worst case scenario. It hires the remaining teachers
of low ability and expected average motivation. When those costs are intermediate,
many relatively lowly motivated teachers will prefer a position at the privileged
school. The underprivileged school hires the remaining teachers. That is, the highly
motivated candidates with any ability preferring to work at the underprivileged
schools and the remainder of the candidates with relatively low motivation and low
ability who did not get their favoured position at the privileged school.
In the second part of this chapter I test the empirical predictions using Dutch
survey data from 2006 on teacher motivation and ability, where ability is measured
by years of experience and level of education. I use a sample of 1658 observations
on primary school teachers and 1632 observations on secondary school teachers. In
both samples, teachers working at underprivileged schools more often state that
their school has trouble lling its vacancies. Hence, the Dutch situation is probably
best described by the second case of the theoretical model, with less highly moti-
vated teachers than positions to ll at the underprivileged schools, implying high or
intermediate costs of working with the underprivileged. When the costs of working
with underprivileged children are high, the key hypothesis to be tested is whether
these schools hire the teachers with the lowest observable ability. There will be
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no correlation between ability and motivation at either school. When the costs of
working with underprivileged children are intermediate, the privileged school hires
the teachers with the highest ability and relatively low motivation, the underprivi-
leged school hires the rest. We should then observe a negative sorting on ability and
positive sorting on motivation. Furthermore, we would expect a positive correla-
tion between ability and motivation among teachers sorting into the underprivileged
school.
Testing the empirical predictions on the primary school teachers sample leads to
the conclusion that it is hard to explain the sorting of Dutch primary school teachers
with this model: None of the variables measuring intrinsic motivation and ability has
a signicant e¤ect in the full primary school teacher sample. A possible explanation
for these results is that Dutch teachers have long careers in the same school. During
their career their motivation to stay in the school might di¤er from the motivation
to sort into the school. Furthermore, the schools student population could have
changed as well. Therefore, I next restrict the sample to teachers who started their
current job in the last 5 years. Among these teachers, those with many years of
teaching experience and high motivation are more likely to sort into underprivileged
schools than teachers with the same level of experience and a low motivation, which
is in line with the model. However, this e¤ect is opposite for teachers with lower
ability levels (both are weakly signicant, that is, at the 10%-signicance level).
Moreover, the e¤ect of education is ambiguous.
Testing the empirical predictions on the secondary school teacher sample yields
more support for the theory. There is no signicant e¤ect of motivation and expe-
rience on the sorting of teachers into underprivileged schools. There is, however,
a clear negative e¤ect of education on the sorting of teachers into underprivileged
schools. This e¤ect remains after restricting the sample to teachers with ve years
or less of experience at their current school, to teachers teaching in the lower grades,
and after restricting the sample to big cities. The results are by and large in line
with the situation of high costs of working at underprivileged schools: On average,
teachers prefer working at privileged schools and these schools hire the teachers with
the highest ability. Within schooltypes I cannot nd evidence of sorting into under-
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privileged schools based on education, possibly due to the fact that the variation of
underprivileged and privileged schools within schooltypes is relatively small.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts and
discusses related literature. Section 3 contains the setup of the model. Section 4
analyzes the model and gives us the predictions for the empirical analysis. Section 5
describes the setting of the Dutch educational sector and the data I use. In section
6 I test the predicions using regression analysis. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Some stylized facts and related literature
There is a broad literature in public administration showing that many people sort
into the public sector because of a so called public service motivation, that is, a
willingness to serve society (see for example Lewis and Frank 2002, Crewson 1997,
Houston 2000, Perry et al. 2009). This idea has recently catched ground in economics
as well. Many scholars have developed theoretical models showing the e¤ects of
public service motivation, or (impure) altruism as economists tend to call it, on
e¤ort provision and sorting into the public sector (e.g. Besley and Ghatak 2005,
Prendergast 2007, Francois 2007, Brekke and Nyborg 2008, Delfgaauw and Dur
2008). Most of these studies focus on heterogeneity in motivation, assuming that
ability is identical. Recently, Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) study the sorting into the
public sector of managers who di¤er in observable motivation and ability. They
show that the most capable managers are privately employed, because the returns
to ability are higher in the private sector. However, public service motivation or
altruism does not only a¤ect whether one is willing to work in the public sector, but
can also a¤ect where in the public sector one is willing to work. Buurman and Dur
(2008) predict, using a theoretical model, that street-level bureaucrats base there
job-choice on the expected non-pecuniary payo¤s of working with a specic group of
clients. The more clients are in need of help, the more unobservably altruistic people
enjoy their job of helping them and the lower pecuniary benets, as for example
salary, can be in order to attract employees. In this chapter I extend the idea of
sorting of agents within the public sector by taking their unobservable motivation
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as well as their observable ability into account and apply it to a specic case: The
sorting of teachers into inner city schools.
People have di¤erent reasons to take a job as a teacher. Some teachers have
extrinsic reasons for becoming a teacher, for instance job security, pay, working con-
ditions such as working hours, holidays, and combining work and family life. How-
ever, for many teachers intrinsic motivation seems to be most important (OECD
2005b). This intrinsic motivation has di¤erent aspects. Some teachers like to teach
for the sheer love of the subject they teach (math, English, science). Others are in-
terested in teaching, because they like to do something for society or, because they
like working with children (OECD 2005b). Still others, e.g. the teachers mentioned
in the introduction, are especially interested in working with underprivileged chil-
dren. This di¤erence in preferences among teachers to work with underprivileged
children is conrmed by Jackson (2009).5 Jackson looks into the consequences for
teacher sorting among schools of a reshu­ ing of students over schools due to the
end of the student busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Due to the end of the busing,
students started to attend schools in the neighbourhood of their homes instead of
schools with more or less equal student populations. This caused teacher turnover
to go up. However, not only at schools where large inows of black students were
to be expected, but also on other schools, where outows of black students were to
be expected. This indicates that not all teachers prefer to teach the relatively easy
student populations.
Nevertheless, many teachers would not consider a job at an inner city school,
because of harsh working conditions. For example, only 29% of novel teachers in
rural and suburban areas would seriously consider working in a public school in
a big city when o¤ered substantially more money (Farkas et al. 2000). A focus
group of teachers in the same research project states that more money would not
induce them to teach in nearby New York, because they had an image of a chaotic
school environment short on supportive parents, administrators or kids. (Farkas
et al. 2000: 21). This view is supported by research in Texas, where the share of
teachers reporting very negatively on several working conditions is much larger in
5Jackson uses race as a proxy for student attributes such as income level and achievement.
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urban areas than in suburban areas. In 1999-2000 a share of 9.2% of the teachers in
urban areas reports very negatively on administrative support, whereas only 7.2%
of suburban teachers shares such a view. In urban areas 22.1% of the teachers has a
negative view on parental support, against 13.7% in suburban areas. And 12.4% of
urban teachers has a negative opinion on the adequacy of the materials, while only
7.6% of suburban teachers shares that opinion (Hanushek and Rivkin 2007). Hard
working conditions do not only scare o¤ potential teachers, but are also a reason
for existing teachers to leave their job or the profession (see e.g. OECD 2005b,
Ingersoll 2001). Teachers are more likely to leave Norwegian schools when the share
of minority students or students with special needs at these schools is higher (Falch
and Strøm 2009). Ingersoll (2001) nds that turnover in urban areas in the US
(14,4%) is above the average rate (13,2%).6 He also observes that dissatised urban
teachers moving to another teaching job, mention student discipline problems and a
lack of student motivation much more often than dissatised teachers in the entire
sample of schools. The lack of student motivation and an unsafe environment catch
the eye as reasons for the dissatisfaction of urban teachers leaving the profession,
compared to other teachers.
Harsh working conditions is one of the reasons why many teachers do not want
to work in inner city schools. Another reason is that teachers like to work in the
neighbourhood of their own homes or the place where they grew up. Boyd et al.
(2005) show that teachers in the state of New York have a strong preference to take
their rst job as a teacher in the region where they went to high school, or in a region
that resembles the region where they went to high school. This implies, according
to Boyd et al., that even when all teachers originating from urban areas take up a
job in an urban area, a shortage of urban teachers remains in quantitative terms. It
also implies a shortage in quality, since those teachers are drawn from urban schools,
that is, schools usually performing less than suburban schools.
Sorting of teachers among schools does not only depend on di¤erences in motiva-
tion to work in inner city schools, but also on di¤erences in observed qualications.
Because many teachers are not willing to work in an inner city school, these schools
6Ingersoll (2004) nds a larger di¤erence in turnover among public school teachers on urban
high-poverty schools (22%), rural high poverty schools (16.4%) and low-poverty schools (12.8%).
4.2 Some stylized facts and related literature 71
are left with hard to sta¤ vacancies. These vacancies are lled with the least able
among teachers, the ones who have few alternatives. This sorting on ability is clearly
visible in many US research projects. Lankford et al. (2002) observe that in the state
of New York the underprivileged students in urban areas have teachers with lower
observable qualications (e.g. experience, certication, failed general knowledge or
liberal arts exam, B.A. from least competitive college) than students in other parts
of the state. Clotfelter et al. (2007) nd the same sort of results for North Carolina.
Jackson (2009) shows that schools where the number of black students grew due to
the abolishing of the school bus system, also lost high quality teachers in terms of
observable qualications as years of experience and certication test scores.
However, when looking at quality in terms of value added to student achievement
by teachers, the sorting of teachers is less clear. Hanushek et al. (2005) look at
teacher quality in terms of standardized gains in annual test scores on mathematics
in a large urban district in Texas.7 Several important conclusions can be drawn from
this research project by using the teacher xed e¤ect in the combined teacher and
student panel dataset as an indicator of teacher quality. First of all, teacher quality
matters: When teacher quality in terms of value added improves by a standard
deviation this raises the standardized gains in test scores by 0.22 standard deviation.
Second, teacher education and certication do not inuence the value added by
teachers. Third, more experience leads to gains in test scores in the rst four years
of a teachers career. Especially having a rst year teacher implies a substantially
lower standardized gain in test score compared to having a teacher with six years
or more of experience. Fourth, the correlation between the standardized gains in
test results, which teachers manage to accomplish, for students of low, middle and
high ability is high. This implies that high quality teachers are good for students
at di¤erent ability levels, while low quality teachers perform relatively poorly for
students at all levels.8 Finally, teachers who remain in the urban schools are at least
as good as those who leave. Murnane (1984), based on research in another urban
7Hanushek et al (2005) state that the results for reading are qualitatively the same.
8Research looking at observable teacher characteristics leads to di¤erent conclusions. Vlachos
(2008) concludes that studentsgrades are on average not a¤ected by teacherscognitive and social
skills. However, higher social skills do have a positive e¤ect on the grades of students with a lower
ability, whereas higher cognitive skills have a negative e¤ect.
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area, also rejects the hypothesis that the most e¤ective teachers in terms of value
added leave the urban school system. On the contrary, the evidence seems to point
in the direction that the most ine¤ective teachers leave, although these e¤ects are
not signicant, possibly due to the small sample size.
At rst sight the ndings that inner city schools employ teachers with the lowest
observable qualications, but that it is not the teachers with the lowest quality in
terms of value added who leave those schools, might seem contradictionary. However,
the evidence on the inuence of observed teacher qualications is not that strong
(See e.g. Hanushek and Rivkin 2006, Wayne and Youngs 2003 and OECD 2005b
for an overview). And even studies which nd that observed qualications matter
(e.g. Aaronson et al. 2007), point out that much of the variation in value added is
not explained by observable teacher characteristics. Furthermore, researchers agree
that there is more to teaching than what is observed in administrative data. For
example, a part might be explained by the motivation of teachers to exert e¤ort,
their enthusiasm for teaching, and their classroom behaviour. Therefore, I take
motivation as well as ability into account in the educational production function
and sorting among teachers.
Since observable qualications only matter to some extent, it is not easy to
recognize good teachers when you hire them. The OECD (2005b:10), for example,
concludes that Many, if not most, of the key attributes of successful teachers will
only become evident once they are in the job.This is also supported by Hanushek
et al. (2005) who observe that there is not much evidence that good teachers who
leave the urban district are o¤ered higher salaries or better working conditions in
other districts, which, as Hanushek et al. point out, could be due to a lack of
interest principals in those districts have in hiring qualitatively good teachers or,
more convincingly, to the di¢ culties principals have in identifying good teachers.
4.3 The model
In order to formulate clear hypotheses for my empirical research, I rst analyze a
simple model of teacher sorting among schools.
4.3 The model 73
Schools Schools, labelled j; di¤er only in one respect: j the percentage of
underprivileged children. I assume this j to be observable to schools and teach-
ers.9 For simplicity, there are only two schools: One school has a high percentage of
underprivileged children  and the other school has a low percentage of underprivi-
leged children . I also assume that each class needs one teacher to teach them. The
pupil-teacher ratio in a class is xed and exogenous. The total number of classes,
and thus teacher positions, is P . The number of positions of the school of type 
with many underprivileged children is nP and the number of positions of the school
of type  with many privileged children is (1 n)P . Both schools have a similar pro-
duction function qj =
ZZ
f(i; i;)g(i; i)dd. That is, the school js production,
qj, total value added to pupils, is the sum of the value added by all teachers with
ability i and motivation i employed at school j; where g(i; i) represents the joint
probability density function of teachersability and motivation. The value added
of an individual teacher i with ability i and motivation i is f(i; i). I assume
that having a higher ability or motivation increases the value a teacher adds to his
pupils. Thus, fi (i;i) > 0; fi (i;i) > 0: Furthermore fii (:) < 0, fii (:) < 0, and
fii (:)fii (:) > f
2
ii
(:). An individual teachers motivation is unobservable to the
schools, but the distribution of motivation among teachers is common knowledge:
Motivation is uniformly distributed with lower bound  and upper bound , and
strictly positive, 0 <   i  . Furthermore, a teachers ability is observable to
the schools, strictly positive, uniformly distributed and ranges from 0 <   i  .
The total number of teachers available in the population is T . Schools pay all of
their teachers a at base salary w, which is xed and exogenous for all schools. For
example, a at wage as determined by the government or a central labour agree-
ment between unions and employersorganizations. The schools maximize the value
added by teachers, where the wage bill is a given. Furthermore, schools do not want
to leave any vacancy open10, nor do they want to hire more teachers than there are
classes to teach. I normalize the payo¤ of the schools outside option, not hiring a
9In the Netherlands, for example, this information is publicly available at the website of the
organisation responsible for the allocation of the education budget among schools (www.oic.c.nl).
10Hiring a teacher with the lowest motivation and ability always outweighs the costs of his wage,
because schools do not want to leave the class unattended.
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teacher, to zero. Thus, school js expected payo¤ can be written as:
EUsj =
ZZ
[f(i; i;)  w]g(i; i)dd > 0; (4.1)
subject to the restriction that the number of teachers hired by each school is equal
to the number of positions. That is,
ZZ
g(i; i)dd = nP orZZ
g(i; i)dd = (1   n)P , respectively for the underprivileged and privileged
school.
Teachers Teachers, labelled i, enjoy utility from their income, w. In addition,
and in line with the evidence discussed in previous sections, I assume they also enjoy
teaching underprivileged children. The joys of teaching underprivileged children
increases with the teachers motivation i and the percentage i of underprivileged
children a school has. For convenience, I assume these joys to be represented by ji.
Unfortunately, teaching in schools with a high percentage of underprivileged children
has disadvantages as well. Some of these children are violent towards teachers and
less motivated to learn. Sometimes the schools in areas with many underprivileged
children have less nancial means, lack the latest technical support, and are situated
in older, less healthy, and sometimes even detrimental environments. This bears
a cost k on the teachers, which increases with the percentage of underprivileged
students, jk:
11 Finally, the teacher has an outside option which leads to a utility
of A  0. This is the utility another job or unemployment benet would give him.
In order to be willing to take the job, a teachers expected utility needs to be above
this outside option utility:
EUtij = w + (i   k)j > A (4.2)
I assume that (4.2) holds strictly for all teachers in all schools. Thus, a teachers
expected outside option utility is always less than the utility of a job at his second-
best school. In appendix A I show at which wage level condition (4.2) holds strictly.
11I impose that k is equal for all teachers.
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Finally, the cumulative distribution function of all teachers isR 

R 

g(; )dd = T:
The timing of the model The timing of the model is as follows. First, the
two principals post the advertisements for their positions, say a few months before
the new school year starts. Then teachers apply. Teachers can apply to more than
one position at a time at no cost. Next, the schools o¤er a contract to their preferred
candidates. If a teacher receives more than one o¤er, he will accept the contract
of the school he prefers. I assume that the school year starts immediately after
this hiring process, implying that teachers remain unemployed and positions remain
unlled if no deal is made during the process.
4.4 Analysis
We are interested in the distribution of the di¤erent types of teachers over the two
schools. Therefore, we analyze a very simple case, where the number of positions
equals the number of teachers, thus P = T . For convenience, I normalize this
number to 1, such that P = T =
R 

R 

g(; )dd = 1. I will discuss along the way
what happens when we relax this assumption and allow the number of positions to
be larger than the number of available teachers, P > T .
4.4.1 Who wants to apply where?
Let us rst analyze which teachers will apply to the privileged and underprivileged
school, when the schools post their positions. We can distinguish three di¤erent
cases here. First of all, the most interesting case, where   k  . As can
be seen from (4.2), teachers have an expected utility of w + (i   k) > A when
applying to the school with a large number of underprivileged children. They have
an expected utility of w + (i   k) > A, when applying to the school with a small
number of underprivileged children. Thus, as long as their motivation i is above the
private costs of teaching underprivileged children, i  k, relatively highly motivated
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teachers prefer to work at the underprivileged school.12 The rest of the teachers with
relatively low motivation, i < k; prefer a job at a privileged school. Second, if k > 
all teachers prefer to work at the privileged school. Third, if k   all teachers prefer
to work at the underprivileged school. However, in all three cases teachers prefer
teaching in any school above their outside option (condition (4.2) holds strictly) and
have no costs of applying. Thus, independently of the exact level of k, all teachers
will apply at both schools.
If some teachers prefer their outside option to teaching in either school, there
are more positions than teachers, P > T: As long as the remaining teachers prefer
teaching in either school to their outside option (condition (4.2) still holds for those
teachers), teacherspreferences for working at a particular type of school do not
change. Moreover, since there are no costs of applying, these teachers will still
(weakly) prefer to apply at both schools.13
4.4.2 Which teachers will be hired?
We can distinguish two di¤erent cases, depending on the number of teachers with
motivation i  k compared to the number of positions at the underprivileged school.
The rst case is the case where the number of highly motivated teachers with i  k,
denoted by rT , who prefer to work at the underprivileged school is larger than or
equal to the number of positions at that school, thus rT  nP . The second case is
the case where the number of highly motivated teachers is smaller than the number
of positions at the underprivileged school, rT < nP:
Many highly motivated teachers: rT  nP At rst glance, both schools
have many applicants to choose from, as all teachers apply at both schools. Thus,
12I assume that when indi¤erent between teaching to underpriviliged and priviliged children,
the teacher will prefer teaching underpriviliged children.
13If condition (4.2) does not hold and a part of the remaining teachers prefers their outside
option to teaching at their second-best school, we have two di¤erent cases. First, some or all of
the teachers with motivation i < k prefer their outside option to teaching at the underpriviliged
school. Those teachers will only apply for a job at the priviliged school. Second, when (some of)
the highly motivated teachers with i  k prefer their outside option to teaching at the priviliged
school, then these teachers will only apply for a job at the underpriviliged school. Furthermore,
this implies that teachers with lower motivation are not willing to apply for any teaching job. See
appendix A.
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to whom will the schools o¤er a contract when P = T? The schools do not know
the motivation of each individual teacher, but they do know the share of highly
motivated teachers in the population of teachers rT , with motivation i  k. They
also know that motivation and ability are uncorrelated, thus among teachers in every
level of ability a share r of all these teachers has motivation i  k and will prefer
to work at the underprivileged school whenever they can choose between a job at
this school or the privileged school. Therefore, the underprivileged school will o¤er
candidates with i  b a contract as hiring the candidates with the highest ability
renders the highest expected payo¤, as can be seen from (4.1). The underprivileged
school chooses the level of b in such a way, that the share r of teachers with ability
i  b who will accept this job, the teachers with motivation i  k; exactly equals
the number of positions at this school nP . The school does not have to fear that too
many candidates will accept the contract. The reason is that the privileged school
also prefers to hire teachers with the highest level of ability, because these render
the highest expected utility, see (4.1). Hence, candidates with i  b and i < k
will also receive a competing o¤er from the privileged school and accept it as this
is their preferred option as can be seen from (4.2). Unfortunately for the privileged
school, hiring only candidates with i  b and i < k does not su¢ ce. The school
knows that, to ll its remaining positions, it has to o¤er all other candidates, with
i < b and i < k, a job as well. As this last group of teachers only receives an o¤er
from the privileged school, they will surely accept it, because the expected utility
from this o¤er lies above their outside option utility.
The expected payo¤ of the underprivileged school can thus be written as14:
EUs

=
Z 
b
Z 
k
[f(; )  w] g(; )dd; (4.3)
subject to
Z 
b
Z 
k
g(; )dd = nP;
since the principal does not want to leave the class unattended nor does he want to
14For ease of exposition I suppress subscripts i.
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have unproductive teachers.
The expected payo¤ of the privileged school can be written as:
EUs

=
Z 

Z k

[f(; )  w] g(; )dd+
Z b

Z 
k
[f(; )  w] g(; )dd; (4.4)
subject to Z 

Z k

g(; )dd+
Z b

Z 
k
g(; )dd = (1  n)P:
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium distribution of types in the case with  < k 
. The underprivileged school hires the teachers with the highest ability and highest
motivation, while the privileged school hires the rest. That is, teachers with low
ability and any motivation sort into the privileged schools together with teachers
of high ability and low motivation. Thus, there is a negative correlation between
ability and motivation among teachers sorting into the privileged school. In the
special case where k  , all teachers prefer working at the underprivileged school.
This school o¤ers a contract to exactly the number of teachers it needs with ability
i  b.15 The others are hired by the privileged school. In this case there is no
correlation between ability and motivation of teachers.
15Even if the payo¤ of motivation is much higher than that of ability, randomizing the hiring
of teachers would not lead to better results than hiring the ones with the highest ability, since
we assume that ability and motivation are independently distributed among the teachers in the
population. This would also be the case when teachers motivation and ability are not uniformly
distributed. However, when motivation and ability are not indepently distributed the results could
change. For example, when ability and motivation are negatively correlated randomizing or hiring
the lowly able could lead to higher payo¤s than hiring the ones with the highest ability.
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Figure 1: The sorting of teachers among schools when rT > nV
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What happens when the number of positions is larger than the number of teach-
ers, P > T? The underprivileged school will not have any vacant positions left, as I
have assumed that rT  nP . However, the privileged school will be left with vacant
positions: This school is only able to hire the remaining (rT  nP ) highly motivated
candidates with low ability and (1  r)T candidates with relatively low motivation.
As P > T the number of positions (1  n)P is larger than the number of applicants
(rT   nP ) + (1  r)T at the privileged school.16
Few highly motivated teachers: rT < nP When the number of highly
motivated teachers is smaller than the number of positions at the underprivileged
school, the privileged school is in the more favourable position. It o¤ers all highly
16I have assumed that condition (4.2) holds for all teachers T . If it does not hold for all highly
motivated teachers i  k, because the wage is not high enough, w < bbw, then (some of) the
remaining highly motivated teachers (rT  nP ) prefer their outside option to a job at the priviliged
school, see appendix A. This increases the hiring problem of the priviliged school. This also implies
that all of the lowly motivated teachers with i < k, would prefer their outside option to teaching,
as ew > bbw. Hence, the hiring problem of the priviliged school becomes even more severe.
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able teachers with i  b a contract, choosing the level of b such that the share
of (1  r) contracts accepted by the teachers with motivation i < k exactly equals
its number of positions (1   n)P . The privileged school does not run the risk of
hiring more teachers than it has positions to ll by o¤ering all these teachers a
contract, since it will not be able to attract the relatively highly motivated teachers
among them. These highly able teachers will surely receive a competing o¤er from
the underprivileged school as well and these competing o¤ers will be accepted by
teachers with a relatively high motivation, i  k. As this time the underprivileged
school is in the less favourable position, it has to o¤er the candidates with i < b
and i  k a job as well, to ll its remaining positions when the number of teachers
is equal to the number of positions, P = T .
In this case, the expected payo¤ of the underprivileged school can be written as:
EUs

=
Z 

Z 
k
[f(; )  w] g(; )dd+
Z b

Z k

[f(; )  w] g(; )dd; (4.5)
subject to Z 

Z 
k
g(; )dd+
Z b

Z k

g(; )dd = nP:
The expected payo¤ of the privileged school is:
EUs

=
Z 
b
Z k

[f(; )  w] g(; )dd; (4.6)
subject to
R b R k g(; )dd = (1  n)P .
Thus, as illustrated by gure 2, in the case where  < k   the privileged
school employs the teachers with relatively high ability and low motivation. The
underprivileged school employs highly motivated teachers with all kinds of ability. In
addition it employs a group of teachers with relatively low ability and lowmotivation.
This implies that among the teachers employed at the underprivileged schools there
is a positive correlation between ability and motivation. In the special case where
k > , all teachers prefer working at the privileged school. This school then o¤ers
a contract to the number of teachers it needs with ability i > b . The rest of
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the teachers is hired by the underprivileged school. There is no correlation between
motivation and ability in either type of school.
Figure 2: The sorting of teachers among schools when rT < nV
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What happens when there are more positions than teachers, P > T? If the
number of teachers with a relatively low motivation is still larger than the number
of positions at the privileged school, (1  r)T > (1 n)P , then the privileged school
has no problems hiring a su¢ cient number of teachers. The underprivileged school,
however, does have a problem. The school is able to hire the highly motivated
teachers and the remaining part of the lowly motivated teachers, rT + (1   r)T  
(1  n)P . As T < P; this number is smaller than the number of its positions, nP .17
17When condition (4.2) does not hold for all remaining teachers, this hiring problem gets worse.
If there are more lowly motivated teachers than positions at the priviliged school, (1   r)T >
(1   n)P , but a part of those teachers not employed by the priviliged school prefers his outside
option to a job at the underpriviliged school, the hiring problem of the underpriviliged school
becomes larger. Last, when in addition to rT < nP also (1   r)T < (1   n)P , both schools have
problems hiring a su¢ cient number of teachers.
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4.4.3 Changing costs of working with the underprivileged
In the analysis above the costs k of working with the underprivileged are constant. It
is interesting to know how the expected payo¤ of the schools is a¤ected by a change
in those costs, for example, by a government policy of installing weapon detectors
at the school entrance.
Many highly motivated teachers: rT  nP What happens to the expected
payo¤of the underprivileged school when k changes marginally? Di¤erentiating (4.3)
with respect to k, subject to the restriction that
R b R k g(; )dd = nP , gives us:
@EU
@k
=  
Z 
b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )d+R 
k
[f(; b)  w] g(; b)dR 
k
g(; b)d
Z 
b g(k; )d T 0: (4.7)
Thus, when the costs k of working with underprivileged children increase, the
underprivileged school will lose a number of
R b g(k; )d agents with motivation
k. These could have rendered the school a payo¤ of
R b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )d:
To keep the total number of teachers employed constant, the school will hire ex-
actly the same number of agents (
R b g(k; )d) with a lower ability. The aver-
age payo¤ of those additional agents is
R 
k [f(;b) w]g(;b)dR 
k g(;b)d . That is, the total pay-
o¤ of all agents with marginal ability b, divided by the total number of agents
with marginal ability b. Thus, the principal is willing to give up a total payo¤ ofR b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )d by hiring less lowly motivated agents in return for receiv-
ing a total payo¤of
R 
k [f(;b) w]g(;b)dR 
k g(;b)d
R b g(k; )d by hiring the less able in exchange.
This could have positive, neutral or negative consequences for the expected payo¤
of the school. Rearraging (4.7) shows that decreasing costs k of working with under-
privileged children has negative consequences for the payo¤ of the underprivileged
school, when:
R 
k
[f(; b)  w] g(; b)dR 
k
g(; b)d >
R b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )dR b g(k; )d ;
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that is, the average productivity of the teachers with marginal ability is higher than
the average productivity of the teachers with marginal motivation. This depends on
the marginal product of teachers ability and motivation. For example, if the mar-
ginal product of motivation is always higher than the marginal product of ability,
decreasing the costs k of working with the underprivileged can have unpleasant con-
sequences for the underprivileged school, because it loses some of its highly motivated
teachers with motivation

k; 

and ability b in return for the a group of teachers
with motivation k and ability [b; ]. However, when ability rather than motivation
is key, lowering the costs k may be in the underprivileged schools interest.
Since the total number of teachers is equal to the total number of positions, a
change in k has the exact opposite e¤ect on the expected payo¤ of the privileged
school:
@EU
@k
=
Z 
b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )d R 
k
[f(; b)  w] g(; b)dR 
k
g(; b)d
Z 
b g(k; )d T 0: (4.8)
Few highly motivated teachers: rT < nP Di¤erentiating (4.5) with respect
to k subject to the restriction that
R 

R 
k
g(; )dd+
R b

R k

g(; )dd = nP shows
that the e¤ect of a change in k has the following consequences for the underprivileged
schools expected payo¤ :
@EU
@k
=  
Z 
b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )d+R k

[f(; b)  w] g(; b)dR k

g(; b)d
Z 
b g(k; )d  0: (4.9)
When the costs of working with underprivileged children k increase, less teachers
are eager to work for the underprivileged school. Thus,
R b g(k; )d agents with
motivation k; which would have provided the underprivileged school with payo¤s
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R b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )d now prefer working at the privileged school. The privi-
leged school will raise its requirements regarding the ability level of the even larger
abundance of teachers it can now choose from. The remaining number of teachers,R b g(k; )d; of lower ability have to be hired by the underprivileged school in order
to leave no classes unattended. These teachers render the underprivileged school an
expected value added of
R k
 [f(;b) w]g(;b)dR k
 g(;b)d
R b g(k; )d.
A decrease in k has a positive e¤ect on the underprivileged schools expected
payo¤. This can be seen from rearranging (4.9). Decreasing k is benecial for the
underprivileged school, when:
R b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )dR b g(k; )d >
R k

[f(; b)  w] g(; b)dR k

g(; b)d :
This will always (weakly) be the case, since the average ability and average motiva-
tion of teachers in the term on the left-hand side is weakly higher than in the term
on the right-hand side and the schools expected utility of a teacher is higher, the
more competent and motivated the teacher is. Thus, stated otherwise, increasing
costs of working with underprivileged children k is always cumbersome for the un-
derprivileged school. When the costs of working with the underprivileged are high,
k > , the underprivileged school faces its worst case scenario.
Again the results for the privileged school are exactly opposite. This school
benets from increases in k:
@EU
@k
=
Z 
b [f(k; )  w] g(k; )d R k

[f(; b)  w] g(; b)dR k

g(; b)d
Z 
b g(k; )d  0: (4.10)
4.4.4 Testable predictions
This paragraph summarizes the most important results from the theoretical analysis.
I have the following two sets of testable predictions, depending on the number of
highly motivated teachers compared to the number of positions in the type of school
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with many underprivileged students.
First of all, when there are many motivated teachers compared to positions at
the underprivileged school, rT  nP , I have the following empirical predictions for
intermediate values of the costs of working with underprivileged children (  k  ):
1. the underprivileged school hires the teachers with the highest ability and mo-
tivation;
2. the privileged school hires the rest of the available teachers;
3. there is a negative correlation between ability and motivation among teachers
in the privileged school.
When the costs of working with the underprivileged are low, k < , I have the
following predictions:
1. the underprivileged school hires the teachers with the highest ability;
2. the privileged school hires the rest;
3. there is no sorting on motivation and, therefore, no correlation between ability
and motivation among teachers in either school.
Second, when there are few motivated teachers compared to positions at the
underprivileged school, rT < nP , the following predictions remain for intermediate
costs of working with underprivileged children (  k  ):
1. the privileged school hires the teachers with the highest ability and relatively
low motivation;
2. the underprivileged school hires the rest;
3. there is a positive correlation among ability and motivation among teachers in
the underprivileged school.
When the costs of working with the underprivileged are su¢ ciently high, k > ,
then:
1. the teachers with the highest ability are all hired by the privileged school;
2. the rest is hired by the underprivileged school;
3. there is no sorting on motivation and, therefore, no correlation between ability
and motivation among teachers in either school.
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4.5 Data
I use an exceptionally rich dataset about the motivation of people employed in
the Dutch educational sector in 2006. In section 4.5.1 I rst describe the Dutch
educational sector. In section 4.5.2 I describe the data used.
4.5.1 The Dutch educational sector
Size of the Dutch educational sector The entire Dutch educational sector
is large. It employed about 5 percent of the Dutch active labour force in 2006
(Ministerie van OCW 2008: 40). In this study we focus on a part of this sec-
tor, namely (compulsory) primary and secondary education. In 2006 175,300 per-
sons (131,400 full time equivalents) were employed in primary education. Among
those, there were 101,300 teachers, 7,700 educational support sta¤, 11,000 man-
agers and 11,400 administrative and organizational support sta¤ (Ministerie van
OCW 2008: 80). Primary education was attended in the school year 2005/2006
by 1,600,000 children, usually between four and twelve years old. Of those pupils,
240,000 were of an ethnic minority and 350,000 were from a disadvantaged social
group18 (www.statline.cbs.nl). After primary education, pupils attend secondary ed-
ucation. This is divided in di¤erent types of schools from lower vocational training
up to pre-university education. Depending on the type of education it takes four
till six years to receive a diploma. Afterwards pupils can attend further education,
that is, intermediate or higher vocational training, or university. In 2006 secondary
education employed 102,700 persons (84,400 full time equivalents): 75,500 teachers,
4,100 managers and 23,100 other sta¤ members (Ministerie van OCW 2008: 81).
Secondary education was attended by 940,000 students in the school year 2005/2006.
Of those students 130,000 were of an ethnic minority (www.statline.cbs.nl).
Teachersqualications Qualied teachers in primary schools need a degree in
primary teaching from a higher vocational training institute. Qualied teachers in
secondary education have either a rst degree or second degree qualication. Qual-
18Pupils from a disadvantaged social group include children from parents with a low level of
education, children from boatmen and gipsies.
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ied teachers of the second degree have a degree from a higher vocational training
institute and are allowed to teach in the rst three years of secondary education and
the nal year of lower vocational training. Teachers of the rst degree are allowed to
teach all levels. To get a rst degree in teaching, a second degree teacher has to fol-
low an additional training at a vocational training institute, or follow the university
teacher training programme instead (www.werkeninhetonderwijs.nl). In addition to
qualied teachers, also a group of underqualied teachers is allowed to teach. That
group consists of teachers-in-training and qualied teachers teaching outside their
own subject or at a higher level (with some restrictions) (Ministerie van OCW 2007:
34). In 2005 about 80 percent of the teachers in secondary education was fully
qualied to teach their subjects, 6 percent was not qualied and 14 percent was
underqualied. In the four large cities there were less fully qualied teachers. Only
73 percent of the teachers was fully qualied there, 10 percent unqualied and 16
percent underqualied. In addition to regional di¤erences there are also di¤erences
among the di¤erent types of schools. At lower vocational schools (VMBO) the per-
centage of not fully qualied teachers is between 20 and 27 percent, while at senior
general education (Havo) this is 16 percent and at pre-university education (VWO)
it is 13 percent (Ministerie van OCW, 2005: 26, 27).
Teachers salaries Teachers salaries are determined in a central labour agree-
ment per educational sector (Ministerie van OCW 2008: 68). Teachers are usually
remunerated on the basis of their seniority. That is, the number of years they are
employed in education. There is little di¤erentiation in remuneration between and
within schools in the Netherlands. This absence of di¤erentiation is somewhat puz-
zling at rst glance, because schools in secondary education have room for individual
di¤erentiation and there are regional di¤erences in the tightness of the teacher labour
market. However, it seems quite di¢ cult to break through the Dutch cultural norms
of equality in the teacher labour market (Waterreus et al. 2006: 566-567, Vrielink et
al. 2004, Ministerie van OCW 2007: 64-65, Ministerie van OCW 2008: 30). From
2009 onwards, extra budget will become available for teacherssalaries. This money
will make more di¤erentiation and a better teacher remuneration possible. Sec-
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ondary schools in urban regions in the Western part of the Netherlands will receive
an additional budget in order to solve their labour market problems (Ministerie van
OCW 2008: 13, 15).
Di¤erences in labour market tensions There was not too much tension on the
labour market for teachers in the school year 2005/2006, as the unlled vacancy rate
(unlled vacancies as percentage of total employment) was below the critical level
of 1% (Rigter et al. 2006: 59, Paulussen-Hoogenboom et al. 2006: 46, Ministerie
van OCW 2008: 39). However, there were regional di¤erences in teacher shortages.
In primary education there was an unlled vacancy rate of 0.2% on average, while
in the four largest cities it was more than twice as high, that is 0.5% (Rigter et al.
2006: 59). In secondary education the unlled vacancy rate was on average 0.2%,
while in the four largest cities it was 0.3% (Paulussen-Hoogenboom et al. 2006: 46,
47). The di¤erences between schools with and without a large number of students
from an ethnic minority was larger. Schools with less than 5% students from an
ethnic minority had an unlled vacancy rate of 0.3% on average during the school
years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. Schools with more than 25% students of an ethnic
minority had an unlled vacancy rate of 0.6% on average in those years (Paulussen-
Hoogenboom et al. 2006: 51).
4.5.2 Dataset and Empirical Strategy
Data
The data I use is collected by SBL (The Association for the Professional Qualities of
Teachers)19 in their research project Education Talking. The aim of this project
was to gain insight in the motivation and satisfaction of employees working in all ed-
ucation sectors in the Netherlands, thus from primary to higher education, in order
to set an agenda for educational policy renewals. A websurvey was issued among
employees working in education in the Netherlands in March-April 2006. Respon-
dents were approached directly at schools as well as through posters, free cards in
19SBL developed and promotes a quality standard of education in the Netherlands by formulat-
ing the required competences for teachers, and by focusing attention on professionalism.
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teachersand teacher assistantspigeon holes, websites, teacher magazines, mailings
and e-mails from schools, advertisements in a national newspaper, articles in several
newspapers and magazines, mailings and articles of professional and intermediary
organizations and yers at teacher conferences. All in all this led to a response of
over 12.000 education workers. The sample is not representative of all educational
workers, because there is some overrepresentation of elderly employees and some
underrepresentation of employees from secondary and higher education. However,
this does not have large consequences for the external validity of the outcome, since
there is not too much di¤erence in answers among respondents of di¤erent age or
sector with the exception of employees from higher education (SBL 2006).
I restrict myself to employees in primary and secondary education. Intermediate
and higher vocational training institutes, as well as universities are less well spread
over the country and are more likely to be local monopolies in the labor market as
well as the market for students. Therefore, I leave them out of the sample. I also
excluded special education institutions from the sample. Furthermore, I restricted
the sample to teachers as I am interested in how intrinsic motivation to work with
students a¤ects the sorting of teachers among schools. I removed teachers with
hardly any or no education from the sample. Since a certain level of education is
required to be allowed to teach, this implies that those data entrees are probably
wrong. This leaves me with a sample of 6164 teachers in primary and secondary
education.
My dependent variable is the school in which a teacher works. To be precise: It
is the extent to which a school has many underprivileged students. In order to get
such a measure of schools with underprivileged children I use two questions from the
survey. Does your school have students from an ethnic minority?((Almost) All
students are from an ethnic minority, More than half the students are from an ethnic
minority, less than half of the students are from an ethnic minority, (Almost) none of
the students are from an ethnic minority). Second, I also use Does your school have
many at-risk students(Many, Not Many and Not Few, Few). I applied Principal
Component Analysis (PCA), extracted one component and saved the results as a
new variable to get one measure of Underprivileged Children.The results of the
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Principal Component Analysis were (just) su¢ cient to allow for such a new variable.
The results of the Principal Component Analysis are in Appendix B. I use the new
variable "Underprivileged Children" as dependent variable in my Ordinary Least
Squares estimation. The higher the score on this variable, the more underprivileged
students attend this school.
Ability and intrinsic motivation are important explanatory variables according
to my theoretical model. As a proxy for ability I use the self-reported years of expe-
rience and the teachers highest level of educational level. I also added several other
observable variables to control for sex, marital status and being the breadwinner. To
obtain a measure for intrinsic motivation and other motivational control variables I
conducted a Principal Component Analysis on almost 50 statements on motivation.
In the survey respondents were asked how they agreed to those statements on a scale
of 1 to 7 (This statement does not suit me at allto This statement suits me very
well) on what motivated them. For example:
- I like to work with students;
- I like to have a good salary;
- I must have the feeling that my job is important;
- I want to provide students with good prospects;
- Students who need extra care can count on me;
- New developments in education stimulate my professionalisation.
Appendix C shows the results of the Principal Components Analysis. I extracted
the following twelve components: Intrinsic Motivation20, Employment Conditions,
Exchange, Excellence, Organization, Recognition, Safe Environment, Team Work,
Common View, Social Interaction, Autonomy and Leadership. Although all the
individual items in the PCA have less than 5% missing values, the removal of missing
values listwise reduces the sample size from 6164 to 3733 observations.
20Based on our theoretical model one might want to split intrinsic motivation in two separate
components: Intrinsic motivation towards all students and intrinsic motivation towards under-
privileged students. However, in the data this distinction was not visible. Principal component
analysis on the ve items concerning intrinsic motivation shows only one factor. Furthermore,
regression analysis with the item concerning students at risk and the rest of the items shows too
much multicollinearity.
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Descriptive Statistics
Primary Education Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of the primary
school sample. The sample is divided in two, to see if there are any di¤erences for
schools with a high percentage of underprivileged children and schools with a low
percentage of underprivileged children. A school with a high percentage of under-
privileged children is chosen to have a value for the factor of underprivileged children
equal to or above zero and a school with many privileged children is supposed to
have a factor of underprivileged children below zero. The di¤erences are small and
almost always insignicant, except for experience and marital status. The teachers
in underprivileged schools are more likely to be single parents than those in the
privileged schools. On the other hand, the teachers in the privileged school more
often have a partner and children. A somewhat counterintuitive observation is that
the percentage of privileged school teachers with less than ve years of experience
is higher than that of the underprivileged school teachers. However, this di¤erence
is not signicant. The di¤erence between teachers in underprivileged schools and
privileged schools with 6-10 years of experience does di¤er signicantly: A larger
part of the teachers in underprivileged schools has 6-10 years of experience.
Secondary Education The descriptive statistics of the secondary schoolteacher
sample in table 2 show some interesting di¤erences with the primary schoolteachers
sample.
First of all, secondary school teachers di¤er signicantly from primary school-
teachers in several respects. They have a lower intrinsic motivation to teach than
primary school teachers, but care more about their employment conditions. They
also care more about excellence in their job, having autonomy, and leadership. How-
ever, secondary school teachers care less about exchange of knowledge, a well-run
organization, a safe environment, recognition and a common view than primary
school teachers.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Primary School Sample
Variable Obs Underpriviliged Children Obs Priviliged Children Obs Total
(Factor >=0) (Factor<0)
Underpriviliged Children 1328 1451 2779
  Mean 0.90 -0.86 -0.02
  St.dev. 0.76 0.37 1.06
Intrinsic Motivation 815 849 1674
  Mean 0.20 0.24 0.18
  St.dev. 0.82 0.79 0.85
Employment Conditions 815 849 1674
  Mean -0.06 -0.01 -0.03
  St.dev. 0.96 1.01 0.99
Exchange 815 849 1674
  Mean 0.21 0.16 0.18
  St.dev. 0.81 0.89 0.85
Excellence 815 849 1674
  Mean -0.05 -0.13 -0.09
  St.dev. 0.95 0.93 0.94
Organization 815 849 1674
  Mean 0.09 0.06 0.07
  St.dev. 0.91 0.94 0.93
Recognition 815 849 1674
  Mean 0.21 0.22 0.21
  St.dev. 0.84 0.87 0.86
Safe Environment 815 849 1674
  Mean 0.10 0.11 0.10
  St.dev. 0.85 0.89 0.88
Team Work 815 849 1674
  Mean 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
  St.dev. 0.91 0.97 0.94
Common View 815 849 1674
  Mean 0.17 0.14 0.16
  St.dev. 0.81 0.86 0.84
Social Interaction 815 849 1674
  Mean -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
  St.dev. 0.81 0.89 0.85
Autonomy 815 849 1674
  Mean -0.22 -0.26 -0.24
  St.dev. 0.97 0.99 0.98
(To be continued)
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Primary School Sample (Continued)
Variable Obs Underpriviliged Children Obs Priviliged Children Obs Total
(Factor >=0) (Factor<0)
Leadership 815 849 1674
  Mean -0.19 -0.20 -0.20
  St.dev. 0.90 0.95 0.92
Age 1328 1451 2787
  Mean 43.36 43.52 43.42
  St.dev. 11.34 11.26 11.32
Experience in education 1325 1448 2789
  Less than 1 year 1.8% 2.4% 2.2%
  1-5 year 20.3% 20.6% 20.5%
  6-10 year 17.4% 13.8% 15.5%
  11-15 year 9.9% 9.3% 9.6%
  16-20 year 7.2% 9.3% 8.3%
  21-25 year 10.2% 12.6% 11.4%
  26-30 year 13.7% 12.3% 12.9%
  more than 30 year 19.5% 19.5% 19.6%
Education 1328 1451 2795
  MBO 1.5% 2.2% 1.9%
  Havo/VWO 3.5% 2.8% 3.1%
  HBO 90.1% 90.8% 90.5%
  WO 4.8% 4.2% 4.5%
Marital Status 1320 2775
  Married-Cohabitating with
children living at home 39.2%
1439
43.0% 41.1%
  Married-Cohabitating
without children living at home 39.0% 37.9% 38.4%
  Single 14.7% 13.0% 13.9%
  Single Parent 4.6% 3.4% 4.0%
  Living at home 2.4% 2.6% 2.6%
Breadwinner 1328 1451 2787
  Yes 51.2% 49.0% 50.1%
Sex 1323 1448 2787
  Female 76.0% 74.1% 75.0%
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Secondary School Sample
Variable Obs Underpriviliged Children Obs Priviliged Children Obs Total
(Factor >=0) (Factor<0)
Underpriviliged Children 1238 1427 2661
  Mean 0.64 -0.88 -0.18
  St.dev. 0.62 0.35 0.90
Intrinsic Motivation 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.23 -0.30 -0.27
  St.dev. 1.14 1.11 1.13
Employment Conditions 722 916 1646
  Mean 0.08 0.04 0.06
  St.dev. 1.05 1.00 1.02
Exchange 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.14 -0.35 -0.25
  St.dev. 1.08 1.11 1.10
Excellence 722 916 1646
  Mean 0.11 0.10 0.10
  St.dev. 1.08 1.06 1.06
Organization 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.02 -0.16 -0.10
  St.dev. 1.01 1.10 1.06
Recognition 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.22 -0.15 -0.18
  St.dev. 1.14 1.04 1.09
Safe Environment 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.07 -0.16 -0.12
  St.dev. 1.12 1.10 1.11
Team Work 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
  St.dev. 1.11 1.07 1.08
Common View 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.12 -0.20 -0.16
  St.dev. 1.13 1.15 1.14
Social Interaction 722 916 1646
  Mean -0.08 0.08 0.01
  St.dev. 1.14 1.08 1.11
Autonomy 722 916 1646
  Mean 0.19 0.31 0.26
  St.dev. 1.01 0.95 0.98
(To be continued)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Secondary School Sample (Continued)
Variable Obs Underpriviliged Children Obs Priviliged Children Obs Total
(Factor >=0) (Factor<0)
Leadership 722 916 1646
  Mean 0.14 0.24 0.19
  St.dev. 1.09 1.00 1.04
Age 1238 1427 2680
  Mean 45.78 45.29 45.51
  St.dev. 10.80 10.78 10.80
Experience in education 1238 1424 2677
  Less than 1 year 3.0% 2.6% 2.7%
  1-5 year 21.0% 18.8% 19.9%
  6-10 year 17.7% 15.3% 16.4%
  11-15 year 9.5% 9.8% 9.7%
  16-20 year 8.1% 8.8% 8.4%
  21-25 year 11.1% 11.4% 11.3%
  26-30 year 11.8% 15.4% 13.7%
  more than 30 year 17.9% 17.7% 17.8%
Education 1238 1427 2680
  HBO 63.7% 50.0% 56.3%
  WO 36.3% 50.0% 43.7%
Marital Status 1234 1416 2664
  Married-Cohabitating with
children living at home
42.1% 43.7% 42.7%
  Married-Cohabitating without
children living at home
38.5% 39.2% 38.7%
  Single 13.9% 12.5% 13.0%
  Single Parent 3.7% 2.7% 3.2%
  Living at home 1.8% 1.9% 1.9%
Breadwinner 1238 1427 2680
  Yes 67.9% 66.5% 67.2%
Sex 1232 1421 2666
  Female 43.7% 39.4% 41.3%
Category 1238 1427 2680
  VMBO first three years 18.7% 7.7% 12.8%
  VMBO last year 33.1% 14.9% 23.3%
  Havo-VWO first three years 17.8% 27.5% 23.0%
  Havo-VWO last two or three years 30.4% 49.9% 40.8%
Second of all, the di¤erences between teachers in underprivileged and privileged
schools are somewhat larger and more often signicant than among primary school-
teachers. Secondary school teachers in underprivileged schools care signicantly
more about the exchange of knowledge and being in a well run organization than
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teachers in privileged schools. Privileged school teachers on the other hand care sig-
nicantly more about social interaction, autonomy and leadership. There are more
female teachers in underprivileged schools. The percentage of teachers with less
than ten years of experience is higher in underprivileged schools than in privileged
schools (41.7% versus 36.7%). Teachers in underprivileged schools have a lower ed-
ucation than teachers in privileged schools, only 36.3% of teachers has a university
degree, while 50.0% at the privileged schools. This could be due to the fact that
in the underprivileged schoolteachers sample only 30.4% teaches in the last years of
Havo/VWO, where you need a rst degree in teaching, and almost half (49.9%) of
the teachers in privileged schools teaches in those years.
Estimation
I estimate the e¤ect of ability and motivation on the sorting into underprivileged
schools using ordinary least squares (OLS). Let y be the measure for the extend
to which a school has underprivileged children. Furthermore, Xm stands for the
variable measuring intrinsic motivation,Xa stands for a vector of variables measuring
ability,XmXa is a vector of interaction terms between a teachers intrinsic motivation
and ability, Xo stands for other observable teacher characteristics such as age and
sex, Xc is a vector of other motivational controls and, nally, " is the error term.
The regression equation is:
y = + Xm + Xa + XmXa + Xo + Xc + ":
Table 3 shows the translation of our theoretical predictions into testable empirical
ones. I have to make additional translations to be able to test these predictions,
because I have categorical variables and interaction terms. This makes the interpre-
tation of the coe¢ cients not straightforward. For example, if the coe¢ cient of the
motivational variable of someone with less than one year of experience is , then
the coe¢ cient of someone with one to ve years of experience would be  +  0, for
someone with ve to ten years of experience  +  1, and so forth.
To illustrate the tests, let us have a look at the predictions for the case where
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there are less motivated teachers than positions at underprivileged schools and in-
termediate costs of working in those schools,   k  . Teachers with a low level
of ability,   b, must accept a job at the underprivileged school,  < 0. Since
our ability variables are categorical this would imply that the coe¢ cients for the
di¤erent categories are decreasing in increasing ability, thus 0 > 1 > 2 and so
forth.
Teachers with a high level of ability,  > b, have a choice which job to take.
Above this threshold level, my theory predicts that the higher the teachers moti-
vation, the more willing he is to sort into a more underprivileged school. Below
this threshold level, motivation does not matter, since these teachers have no other
choice than to accept the job at the underprivileged school. We can test this by using
the categorical variables of experience and education in the model. For the lowest
levels of ability, we expect no e¤ect of motivation. That is, an estimate of intrinsic
motivation of zero:  +  = 0: For the higher levels of ability we expect a positive
e¤ect of motivation on the sorting into underprivileged schools, thus  +  > 0:
Furthermore, we would expect a positive correlation between ability and motivation
among teachers in the underprivileged schools, thus, for example  2 >  1 >  0.
21
For high costs of working with underprivileged children, k > , there is no sorting
on motivation ( = 0) and there is no correlation between ability and motivation at
either school ( = 0). Thus, at all ability levels the estimate of intrinsic motivation
will not be di¤erent from zero,  +  = 0, and the coe¢ cient for ability will be
negative,  < 0, implying 0 > 1 > 2
21To be precise, when one of the ability categories with   b is the base category, then we
woud expect  = 0 and  i = 0 for that category. For ability categories with  > b; we would then
expect +  i > 0 and  2 >  1 >  0:
When one of the ability categories of  > b is the base category, we would expect  > 0 and
 i > 0 for that category. Furthermore, we would expect  2 >  1 >  0:
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4.6 Empirical results
4.6.1 Primary Education
The rst question is which set of predictions to test. Therefore we need to know
whether the underprivileged or the privileged schools are more likely to have hir-
ing problems. On average, teachers stating that their schools have hiring prob-
lems work on a school with more underprivileged children (Underprivileged School,
M=0.12, SE=0.05) than teachers stating that their school have no hiring prob-
lems (Underprivileged School, M=-0.04, SE=0.02). This di¤erence is signicant
t(2737) =  2:970; p = 0:003. This implies that we are likely to be in the case with
less motivated teachers than vacancies at the underprivileged school, rT < nP . This
is in line with the data in section 4.5.1. Given this case we would expect one of both
sets of predictions from the bottom half of table 3 to hold.
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All primary school teachers The rst and second column in table 4 show
the nal model22, explaining the sorting of primary school teachers into schools
with underprivileged children. The rst column contains the nal model for the
full sample of primary school teachers (N=1658). We can reject the null hypothesis
that all coe¢ cients are equal to zero (F = 1:766, p = 0:010). However, the model
explains very little of the sorting of teachers into underprivileged schools (R
2
=
0:012). If anything, we can conclude that the sorting of primary school teachers
into underprivileged schools is not easy to predict using our data on Dutch primary
schoolteachers. The e¤ects of intrinsic motivation, experience, and education are not
signicant, neither are the interaction terms. This is not in line with the predictions
of the theoretical model. The results come closest to the k >  case, where the
costs of working at an underprivileged school are too high for even the intrinsically
motivated teachers to volunteer for working at an underprivileged school. However,
the coe¢ cients for ability were not signicant in the regression analysis, whereas I
would have expected them to be negative in the k >  case.23 To check whether a
model without the interaction terms would be more in line with the k >  case, the
second column shows these results. This model shows again insignicant e¤ects of
intrinsic motivation, experience, and education.
An important variable explaining the teachers choice of school is probably the
place where a teacher lives. A teacher who prefers to live in the city is more likely
to end up teaching underprivileged children than a teacher who lives and works
in the suburbs. Unfortunately, data on the place of residence of the teachers are
not available for this sample. Data on the urbanicity of the neighbourhood where
the school is located are available. However, restricting the primary schoolteacher
sample to teachers working in urban areas (with more than 100.000 residents) leaves
too few observations for the regression analysis.
22Insignicant controls were dropped from the nal model. Furthermore, age was excluded from
the nal regressions, because the correlation with experience was over 0.8. The coe¢ cients with
and without age do not di¤er much, neither do the signicance levels of experience.
23Ordered logit regressions with Does your school have students from an ethnic minority?or
Does your school have many at-risk studentsas dependent variables does not lead to di¤erent
conclusions. Furthermore, binary logit with schools divided in two types (underprivileged or priv-
ileged) does not lead to any signicant results either and the joint test of the coe¢ cients shows
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all coe¢ cients are equal to zero.
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Table 4 : Sorting of Primary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students
Dependent variable: Underprivileged Schools
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Theoretical model
Intrinsic Motivation .016 -0.040 .283* -0.034
(.077) (.033) (.155) (.057)
Experience:
  Less than one year -0.117 -0.155 -0.167 -0.259
(.196) ( .191) (.239) (.235)
  1-5 years .025 .000 .045 -0.071
(.087) (.085) (.174) (.172)
  6-10 years .080 .073 -0.061 -0.099
(.092) (.090) (.204) (.201)
  11-15 years -0.052 -0.046 -0.043 -0.204
(.108) (.105) (.251) (.234)
  16-20 years -0.073 -0.131 0.011 -0.154
(.123) (.119) (.268) (.263)
  21-25 years -0.078 -0.049 -0.598** -0.463*
(.111) (.104) (.257) (.247)
  26-30 years .143 .120 -0.033 -0.117
(.103) (.100) (.227) (.227)
  more than 30 years (base)
Education:
  MBO -0.331 -0.151 -1.176 .307
(.247) (.215) (1.018) (.557)
  Havo/VWO -0.253 -0.233 -0.457 -0.567*
(.182) (.157) (.407) (.327)
  HBO (base)
  WO .003 .004 .013 -0.011
(.129) (.128) (.178) (.174)
Experience* Intrinsic Motivation:
  Less than one year*Intrinsic -0.174 -0.489*
(.216) (.260)
  1-5 years*Intrinsic -0.113 -0.337*
(.105) (.175)
  6-10 years*Intrinsic -0.028 -0.465*
(.110) (.266)
  11-15 years*Intrinsic .009 -0.731**
(.119) (.309)
  16-20 years*Intrinsic -0.307** -0.850**
(.148) (.365)
  21-25 years*Intrinsic .072 .100
(.135) (.301)
  26-30 years *Intrinsic -0.114 -0.166
(.116) (.236)
  more than 30 years*intrinsic (base)
Education*Intrinsic:
  MBO *Intrinsic .450 1.778*
(.288) (1.008)
  Havo/VWO*Intrinsic .049 -0.492
(.220) (.399)
  HBO*Intrinsic (base)
  WO *Intrinsic -0.036 .144
(.128) (.223)
(To be continued)
< 5 year current job Full Sample
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Table 4 : Sorting of Primary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students
(Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Observable Controls
Sex (Female=0)
Breadwinner (Yes=0) -0.187**
(.090)
Marital Status (Single=base):
  Married/cohabitating with children (Base)
  Married/cohabitating without children .040 .039
(.062) (.062)
  Single .230*** .232***
(.083) (.082)
  Single parent .407*** .395***
(.145) (.144)
  Living with parents .000 -0.004
(.180) (.180)
Motivational controls
Autonomy .077***  .078***
(.027) (.027)
Organization
Exchange of knowledge
Team Work
Safe Environment
Recognition
Employment Conditions -0.103** -0.084*
(.049) (.049)
Leadership
Social Interaction
Excellence
Common View
Constant -0.042 -0.029 0.173 .114
(.080) (.079) (.158) (.156)
Model Fit
Number of observations 1658 1658 638 638
Goodness of Fit (P-value) 1.766(.010)*** 2.187(.004)*** 1.529(.055)* 1.024(.424)
R2 0.027  0.021 0.054 0.019
R2 adjusted 0.012  0.011 0.019 0.000
OLS with dependent variable "Schools with Underpriviliged Children".
Significance: *=10%, **=5% and ***=1%.
Standard error in parentheses.
Only significant controls included.
 Full Sample
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Primary school teachers with less than ve years of experience in cur-
rent job One of the reasons for the di¢ culty to predict the sorting of primary
school teachers into underprivileged schools might be the fact that many teachers
remain for many years in the same school. During this period their motivation to
sort into the school could change from the motivation to stay in the school. Further-
more, the schools population could change over time as well. Examples of white
schools turning into black schools over time are readily available. Therefore, I
restrict the sample to teachers who have less than ve years of experience in their
current school.
The results are in the third and fourth column of table 4. The third column con-
tains the model with the interaction terms included. It is statistically di¤erent from
zero at the 10%-level (F = 1:529, p = 0:055). The e¤ect of experience is non-linear
and not signicant. The e¤ect of education is positive, contrary to our predictions,
but not signicant. The interaction between education and intrinsic motivation is
non-linear and insignicant as well. Finally, the interaction between experience and
intrinsic motivation is non-linear and signicant at the 10%-level. This interaction
term shows a signicant di¤erence of the e¤ect of intrinsic motivation on sorting into
more underprivileged schools. Among the more experienced teachers (more than 30
years), the ones with a high motivation sort into the more underprivileged schools
than teachers with a low motivation. For example, a teacher with an experience of
30 years or more and a motivation of one standard deviation above the average sorts
into a school scoring about a quarter of a standard deviation higher on the under-
privileged variable than a teacher with average motivation (statistically signicant
at the 10%-level). This is in line with the model. However, among teachers of lower
ability we would have expected a neutral e¤ect of motivation, but unfortunately we
see a negative e¤ect. Teachers with a motivation of one standard deviation above
the average are signicantly (at the 10%-level) less likely to sort into the more un-
derprivileged schools than teachers with an average motivation among the group of
teachers with eleven to twenty years of experience.
A few of the controls had a signicant e¤ect. Breadwinners are more likely to
sort into the more underprivileged schools than other teachers. Teachers who have a
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high extrinsic motivation, the teachers who care more about their salary and other
employment conditions, are less likely to sort into the more underprivileged schools.
The fourth column shows the model without interaction terms to test the k > 
case. The model does not t the data well as we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that all explanatory variable coe¢ cients are jointly zero.
4.6.2 Secondary Education
Again on average, teachers stating that their schools have hiring problems work
on a school with more underprivileged children (Underprivileged School, M=-0.07,
SE=0.03) than teachers stating that their school have no hiring problems (Un-
derprivileged School, M=-0.24, SE=0.02). This di¤erence is signicant t(2023) =
 4:458; p = 0:000. This implies that for secondary school teachers we are also most
likely to be in the case with less motivated teachers than vacancies at the under-
privileged school, rT < nP . Given this case we would also expect for the secondary
schoolteachers that one of both sets of predictions from the bottom half of table 3
holds.
All secondary school teachers In the rst column of table 5 we see model 1
explaining the sorting of teachers into underprivileged schools for teachers when costs
of teaching in underprivileged schools are intermediate (N=1632). In this sample
there is no e¤ect of intrinsic motivation nor experience. The e¤ect of education is
negative. That is, if the teacher has a university degree, he is signicantly less likely
to work in an underprivileged school. The interaction e¤ects of ability and intrinsic
motivation are insignicant. In model 2 I left out the interaction terms, implying
we are in the case where k > , the costs of teaching in underprivileged schools
are high compared to the motivation to teach underprivileged children. The e¤ect
of motivation and experience is insignicant. The e¤ect of education is negative
again. Thus these estimates are largely in line with our theoretical predictions for
the k >  case (no e¤ect of intrinsic motivation and a negative e¤ect of ability on
the sorting into underprivileged schools). The models perform better in explaining
the sorting of secondary school teachers into underprivileged schools than those of
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primary school teachers, although the explained variance in model 1 and model 2
is still rather low (R
2
= 0:051) and (R
2
= 0:053). In both models teachers with a
preference for autonomy, strong leaders and social interaction are less likely to sort
into the more underprivileged schools, while teachers who think working in a well
run organization and exchanging knowledge is important, are more likely to do so.
Secondary school teachers with less than ve years of experience in
current job For both cases, k >  or  < k  , we look at the sorting of teachers
with less than 5 years in their current job. Again there is no e¤ect of intrinsic
motivation and experience, and a negative e¤ect of education on the sorting of
teachers into underprivileged schools. This resembles the k >  case as well. Also
the e¤ects of most of the controls, except leadership, are qualitatively in line with
those of model 1 and 2 of the full sample. There is no e¤ect of leadership in this
subsample.
Teachers teaching in the cities Data on the place of residence are also not
available for teachers in the secondary school sample. However, this time I was able
to run the analysis on the subsample of teachers working at schools in the cities.
This at least allows us to see whether there is sorting among teachers working in
urban areas (with more than 100.000 residents) into underprivileged and privileged
schools based on ability and motivation. Again, as in the full sample, we can only
see sorting based on education (table 6). The higher the teachers education, the less
likely he is to work at an underprivileged school. Furthermore, teachers who like to
exchange knowledge are more likely to work at underprivileged schools and teachers
who favour social interaction are less likely to work at underprivileged schools.
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Table 5 : Sorting of Secondary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students
Dependent variable: Underprivileged Schools
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Theoretical model
Intrinsic Motivation .010 .018 .309 -0.003
(.050) (.020) (.283) (.036)
Experience:
  Less than one year -0.027 .014 -0.151 -0.092
(.143) ( .133) (.270) (.264)
  1-5 years .004 .008 -0.094 -0.086
(.076) (.075) (.237) (.235)
  6-10 years .004 -0.007 .011 .002
(.077) (.076) (.250) (.248)
  11-15 years -0.038 -0.036 -0.036 -0.025
(.093) (.089) (.273) (.267)
  16-20 years -0.206** -0.195** -0.016 -0.101
(.098) (.094) (.336) (.325)
  21-25 years -0.066 -0.052 -0.118 -0.108
(.088) (.084) (.277) (.276)
  26-30 years -0.091 -0.107 -0.141 -0.151
(.083) (.080) (.299) (.289)
  more than 30 years (base)
Education:
  HBO (base)
  WO -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.184** -0.219***
(.046) (.045) (.083) (.080)
Experience* Intrinsic Motivation:
  Less than one year*Intrinsic -0.087 -0.433
(.126) (.308)
  1-5 years*Intrinsic -0.027 -0.399
(.066) (.288)
  6-10 years*Intrinsic .077 -0.278
(.062) (.292)
  11-15 years*Intrinsic .000 -0.345
(.072) (.296)
  16-20 years*Intrinsic -0.028 -0.145
(.086) (.355)
  21-25 years*Intrinsic -0.038 -0.411
(.075) (.330)
  26-30 years *Intrinsic .043 -0.310
(.068) (.345)
  more than 30 years*intrinsic (base)
Education*Intrinsic:
  HBO*Intrinsic (base)
  WO *Intrinsic -0.001 .086
(.039) (.075)
(To be continued)
 Full Sample < 5 year current job
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Table 5 : Sorting of Secondary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students
(Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Observable Controls
Sex (Female=0)
Breadwinner (Yes=0)
Marital Status (Single=base):
  Married/cohabitating with children (Base)
  Married/cohabitating without children
  Single
  Single parent
  Living with parents
Motivational controls
Autonomy -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.134*** -0.138***
(.022) (.022) (.041) (.040)
Organization .056*** .055*** .090** .082**
(.021) (.021) (.040) (.040)
Exchange of knowledge  .074*** .072*** .135*** .137***
(.021) (.021) (.042) (.041)
Team Work
Safe Environment
Recognition
Employment Conditions
Leadership -0.050** -0.051**
(.021) (.021)
Social Interaction -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.066*
(.020) (.020) (.037)
Excellence
Common View
Constant 0.004 .006 0.058 .061
(.061) (.060) (.232) (.231)
Model Fit
Number of observations 1632 1632 557 557
Goodness of Fit (P-value) 4.987(.000)*** 7.494(.000)*** 2.298(.001)*** 3.349(.000)***
R2 0.064  0.061 0.083 0.069
R2 adjusted 0.051  0.053 0.047 0.048
OLS with dependent variable "Schools with Underprivileged Children".
Significance: *=10%, **=5% and ***=1%.
Standard error in parentheses.
Only significant controls included.
 Full Sample
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Table 6 : Sorting of Secondary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students in the Cities
Dependent variable: Underprivileged Schools
Model 1 Model 2
Theoretical model
Intrinsic Motivation -0.066 -0.021
(.100) (.038)
Experience:
  Less than one year .087 .073
(.336) ( .263)
  1-5 years .137 .137
(.160) (.157)
  6-10 years 0.011 -0.029
(.161) (.157)
  11-15 years .071 .023
(.195) (.185)
  16-20 years -0.027 .046
(.233) (.213)
  21-25 years .069 .105
(.181) (.174)
  26-30 years .255 .219
(.187) (.182)
  more than 30 years (base)
Education:
  HBO (base)
  WO -0.285*** -0.279***
(.095) (.091)
Experience* Intrinsic Motivation:
  Less than one year*Intrinsic .042
(.273)
  1-5 years*Intrinsic -0.048
(.125)
  6-10 years*Intrinsic .164
(.111)
  11-15 years*Intrinsic .117
(.139)
  16-20 years*Intrinsic -0.140
(.195)
  21-25 years*Intrinsic -0.091
(.129)
  26-30 years *Intrinsic .137
(.148)
  more than 30 years*intrinsic (base)
Education*Intrinsic:
  HBO*Intrinsic (base)
  WO *Intrinsic .011
(0.82)
(To be continued)
Cities > 100.000 inhabitants
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Table 6 : Sorting of Secondary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students in the Cities
(Continued)
Model 1 Model 2
Observable Controls
Sex (Female=0)
Breadwinner (Yes=0)
Marital Status (Single=base):
  Married/cohabitating with children (Base)
  Married/cohabitating without children
  Single
  Single parent
  Living with parents
Motivational controls
Autonomy
Organization
Exchange of knowledge .115*** .114***
(.042) (.042)
Team Work
Safe Environment
Recognition
Employment Conditions
Leadership
Social Interaction -0.096** -0.101***
(.039) (.039)
Excellence
Common View
Constant .234* .244*
(.134) (.131)
Model Fit
Number of observations 542 542
Goodness of Fit (P-value) 2.095(.004)*** 2.969(.001)***
R2 0.071  0.058
R2 adjusted 0.037  0.038
OLS with dependent variable "Schools with Underprivileged Children".
Significance: *=10%, **=5% and ***=1%.
Standard error in parentheses.
Only significant controls included.
Cities > 100.000 inhabitants
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Di¤erences among schooltypes The above regressions show that across
schooltypes a university degree leads to sorting into the more privileged schools.
However, any secondary schoolteacher is allowed to teach in the rst three grades
of secondary school and the upper grade of the VMBO (the lower vocational train-
ing), but only teachers with a rst degree (post-HBO education or university de-
gree) are allowed to teach in the upper grades of Havo/VWO. Furthermore, there
is a strong correlation between the type of school (Havo/VWO versus VMBO)
and the extend to which they have underprivileged students. That is, teachers
working at a VMBO-school more often state that they work at an underprivileged
school (M=0.24, SE=0.03) than teachers working at a Havo/VWO-school (M=-0.41,
SE=0.02). This di¤erence is signicant t(2659) = 19:204; p = 0:000. Thus, the fact
that we see sorting across schooltypes can be due to the e¤ect that the requirements
for teaching are higher in the upper grades of secondary school or that the sorting
into underprivileged schools coincides with the sorting across schooltypes. To dis-
entangle these e¤ects we look at a subsample of teachers teaching in schooltypes for
which a HBO-education is su¢ cient. I thus delete the upper grades from Havo/VWO
from the sample. The rst two columns of table 7 show the results. For the model
with interaction terms, neither ability, nor motivation, nor their interaction terms
are signicant. For the model without interaction terms, we see that the e¤ect of
having an university degree is negative and signicant at the 10%-level. This would
imply high costs of working at underprivileged schools and therefore only the low
ability teachers, who have little choice, end up working there.
To see whether there was sorting within schooltypes as well we also looked at
the following two subsamples: Teachers teaching in VMBO and teachers teaching in
Havo/VWO. This unfortunately led to relatively small subsamples with not enough
variation within the samples (see the last four columns of table 7). The only model
for which we could reject the null hypothesis that all coe¢ cients are jointly zero was
the model for the case where  < k   in the VMBO-subsample. However, none
of the parameters from the theoretical model was signicantly di¤erent from zero in
this model.
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Table 7 : Sorting of Secondary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students
Dependent variable:
 Underprivileged Schools Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Theoretical model
Intrinsic Motivation 0.020 .024 .005 -0.037 -0.010 .000
(.072) (.028) (.088) (.035) (.056) (.021)
Experience:
  Less than one year -0.192 -0.098 -0.218 .066 .161 .139
(.205) ( .185) (.278) ( .250) (.143) ( .134)
  1-5 years -.050 -0.066 -0.006 .038 -0.007 -0.012
(.112) (.111) (.131) (.129) (.080) (.078)
  6-10 years  -0.035 .053 -0.103 -0.074 .017 .016
(.115) (.115) (.132) (.133) (.083) (.080)
  11-15 years -0.066 -0.059 -0.085 -0.074 -0.004 -0.002
(.138) (.135) (.160) (.160) (.102) (.093)
  16-20 years -0.243 -0.231 -0.393 -0.348* -0.057 -0.052
(.153) (.151) (.177) (.179) (.102) (.096)
  21-25 years -0.050 -0.062 -0.090 -0.074 -0.079 -0.092
(.133) (.129) (.150) (.149) (.095) (.090)
  26-30 years -0.066 -0.098 -0.139 -0.208 -0.063 -0.055
(.127) (.124) (.145) (.144) (.090) (.084)
  more than 30 years (base)
Education:
  HBO (base)
  WO -0.112 -0.131* .041 .030 -0.015 -0.017
(.080) (.076) (.114) (.111) (.050) (.048)
Experience* Intrinsic Motivation:
  Less than one year*Intrinsic -0.200 -0.218 .052
(.182) (.278) (.125)
  1-5 years*Intrinsic -0.059 -0.006 .021
(.093) (.131) (.072)
  6-10 years*Intrinsic .083 -0.103 .002
(.091) (.132) (.066)
  11-15 years*Intrinsic -0.072 -0.085 -0.002
(.103) (.160) (.082)
  16-20 years*Intrinsic -0.152 -0.393 -0.009
(.142) (.177) (.091)
  21-25 years*Intrinsic  .014 -0.090 .035
(.108) (.150) (.080)
  26-30 years *Intrinsic .071 -0.139 -0.014
(.108) (.145) (.071)
  more than 30 years*intrinsic (base)
Education*Intrinsic:
  HBO*Intrinsic (base)
  WO *Intrinsic -0.112 .058 .006
(.080) (.079) (.044)
(To be continued)
First three grades + VMBO 4 Havo/VWOVMBO
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Table 7 : Sorting of Secondary School Teachers into Schools with Underprivileged Students
(Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Observable Controls
Sex (Female=0)
Breadwinner (Yes=0)
Marital Status (Single=base):
  Married/cohabitating with children (base)
  Married/cohabitating without children -0.003
(.072)
  Single .038
(.096)
  Single parent .444***
(.165)
  Living with parents -0.167
(.198)
Motivational controls
Autonomy -0.103*** -0.096*** -0.123***
(.031) (.031) (.041)
Organization .040*  .041*
(.022)  (.022)
Exchange of knowledge .077*** .074**  .086**
(.030) (.030)  (.038)
Team Work
Safe Environment .049*
(.029)
Recognition
Employment Conditions
Leadership -0.062*
(.036)
Social Interaction -0.060** -0.059 -0.040* -0.041**
(.028) (.028) (.021) (.021)
Excellence .063*** .062***
(.023) (.023)
Common View -0.066* -0.081**
(.035) (.035)
Constant 0.085  0.095 0.346*** .302***  -0.447*** -0.443***
(.106) (.105) (.100) (.100) (.068) (.066)
Model Fit
Number of observations 952 952 580 580 1044 1044
Goodness of Fit (P-value) 1.812(.009)*** 2.269(.003)*** 1.947(.007)*** 1.448(.156) .945(.529) 1.527(.108)
R2  0.047  0.037 0.068  0.025 0.018 0.017
R2 adjusted 0.021  0.021 0.033  0.008 -0.001 0.006
OLS with dependent variable "Schools with Underprivileged Children".
Significance: *=10%, **=5% and ***=1%.
Standard error in parentheses.
Only significant controls included.
First three grades + VMBO 4 Havo/VWOVMBO
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4.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter formally analyses the sorting of teachers with unobservable motivation
and observable ability into underprivileged schools. The model predicts that when
there are few motivated teachers and intermediate costs of working with underpriv-
ileged children, teachers with high motivation and all sorts of ability sort into the
underprivileged school, as well as a group of lowly able and lowly motivated teachers
not employed by the privileged school. When the costs of working with the under-
privileged are high, there is no sorting on motivation and the underprivileged school
is left with the teachers of low ability.
The international empirical literature shows support for the theory. As does
anecdotal evidence for the Netherlands, as for example an inner city school principal
in Rotterdam, proclaiming that Teachers dont live in this neighbourhood any more,
so we depend on idealists (Valk, 2003:3). Testing the model using Dutch survey
data shows that the sorting of secondary schoolteachers is largely in line with the case
where there are high costs of working with the underprivileged: There is no sorting
on motivation and teachers with a higher ability, as measured by education, are less
likely to work in the more underprivileged schools. The e¤ect of the other indicator
of ability, teachers experience, is not signicant. The results for the primary school
example are more ambiguous: There is no sorting on ability and only some sorting
on motivation, although not always in the predicted direction.
Many di¤erent reasons could explain the fact that the theory is not fully sup-
ported by the Dutch data. First of all, there are some limitations to the theory. It
does, for instance, not capture all the possible variables inuencing teacher sorting.
Second, the same goes for the data. We might need a more comprehensive dataset
to test the theory to control for other reasons for teacher sorting, as for example
place of residence. Third, there might also be a more positive reason why we found
little support for teacher sorting: There might not be a big di¤erence between privi-
leged and underprivileged schools in the Netherlands, especially in primary schools.
Although there is clear anecdotal evidence that some schools in the big cities have
a more problematic student population to teach, the majority of schools might not
di¤er too much in that respect and therefore sorting might be absent.
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Fourth, the theoretical predictions were based on a model with only two types
of schools: Privileged versus underprivileged. One could argue that a theoretical
model with a continuum of schooltypes would lead to better predictions. To see
how this would alter the predictions we look at the case with intermediate costs
of working at underprivileged schools and a shortage of highly motivated teachers.
The crucial part in the analysis is that teachers with i  k always prefer to work
at a school with as a high a percentage of underprivileged children as possible, since
this renders them the highest utility (see (4.2)), and teachers with i < k will prefer
teaching in schools with as a high a percentage of privileged children as possible.
Remember that all teachers apply everywhere, since there are no costs of applying
and any teaching job renders more utility than teachers outside option utility. Thus
the most priviliged school o¤ers contracts to the teachers with the highest level of
ability ( > b), teachers with i < k will accept it. The next school in line will o¤er
a contract to all teachers with b >  > bb. At the other side of the spectrum the most
underprivileged school will o¤er a contract to the teachers with the highest ability
as well, the teachers with motivation i  k will accept it. The next underprivileged
school in line will o¤er contracts to teachers of the next ability level, and so forth.
In this case the intermediate types of schools are the worst o¤: They end up with
the teachers of the lowest ability and possibly lowest motivation. However, the data
(see table 4 and 5) are not in line with this model. When the costs of working with
the underprivileged are very high, k > , the predictions are the same as in the
two-type model: All teachers prefer to work at the privileged school and the ones
with the highest ability are hired by the most privileged school, and so forth.
Fifth, one could argue that with a continuum of schools there is also a di¤erence in
costs of working with the underprivileged at the di¤erent schools. Thus, for example,
the costs of working with underprivileged children at school 1 (k1) are higher than
the costs of working with the underprivileged at school 2 (k2) whenever 1 > 2: In
that case the privileged school will attract the teachers with the highest ability and
lowest motivation. The next school will attract a group of teachers with the same
ability, but slightly higher motivation and a group of teachers with lower ability but
also on average slightly higher motivation, and so forth. This implies that the most
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underprivileged school will hire the teachers with the highest ability and highest
motivation and a group of teachers with the lowest ability and any motivation, as in
our two typemodel. However, our data do not support these hypotheses any better
than the current hypotheses.
Finally, in this chapter motivation is captured by the answers on several questions
about stated preferences. The use of stated preferences has some well-known disad-
vantages, as for example self-serving bias. It would have been better to use revealed
preferences data (see e.g. Buurman, Dur and Van den Bossche 2009). Unfortunately,
revelealed preferences data on teacher motivation are not available.
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4.A Appendix A
In order to prefer teaching in any school above their outside option, condition (4.2)
has to hold. Here I show how high the wage has to be for condition (4.2) to hold.
First of all, I look at the conditions under which teachers are willing to take their
preferred job. For teachers with low motivation, i < k, the wage has to be higher
than their outside option utility plus their non-pecuniary costs of teaching in a
privileged school, w > ew = A   (i   k), and for teachers with high motivation,
i  k, the wage has to be higher than the outside option utility minus their non-
pecuniary benets of teaching in an underprivileged school, w > eew = A  (i  k).
Next, I look at the conditions under which teachers are also willing to take a job
at the school of their second choice. Rearranging (4.2) shows that teachers with
motivation i < k are willing to accept a job at an underprivileged school as long
as the wage w is high enough: w > bw = A  (i   k): Thus the wage needs to be
above the outside option utility A and the non-pecuniary payo¤s of teaching in the
underprivileged school which are negative for those teachers, (i k) < 0. Teachers
with motivation i  k have zero or positive non-pecuniary payo¤s, (i   k)  0,
even when teaching in the privileged school, their second-best school. For those
teachers to prefer teaching in the second-best school to their outside option, the
wage needs to be above the outside option utility minus the non-pecuniary payo¤s
of teaching, w > bbw = A   (i   k): Since the wage is equal to every teacher, this
implies that when (4.2) holds for teachers with low motivation, it will certainly hold
for teachers with higher motivation, since bw > bbw .
It is easy to see that, bw > ew > bbw > eew. Whenever the wage is high enough for
a teacher with motivation i < k to accept a job at his second-best school, he will
also accept a job at his preferred school. Furthermore, all teachers with a higher
motivation than his, those with i = k, are willing to accept a job at both schools as
well. Stated otherwise, whenever the wage is not high enough to attract a su¢ cient
number of teachers, the least motivated among the potential teachers are not willing
to apply for a job as teacher. Thus (4.2) will always hold if w > bw.
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4.B Underprivileged School
To construct a measure for the number of underprivileged children we used the two
variables Students from an ethnic minorityand Students at-risk, see table B.1
and B.2 for descriptive statistics.
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on these 2 items to con-
struct a factor. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure shows that the sampling
adequacy for the analysis is exactly at the acceptable limit of KMO=0.5 (Field,
2009). The KMO-values for the individual items were 0.5 as well. Bartletts test of
sphericity 2(1) = 1372; p < :000, indicating that correlations between items were
su¢ ciently large for PCA. The factor had an eigenvalue of 1.4 and explained 72% of
the variance. The scree plot showed indeed one factor. We saved the factor scores
as variable using the regression method and used it as dependent variable in our
regression analysis. Table B.3 shows the factor loading and table B.4 the descriptive
statistics of the new variable Underprivileged school.
Table B.1 Does your school have students from an ethnic minority?
Frequency Percentage
Almost no students from an ethnic minority 2701 43.8
Less than half of the students is from an ethnic minority 2421 39.3
More than half of the students is from an ethnic minority 529 8.6
Almost all students are from an ethnic minority 493 8
Missing 20 0.3
Total 6164 100
Table B.2 Does your school have at-risk students?
Frequency Percentage
Few 2188 35.5
Neither few nor many 2381 38.6
Many 1565 25.4
Missing 30 0.5
Total 6164 100
Table B.3 Component Matrix
Component
Students from an ethnic minority 0.851
Students lagging behind 0.851
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. One component extracted.
Table B.4 Descriptive statistics Underprivileged School
N Minimum Maximum Mean St.Dev.
Underprivileged School 6123 -1.21 2.27 0 1
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The questionnaire contains many questions about motivation. I conducted a Prin-
cipal Component Analysis (PCA) with orthogonal rotation (varimax)24. Table C.1
shows the descriptive statistics of the items used in this analysis.
The KMO = 0.96 for this analysis, which indicates that the sampling is more
than adequate for the analysis, as were all the individual KMO values. Bartletts test
of sphericity 2(1891) = 97594:1293; p < :000, indicating that correlations between
items were su¢ ciently large for PCA. Twelve components had an eigenvalue over
Kaisers criterion of 1. Together they explained 56% of the variance. The scree
plot was somewhat ambiguous, but could justify 12 components. I saved the twelve
component scores as variables using the regression method. These twelve variables
are the motivational variables in the regression analysis. Table C.2 shows the factor
loading after rotation (only loadings > 0.4 are shown) and table C.3 the descriptive
statistics of the new variables.
The rst component captures items on exchange of knowledge with other people
(Exchange). The second component loads on items which are important for peo-
ple who like to excel in their job (Excellence). The third component captures the
importance people attach to a well run organization (Organization). The fourth
component is about recognition and appreciation by parents, students, and so forth
(Recognition). The fth component stands for intrinsic motivation to teach. It loads
highly on items related to working with students, as for example Students who need
extra care can count on me.The sixth component represents the importance of a safe
working environment (Safe_Environment). Component number seven represents the
importance people attach to working as a team (Team_Work) and component num-
ber eight for the importance of having a common view or vision (Common_View).
Component number nine loads highly on items concerning the importance of social
interaction with colleagues (Social_Interaction). The tenth component loads highly
24One could argue that, theoretically, the components need not be orthogonal and perhaps
an oblique rotation would be more appropriate. However, based on the component correlation
matrix of the oblimin rotation with Kaiser Normalization we need not worry too much about the
correlation between the components. The intrinsic motivation component loaded high on the same
items in both cases.
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on employment conditions as salary. Component eleventh catches the importance of
having autonomy in the job (Autonomy). Finally, component twelve represents the
importance teachers attach to strong leadership (Leadership).
Table C.1 Descriptive Statistics Items PCA (to be continued)
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
I like to do my job well 6152 1 7 6.77 0.54
I like to develop myself in my job 6136 1 7 6.39 0.88
I like to inspire my colleagues 6083 1 7 5.97 1.10
I like to be involved in educational developments 6052 1 7 5.94 1.20
I like to be informed about everything in education 6047 1 7 5.91 1.15
I like to touch every individual student with my teaching 6141 1 7 6.18 1.04
I like to get incentives to improve myself 6112 1 7 5.93 1.15
I like to be leading in keeping education up-to-date 6049 1 7 5.10 1.51
My knowledge and experience should be used to improve
the teaching in my school
6088 1 7 5.93 1.14
I like to inspire new generations of students 6100 1 7 6.30 0.91
I like to renew with my colleagues 6015 1 7 5.66 1.41
I think that a more experienced colleague should have a
role as coach and counsellor
6149 1 7 5.52 1.50
I think that the job should be organized in such a way that
we can easily make use of each other's knowledge and
experience
6125 1 7 6.28 0.95
I think that we should use knowledge and experience
from outside our school more often and they should use
our's
6090 1 7 5.33 1.58
I like to cooperate with people from outside our school 6062 1 7 5.19 1.52
I enjoy other people calling upon my knowledge and
experience
6068 1 7 6.17 0.92
I enjoy calling upon the knowledge and experience of
others
6014 1 7 5.96 1.09
I think it is important to be a member of a union or
professional organization
5981 1 7 4.91 2.20
I enjoy working with students 6147 1 7 6.69 0.62
I like to have a good salary 6126 1 7 6.10 1.33
I must have the feeling that my job is important 6094 1 7 6.38 0.90
I like to provide students with good prospects 6086 1 7 6.58 0.74
Students who need extra care can count on me 6104 1 7 6.40 0.88
I think that enthousiastic colleagues are inspiring 6078 1 7 6.35 1.00
Critical parents challenge me in my development 6065 1 7 5.02 1.53
New developments in education stimulate my
professionalisation
6004 1 7 5.06 1.66
I think that the use of new technologies stimulates my
professionalisation
5884 1 7 5.23 1.55
Appreciation by my students 6141 1 7 6.28 0.85
Appreciation by the parents of my students 6119 1 7 5.90 1.06
Appreciation by my colleagues 6089 1 7 6.12 0.92
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Table C.1 Descriptive Statistics Items PCA (continued)
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Appreciation by the schoolleaders or my boss 6112 1 7 6.17 1.01
Social recognition 6048 1 7 5.89 1.23
Informal contacts with colleagues 6132 1 7 5.83 1.23
To read articles, magazines, books, look for information
on websites
6119 1 7 5.91 1.09
Classroom observation and debriefing by colleagues 6083 1 7 5.20 1.54
Performance appraisal with my boss 6109 1 7 5.29 1.64
Training 6118 1 7 6.00 1.12
Assistance and guidance by external experts 6085 1 7 5.23 1.63
To participate in networks with other schools and
knowledge centers
6081 1 7 5.11 1.58
To learn as a team from other schools 6041 1 7 5.23 1.53
Adapt an existing method to current developments in
education
5987 1 7 5.45 1.50
To respond to individual differences among students 5969 1 7 5.91 1.32
To work with new learning methods 5873 1 7 5.42 1.71
I like to know what is expected of me in my job 6128 1 7 5.94 1.16
I like to determine my own methods 6129 1 7 6.03 1.06
I like to see an inspiring vision on education in my school 6104 1 7 6.03 1.13
I like the work of me and my colleagues to be based on a
common vision
6106 1 7 5.97 1.21
I like the schoolleaders to determine the vision on
education
6113 1 7 3.68 1.81
I like the team to determine the vision on education 6047 1 7 6.02 1.19
I like the organisation of education to work smoothly 6077 1 7 6.30 0.94
I like our personnel policy aiming for improvement and
development of education
6084 1 7 6.11 1.08
I like to have a personnel policy that takes my age into
account
6052 1 7 5.16 1.90
I want to be safe at my workplace 6048 1 7 6.65 0.74
I like to work in a clean environment 6000 1 7 6.35 0.99
I like clear behavioral rules in our school 5955 1 7 6.52 0.81
I want to be able to count on my colleagues 5865 1 7 6.58 0.71
Clear goals for improvement 6084 1 7 5.32 1.43
A plan 6039 1 7 5.44 1.45
Encouragement from the schoolleaders to experiment 6049 1 7 5.38 1.57
Schoolleaders who verify the achievement of goals 6070 1 7 5.10 1.67
To cooperate with colleagues 6088 1 7 6.23 0.98
Realizing the value of what you're doing 6027 1 7 6.22 1.07
Total number of observations (listwise) 3733
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Table C.2 Rotated Component Matrix (to be continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6
To learn as a team from other schools 0.71
To participate in networks with other schools and
knowledge centers 0.71
Assistance and guidance by external experts 0.70
I like to cooperate with people from outside our school 0.66
I think that we should use knowledge and experience
from outside our school more often and they should use
our's 0.65
To work with new learning methods 0.62
New developments in education stimulate my
professionalisation 0.59
To respond to individual differences among students 0.57 0.41
Training 0.57
Adapt an existing method to current developments in
education 0.56
Classroom observation and debriefing by colleagues 0.52
I like to renew with my colleagues 0.49 0.44
Performance appraisal with my boss 0.45
I think that the use of new technologies stimulates my
professionalisation 0.44
I like to get incentives to improve myself 0.41
Critical parents challenge me in my development 0.40
I like to be involved in educational developments 0.75
I like to be informed about everything in education 0.70
I like to develop myself in my job 0.62
My knowledge and experience should be used to improve
the teaching in my school 0.58
I like to inspire my colleagues 0.54
I like to be leading in keeping education up-to-date 0.44 0.54
I like to do my job well 0.47
I like to inspire new generations of students 0.45 0.40
To read articles, magazines, books, look for information
on websites 0.40
A plan 0.78
Clear goals for improvement 0.77
Schoolleaders who verify the achievement of goals 0.63
Encouragement from the schoolleaders to experiment 0.62
Realizing the value of what you're doing 0.45
To cooperate with colleagues 0.40
Appreciation by my colleagues 0.74
Appreciation by the schoolleaders or my boss 0.74
Appreciation by the parents of my students 0.70
Appreciation by my students 0.65
Social recognition 0.57
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Table C.2 Rotated Component Matrix (continued)
7 8 9 10 11 12
To learn as a team from other schools
To participate in networks with other schools and
knowledge centers
Assistance and guidance by external experts
I like to cooperate with people from outside our school
I think that we should use knowledge and experience
from outside our school more often and they should use
our's
To work with new learning methods
New developments in education stimulate my
professionalisation
To respond to individual differences among students
Training
Adapt an existing method to current developments in
education
Classroom observation and debriefing by colleagues
I like to renew with my colleagues 0.40
Performance appraisal with my boss
I think that the use of new technologies stimulates my
professionalisation
I like to get incentives to improve myself
Critical parents challenge me in my development
I like to be involved in educational developments
I like to be informed about everything in education
I like to develop myself in my job
My knowledge and experience should be used to improve
the teaching in my school
I like to inspire my colleagues
I like to be leading in keeping education up-to-date
I like to do my job well
I like to inspire new generations of students
To read articles, magazines, books, look for information
on websites
A plan
Clear goals for improvement
Schoolleaders who verify the achievement of goals
Encouragement from the schoolleaders to experiment
Realizing the value of what you're doing
To cooperate with colleagues
Appreciation by my colleagues
Appreciation by the schoolleaders or my boss
Appreciation by the parents of my students
Appreciation by my students
Social recognition
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Table C.2 Rotated Component Matrix (continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6
I must have the feeling that my job is important
Students who need extra care can count on me 0.65
I enjoy working with students 0.64
I like to touch every individual student with my teaching 0.61
I like to provide students with good prospects 0.53
I think that enthousiastic colleagues are inspiring
I like clear behavioral rules in our school 0.74
I like to work in a clean environment 0.72
I want to be safe at my workplace 0.63
I want to be able to count on my colleagues 0.55
I like the organisation of education to work smoothly 0.51
I like to know what is expected of me in my job 0.43
I think that a more experienced colleague should have a
role as coach and counsellor
I enjoy other people calling upon my knowledge and
experience
I think that the job should be organized in such a way that
we can easily make use of each other's knowledge and
experience
I enjoy calling upon the knowledge and experience of
others
I like the team to determine the vision on education
I like the work of me and my colleagues to be based on a
common vision
I like to see an inspiring vision on education in my school
I like our personnel policy aiming for improvement and
development of education
Informal contacts with colleagues
I like to have a personnel policy that takes my age into
account
I think it is important to be a member of a union or
professional organization
I like to have a good salary
I like to determine my own methods
I like the schoolleaders to determine the vision on
education
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
12 components extracted. Rotation converged in 11 iterations.
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Table C.2 Rotated Component Matrix (continued)
7 8 9 10 11 12
I must have the feeling that my job is important
Students who need extra care can count on me
I enjoy working with students
I like to touch every individual student with my teaching
I like to provide students with good prospects
I think that enthousiastic colleagues are inspiring
I like clear behavioral rules in our school
I like to work in a clean environment
I want to be safe at my workplace
I want to be able to count on my colleagues
I like the organisation of education to work smoothly
I like to know what is expected of me in my job
I think that a more experienced colleague should have a
role as coach and counsellor 0.60
I enjoy other people calling upon my knowledge and
experience 0.55
I think that the job should be organized in such a way that
we can easily make use of each other's knowledge and
experience 0.52
I enjoy calling upon the knowledge and experience of
others 0.48
I like the team to determine the vision on education 0.49
I like the work of me and my colleagues to be based on a
common vision 0.46
I like to see an inspiring vision on education in my school
I like our personnel policy aiming for improvement and
development of education
Informal contacts with colleagues 0.65
I like to have a personnel policy that takes my age into
account 0.60
I think it is important to be a member of a union or
professional organization 0.52
I like to have a good salary 0.51
I like to determine my own methods 0.73
I like the schoolleaders to determine the vision on
education 0.85
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
12 components extracted. Rotation converged in 11 iterations.
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Table C.3 Descriptive Statistics Components
N Min Max Mean St.Dev
Exchange 3733 -4.54 2.92 0.00 1.00
Excellence 3733 -6.86 2.72 0.00 1.00
Organization 3733 -5.02 2.90 0.00 1.00
Recognition 3733 -8.63 3.20 0.00 1.00
Intrinsic Motivation 3733 -8.32 3.57 0.00 1.00
Safe Environment 3733 -7.74 3.62 0.00 1.00
Team Work 3733 -6.04 3.51 0.00 1.00
Common View 3733 -7.55 4.06 0.00 1.00
Social Interaction 3733 -6.10 4.31 0.00 1.00
Conditions of Employment 3733 -4.95 4.42 0.00 1.00
Autonomy 3733 -6.33 3.35 0.00 1.00
Leadership 3733 -3.42 5.15 0.00 1.00
Valid N (listwise) 3733
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4.D Notation
Notation 1 j = percentage of underprivileged children at school j.
Notation 2 P = number of positions (equals the number of classes of pupils to
teach).
Notation 3 qj =school js production function.
Notation 4 i = teacher is ability.
Notation 5 i =teacher is motivation.
Notation 6 f(i; i) =value added of teacher i with ability i and motivation i.
Notation 7 g(i; i) =joint probability density function of teachersmotivation and
ability.
Notation 8 w = the teachers wage.
Notation 9 EUsj =school js expected payo¤.
Notation 10 EUtij =teacher is expected utility of working at school j.
Notation 11 A =teachers reservation wage.
Notation 12 T =total number of teachers.
Notation 13 n =percentage of all vacancies at the underprivileged school.
Notation 14 k =costs of working for underprivileged children.
Notation 15 r =percentage of teachers T with motivation i  k.
Notation 16  =Lagrange Multiplier.

Chapter 5
Summary and Directions for
Further Research
Motivation is an important element inuencing the performance of public sector
workers. However, not all public sector workers will be motivated by the same as-
pects of public sector work nor to the same extent. This di¤erence in motivation
and its consequences is the central focus of this thesis. The rst part of the the-
sis explores the variation in motivation between private and public sector workers
and analyzes the factors that inuence di¤erences in motivation within these two
sectors. The second part of this thesis studies a particular aspect of public sector
workersmotivation, namely the motivation towards clients, and its e¤ects on al-
location decisions and the sorting into street-level bureaucracy. Furthermore, we
study theoretically the consequences of the introduction of incentives for allocation
and sorting decisions. The lessons learned can be applied to optimize public sector
personnel policies.
5.1 Summary
If motivation is key for the quantity and quality of public services provided, the rst
question to ask is whether public service motivation or altruism among public sector
workers indeed exists. This is the subject of chapter two. Many studies using stated
preferences or stated behaviour show that public sector workers have a higher level
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of public service motivation than private sector employees. The same goes for risk
aversion: Public sector workers are more risk averse than private sector workers,
at least according to studies using stated behaviour. Although these studies are
valuable in itself, there also have some well-known disadvantages due to the use
of stated behaviour and stated preferences. These disadvantages include socially
desirable answers and self-serving bias. Therefore, we use revealed preferences data
to add to the existing body of knowledge on the di¤erences between private and
public sector employeesaltruism and risk aversion in the rst part of this thesis.
We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others
and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector.
Respondents of a large-scale survey were o¤ered a substantial reward and could
choose between a widely redeemable gift certicate, a lottery ticket, or making a
donation to a charity. Our multinomial regression analysis shows that public sector
employees are signicantly less likely than private sector workers to choose the risky
option (lottery) over the safe option (gift-certicate). They are more likely, at the
start of their career, to choose the pro-social option (charity) over the selsh option
(gift-certicate) than private sector employees. However, when tenure increases, this
di¤erence in pro-social inclinations disappears and, later on, even reverses. In the
private sector, we nd no such pattern. Furthermore, tenure does not inuence the
choice of the lottery ticket over the gift certicate in either of the sectors. The e¤ect
of tenure on the choice of the pro-social option is not due to any public-sector specic
age e¤ect: It remains intact after controlling for these.
Our data only allow us to tell something about risk-aversion and altruism at the
margin, because the reward for answering the survey provides some additional funds
for altruistic or risky choices. We do not know how much risk people take in their
daily life, nor do we know how much they contribute to the public interest. Maybe
people are not willing to donate to charity, because they already contribute to the
public good beyond their call of duty at work. Regrettably, we cannot control for
the average risks people take in their daily life. However, one of the survey questions
asked people whether they consider their salary to be su¢ cient for the work that
they do. Using the answers to this question we can infer that quite a few public
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sector employees do not contribute to charity, because they feel that they already
contribute enough to society at work for too little pay.
The second part of this thesis comprises chapter three and four and studies
the e¤ects of altruistic feelings towards clients among street-level bureaucrats, both
theoretically and empirically. Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers)
have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. In chapter three
we develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of
its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who di¤er
in unobservable altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid at wages,
they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy.
The attractiveness of the job does not only depend on the base salary, but also
on the composition of the client population. When there are more clients in need
of help, the street-level bureaucrats enjoys more non-pecuniary benets of helping
them. Thus the pecuniary benets, the base salary, can be lower to attract the same
number of employees. Furthermore, if the agency is a monopsonist on the labour
market it might be optimal to hire less agents than necessary to serve all clients, in
order to reduce the salary costs. Thus, our model is able to explain why street-level
bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.
Pay-for-performance induces some of the bureaucrats to sanction, but necessi-
tates an increase in the expected wage to compensate for the sorrows of sanctioning
unwilling clients. When it is too costly to induce all agents to sanction unwilling
clients, this can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism dis-
tribution. However, when the value to the agency of sanctioning unwilling clients
is su¢ ciently high, it might compensate the agents by o¤ering a base salary and
bonus above agentsoutside option utility. The personnel attracted to such a job
is drawn from the bottom of the altruism distribution. Thus, the pecuniary and
non-pecuniary benets of the job can have a substantial impact on the types of
bureaucrats selecting into it.
In chapter four we continue our research on this theme by rst developing a
sorting model in which agents not only di¤er in their unobservable motivation to-
wards clients, but also in their observable ability to work with them. We apply
130 Summary and Directions for Further Research
this to a special case: The sorting of teachers into inner city schools. Inner city
or underprivileged schools often have di¢ culties attracting qualied personnel. The
model predicts that underprivileged schools attract highly motivated teachers of
all abilities and a group of lowly motivated and lowly able teachers, when highly
motivated teachers are scarce and costs of working with the underprivileged are in-
termediate. Thus, we expect a positive correlation between ability and motivation
among teachers sorting into underprivileged schools. When the costs of working with
the underprivileged are high, there is no sorting on motivation and underprivileged
schools end up with teachers of low ability. There will be no correlation between
ability and motivation at either type of school.
In the second part of this chapter we test the empirical predictions using Dutch
survey data from 2006 on teachersstated motivation and ability, where ability is
measured by years of experience and level of education. The data indicate that the
sorting of teachers into Dutch secondary schools corresponds most with the case
of high costs of working with the underprivileged: Teachers prefer working at the
privileged schools and those schools prefer hiring teachers with the highest ability,
that is education. We see no signicant e¤ect of motivation and experience on the
sorting of teachers into underprivileged schools. The e¤ect of education remains
after restricting the sample to teachers with ve years or less of experience at their
current school, to teachers teaching in the lower grades, and after restricting the
sample to the big cities. Within schooltypes, we cannot nd evidence of sorting
into underprivileged schools based on education, possibly due to the fact that the
variation of underprivileged and privileged schools within schooltypes is relatively
small. Among primary school teachers, the results are more ambiguous.
5.2 Directions for further research
This thesis adds additional evidence based on revealed preferences to the existing
body of knowledge on public sector motivation that uses stated behaviour or prefer-
ences. As in these earlier studies, the conclusion is that altruism among bureaucrats
exists, but not among all bureaucrats to the same extent. Of particular interest
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are our ndings that pro-social behaviour among bureaucrats seems to fade away
over tenure. Although similar ndings on the decrease of public service motivation
can be found in articles on public servants by Blau (1960), Van Maanen (1975),
Moynihan and Panday (2007), and Cooman et al. (2009), chapter two is the rst,
to our knowledge, to show di¤erences among the decrease in pro-social behaviour
among public servants versus private sector employees. The decline in pro-social
behaviour among public servants raises two important questions. First of all, why
does it occur? Second, what are the consequences thererof. The last question is all
the more important, since due to the recent nancial crisis and emanating budget
decits, many governments try to solve their budget problems by reducing the num-
ber of people employed in the public sector. This could lead to a vacancy stop or
last-in-rst-out lay-o¤s, which increase tenure by the incumbent employees.
The fading of altruism with tenure in public sector organizations is remarkable.
However, it is not clear what the cause of this decline is. It could be due to naive
beliefs of public sector employees about the state of the world, which is updated
by the on-the-job experience of a public sector worker. Thus, when a civil servant
starts to work in the public sector, he believes that the pecuniary benets and non-
pecuniary benets of the job outweigh his outside option utility. For instance, a
rooky caseworker might believe that the joys of working with needy and deserving
clients provides benets that, together with his salary, are larger than his reservation
wage. A policymaker at a ministry might believe that he can change the rules as
to help the poor and needy. As time goes by, both the caseworker and the pen-
pusher might discover that the same people they try to help, were not as needy or
deserving as the bureaucrats thought they would be. A caseworker will not only
meet clients willing to work, but also clients unwilling to nd themselves a job. This
group might be larger than the caseworker had imagened before taking up the job.
The pen-pusher at the ministry might encounter a similar experience when reading
reports about the number of clients committing fraud or people evading taxes. Thus,
the bureaucrats view on the world changes as he discovers that the clients he tries to
help are di¤erent than the ones he had in mind when accepting the job. Therefore,
his pro-social behaviour could diminish as he learns about this.
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Another explanation for the disillusionment e¤ect is that pen-pushing and street-
level bureaucrats expect other non-pecuniary benets from helping clients, for ex-
ample gratitude. However, many clients are not grateful, since their appeal on
government funds is usually larger than the funds the government is able to pro-
vide them with. Thus, instead of gratitude, many bureaucrats have to deal with
clientsdisappointment or even worse, with clients leveling a reproach at them for
not receiving enough benets. This could also lead to a diminishing level of public
service motivation. In the former case bureaucrats update their beliefs on the de-
privation of the clients, whereas in the second case they update their beliefs about
the gratitude clients provide them with. Whatever the reason for the naivety among
bureaucrats, in both cases experience leads naive bureaucrats to update their beliefs
about the state of the world. This might result in bureaucratsreconsideration of
the benets of the job and a change of occupation. Although the above mentioned
studies of Blau (1960), Van Maanen (1975), and Cooman et al. (2009) provide qual-
itive evidence on the mechanisms described here, a more formal study has not yet
appeared. Thus, an interesting step for further research would be to study this issue
using principal-agent and game theory, in particular Bayesian updating. Again, an
important question is not just who is willing to work for the government, but also
who should the government hire? Should the government hire the naive, but moti-
vated bureaucrats or the bureaucrats with relatively low motivation and a realistic
view on the world? If the loss of naivety leads to turnover, the government might
be better o¤ by screening applicants beforehand and hiring the less naive, or the
ones willing to spend their professional lives in the public sector for more extrinsic
reasons, such as job security. And especially so, when within tenure experience leads
to an increase in the employees ability to perform the job or recruitment costs are
high.
To answer the question of whom should be hired properly, we also need to study
formally the consequences the loss of public service motivation has on the bureau-
crats e¤ort provision and allocation decisions. Since e¤ort in the public sector is
often not or not completely veriable, a bureaucrat can at least partly compensate for
the loss of non-pecuniary benets by reducing his e¤orts. The loss of public service
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motivation could also have an e¤ect on the allocation decisions street-level bureau-
crats make, when within tenure experience lowers their feelings towards clients. The
government could react to these changes by raising the salary over tenure or by
providing bureaucrats with incentives. Whether this is an optimal response remains
to be seen. It could also be optimal to hire new idealistic recruits to replace the
current workforce. Studying these issues formally could provide us with predictions
to be tested in future empirical research.
Testing these predictions empirically is not an easy job. A rst prerequisite to
conduct such a test is to enhance the current research on the e¤ects of public service
motivation. Much of the work on this issue is theoretical in nature. Furthermore,
the empirical studies available mostly use stated preferences and stated behaviour
to infer public service motivation and use surveys data, thus stated performance, as
the dependent variable measuring e¤ects (see e.g. Brewer 2008, Petrovsky 2009).
Much can thus be gained by using revealed preferences on motivation and objective
performance measures. Although it will not always be easy to observe performance
in the public sector in an objective way, we can improve upon the current state of
the research. First of all, a part of the e¤ects of public sector work is observable. For
instance, in educational research a lot of progress has been made by measuring the
value added by teachers (see e.g. Hanushek and Rivkin 2006) or the performance
of caseworkers (see e.g. Heckman, Smith, and Taber 1996). Second, for the part
where performance is not that easily observable, as for instance among policymakers,
progress can be made as well by using employees performance as stated by the
managers instead of the performance stated by employees themselves.
The research in the second part of this thesis shows that, theoretically, di¤erences
among public servants in motivation towards clients, could lead to sorting within
occupations due to di¤erences in clientele. Several stylized facts are in support of this
theory. However, the empirical evidence provided in this thesis is not fully in support
of the presented theory. That could be due to several reasons, as for example the use
of stated preferences and the absence of important information on the teachers place
of residence. Another reason might be that, coincidentally, the Dutch educational
sector is not that plagued by such large di¤erences in student population as to
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attract di¤erently motivated teachers to di¤erent types of schools. An obvious way to
proceede would of course be to test this theory further using better data, for di¤erent
sectors, and even di¤erent countries. To test the e¤ects of incentives on sorting,
e¤ort, and allocation decisions, we need to conduct eld experiments and collect data
Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Introductie
Het bestaan en de e¤ecten van de motivatie van ambtenaren voor de publieke zaak,
ook wel altruïsme genoemd, is een veelvuldig bediscussieerd thema onder economen
en bestuurskundigen (zie bijvoorbeeld Perry en Hondeghem 2008a, Besley en Ghatak
2005, Francois 2000 en 2007). De discussie over de motivatie van ambtenaren en de
e¤ecten daarvan op de hoeveelheid en kwaliteit van publieke diensten blijft echter
niet beperkt tot de academische wetenschap. Veel journalisten, politici en burgers
bediscussiëren dit onderwerp in de media, het parlement en zelfs op straat. De reden
voor dit levendige debat is tweeledig. Allereerst worden ambtenaren vaak betaald uit
de belastingopbrengsten. De belastingbetalers zien dan ook graag dat hun geld goed
besteed wordt. Ten tweede is er veel belangstelling voor de motivatie van ambtenaren
en de e¤ecten daarvan, omdat hetzelfde publiek dat deze discussie voert ook de
klant is van die ambtenaren. Daarbij valt vaak weinig te kiezen tussen publieke
dienstverleners. Bijstandsgerechtigden kunnen alleen bij hun gemeente terecht voor
een uitkering. Ouders kunnen voor hun kinderen vaak maar uit een paar basisscholen
in de buurt kiezen. Misdaadslachto¤ers doen aangifte bij de lokale politie-agent,
gewonden gaan naar het dichtsbijzijnde ziekenhuis.
De mensen die werkzaam zijn als ambtenaar beïnvloeden de aard, kwaliteit en
hoeveelheid van de te leveren publieke diensten. En daardoor kunnen ze soms een
verschil maken in het leven van mensen. Een bijstandsconsulent kan het lot van een
bijstandsgerechtigde beïnvloeden door hem te helpen met het zoeken naar een baan
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of door hem juist een sanctie te geven wegens onvoldoende sollicitatie-inspanningen.
Een leraar kan de vorderingen van zijn leerlingen beïnvloeden door speciale aandacht
te geven aan zorgleerlingen. Verpleegsters kunnen er voor zorgen dat patiënten op
hun gemak gesteld worden voor een operatie. Hoewel de service ook beïnvloed wordt
door de beschikbaarheid van budgetten, de regels van de instelling en de mate van
discretionaire bevoegdheid die de ambtenaren hebben, gaan veel wetenschappers er
vanuit dat de motivatie van ambtenaren een belangrijke factor is die hun presteren
beïnvloedt. Voorbeelden zijn Francois (2000) en Dur en Delfgaauw (2008) die de
e¤ecten van motivatie op de inspanningen van ambtenaren en hun selectie in de
publieke sector onderzoeken met behulp van theoretische modellen. Daarnaast zijn
er een aantal empirische studies die (zij het bescheiden) bewijs leveren voor de
e¤ecten van motivatie op de (zelf-gerapporteerde) prestaties in de publieke sector.
Zie Brewer (2008), Perry, Hondeghem en Wise (2009) en Petrovsky (2009) voor
overzichten.
Hoewel motivatie een belangrijk element is dat de prestaties van ambtenaren
beïnvloedt, zullen niet alle ambtenaren even gemotiveerd zijn of motivatie putten
uit dezelfde elementen van hun werk. Dit verschil in motivatie en de consequenties
ervan is het centrale thema van dit proefschrift. Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift
onderzoekt de variatie in motivatie tussen private en publieke sector werknemers en
analyseert de factoren die invloed hebben op het verschil in motivatie tussen beide
sectoren. Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift bestudeert een speciaal onderdeel van
de motivatie van ambtenaren, namelijk hun motivatie om met mensen te werken, en
de gevolgen daarvan op de beslissingen die zij nemen in hun werk en de keuze voor
een bepaald type werkgever.
Literatuur
Als motivatie zo belangrijk is voor de kwaliteit en de hoeveelheid van de te leveren
publieke diensten, dan is de eerste vraag die opkomt of er daadwerkelijk bewijs is voor
het bestaan van een motivatie voor de publieke zaak of altruïsme onder ambtenaren.
Veel studies in de bestuurskundige literatuur en steeds meer studies in de economis-
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che literatuur kijken naar de verschillen in motivatie tussen ambtenaren met behulp
van zelfverklaarde voorkeuren of zelfverklaard gedrag. Dat wil zeggen, de onderzoek-
ers gebruiken de antwoorden op vragen over het belang van bepaalde baankenmerken
(zoals bijvoorbeeld nuttig voor de maatschappijin de studie van Lewis en Frank
2002), door te kijken naar verschillen in tevredenheid over het werk tussen publieke
en private sector werknemers (zoals Georgellis en Tabvuma 2010 doen), door de
verschillen in zelfverklaard donatiegedrag of vrijwilligerswerk te analyseren tussen
private en publieke sector werknemers (zie Houston 2006) of door de zelfverklaarde
hoeveelheid onbetaald overwerk te vergelijken (Gregg et al. 2008). Net als Perry
et al. (2009) in hun overzichtsstudie van deze literatuur, concluderen deze studies
in het algemeen dat het niveau van motivatie voor de publieke zaak groter is onder
ambtenaren dan onder andere werknemers.
Liefde voor de publieke zaak is echter niet de enige reden om in de publieke sector
aan de slag te gaan. Andere redenen, zoals de wens om zorg en arbeid te combineren
(Leijsink en Steijn 2008), zijn ook belangrijk. Een van de punten die veel aandacht
trekt is de vraag of werknemers in de publieke sector meer risico-avers zijn dan
werknemers in de private sector. Velen denken dat dit het geval is, omdat het loon
en de baanzekerheid in de publieke sector minder aan uctuaties onderhevig zijn dan
in de private sector. Als de meer risico-averse mensen inderdaad aan de slag gaan in
de publieke sector, dan betekent dit dat de introductie van bijvoorbeeld resultaats-
afhankelijke beloning andere e¤ecten kan hebben in de publieke dan in de private
sector. Het bewijs voor de hypothese dat mensen in de publieke sector risico-averser
zijn is, op basis van studies die gebruik maken van zelfverklaarde voorkeuren, niet
overtuigend (zie bijvoorbeeld Rainey 1982, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000, en Frank
en Lewis 2002). Maar studies die gebruik maken van zelfverklaard gedrag laten wel
zien dat werknemers in de publieke sector over het algemeen een lagere risicotole-
rantie hebben dan werknemers in de private sector (Bellante en Link 1981, Hartog
et al. 2002, Guiso en Paiella 2008, Roszkowski en Grable 2009). Hoewel dergelijke
studies waardevolle informatie bevatten en zelfverklaarde voorkeuren en zelfverk-
laard gedrag wel een samenhang vertonen met waargenomen gedrag (Dohmen et
al. 2009), zijn er ook nadelen bekend van het gebruik hiervan, zoals geheugen-
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verlies, beoordelingsfouten, sociaal wenselijke antwoorden en common sourcebias
genoemd door Brewer (2008: 141-142). Daarom gebruiken wij in het eerste deel van
dit proefschrift geopenbaarde voorkeuren, dat wil zeggen daadwerkelijke keuzes, om
de kennis over het verschil in altruïsme tussen publieke en private sector werknemers
te vergroten.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift onderzoekt de verschillen in motivatie onder
werknemers in de publieke sector onderling en de consequenties daarvan voor de
selectie van werknemers binnen de publieke sector. In de bovengenoemde studies,
gaat de meeste aandacht uit naar de verschillen tussen publieke en private werkne-
mers. Maar de publieke sector is een grote sector die zeer uiteenlopende activiteiten
omvat. Werk in de publieke sector loopt uiteen van dossiervreters op ministeries
tot verpleegsters aan de rand van het bed, van secretaresses achter bureaus tot
leraren voor de klas. Dus de baankeuze van werknemers hoeft niet beperkt te blij-
ven tot de keuze tussen publiek en privaat, maar zal zich ook uitstrekken tot het
scala aan beroepen binnen de publieke sector. Hoewel het thema van de motivatie
voor de publieke zaak uitgebreid beschreven is, heeft het thema van baankeuzes
binnen de publieke sector tot nu toe veel minder aandacht gekregen. Zeker binnen
de economische wetenschap. Prendergast (2007) is een van de eerste economen die
aandacht heeft besteed aan het vraagstuk waarom sommige ambtenaren zeer begaan
lijken met de klanten, zoals bijvoorbeeld bijstandsconsulenten, terwijl anderen juist
zeer wantrouwend staan tegenover het publiek, denk bijvoorbeeld aan belastingin-
specteurs en politieagenten. Zijn model voorspelt dat er twee uitersten afkomen
op banen bij instellingen in de publieke sector. Dat wil zeggen enerzijds de mensen
die meer dan deze instellingen begaan zijn met het lot van cliënten en anderzijds de
mensen die veel minder dan deze instellingen begaan zijn met het lot van de cliënten.
De selectie van mensen hoeft niet beperkt te blijven tot de selectie in bepaalde
type beroepen, zoals leraar, politie of bijstandsconsulenten. Ook binnen beroepen
kan selectie optreden. Dit kan komen door een verschil in missie tussen de diverse
werkgevers, zoals bijvoorbeeld beschreven door Besley en Ghatak (2005), of door ver-
schil in samenstelling van de cliëntpopulatie. De baan van een leraar op een school
in de binnenstad kan heel anders zijn dan de baan van een leraar op een school in een
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van de voorsteden door het verschil in leerlingenpopulatie. Dit is precies de witte
vlek die we in het tweede deel van dit proefschrift proberen in te vullen. We richten
onze aandacht hierbij op een speciaal type ambtenaar, de zogenaamde street-level
bureaucraat. Dat wil zeggen, de ambtenaren die dag in dag uit in aanraking komen
met cliënten, leerlingen en andere burgers. Dus, dienstverleners als leraren, politie-
agenten en verpleegsters. Zij hebben vaak een tweeledige taak van enerzijds mensen
helpen en anderzijds mensen bestra¤en. Bovendien hebben zij door de aard van
het werk vaak een heleboel discretie bij het vervullen van hun taken. Dit stelt ons
in staat om een nieuwe invalshoek te bestuderen: De consequenties van motivatie
op de beslissingen die deze bureaucraten nemen. Dit in tegenstelling tot anderen,
zoals Prendergast (2007) en Brekke en Nyborg (2008), die focussen op de gevolgen
van verschillen in motivatie op het inspanningsniveau en selectie. Wij gaan er va-
nuit dat deze dienstverleners geven om de cliënten die zij tegen komen in hun werk.
Daarom houden zij rekening met het nut dat de cliënt aan een beslissing ontleent.
Echter niet allemaal in dezelfde mate (zie Lipsky 1980). Dit heeft invloed op hun
baankeuze. Baankeuzes hangen ook af van de prikkels die een werkgever hanteert.
Francois (2007) kijkt naar de relatie tussen incentives, inspanningen en baankeuzes.
Hij toont aan met behulp van een theoretisch model dat de introductie van resul-
taatafhankelijke beloning in de publieke sector een negatief e¤ect kan hebben op de
productiviteit, omdat mensen met een lage intrinsieke motivatie daardoor ook inter-
esse krijgen in een baan in de publieke sector en degenen met een hoge intrinsieke
motivatie verdrijven (zie ook Delfgaauw en Dur 2007). De relatie tussen prikkels
en de beslissingen (zoals het toewijzen van uitkeringen of sancties) die ambtenaren
nemen is tot op heden nog niet onderzocht door economen. Ons onderzoek levert
inzichten op basis van theorie over dit vraagstuk.
Natuurlijk is motivatie niet de enige factor, die de selectie van ambtenaren voor
een bepaalde baan beïnvloedt. Een andere belangrijke factor is hun talent. Hoewel er
steeds meer onderzoek komt naar de relatie tussen motivatie, inspanningen en selectie
van werknemers in de publieke sector (zie Besley en Ghatak 2005, Prendergast 2007,
Francois 2007, Brekke en Nyborg 2008, Delfgaauw en Dur 2008), is er nog maar
weinig onderzoek dat ook de relatie tussen selectie, motivatie en het talent van
140 Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
werknemers analyseert. Delfgaauw en Dur (2010) tonen aan dat het talent van
managers meer oplevert in de private sector dan in de publieke sector, omdat de
motivatie voor de publieke zaak de lonen in de publieke sector drukt. Daarom komen
de meest talentvolle managers in de private sector terecht. Een natuurlijk vervolg op
dit type onderzoek is onderzoek naar de relatie tussen motivatie, talent en baankeuze
binnen de publieke sector. Daarom bestuderen we in het laatste hoofdstuk van dit
proefschrift zowel theoretisch als empirisch de e¤ecten van motivatie en talent op de
selectie van leraren in scholen met veel zorgleerlingen.
Motivatie voor de publieke zaak
Voordat we een overzicht geven van de belangrijkste resultaten van dit proefschrift
gaan we eerst nader in op het begrip motivatie. Motivatie is volgens de Longman
dictionary of contemporary English (2008) een wil of gretigheid om iets te doen
zonder dat dit opgedragen of verplicht is. Motivatie kunnen we onderscheiden in
extrinsieke motivatie, dat is een motivatie gevoed door externe bronnen, zoals
bijvoorbeeld nanciële prikkels of promotiekansen, en intrinsieke motivatie, dat wil
zeggen een motivatie die deel uitmaakt van de aard of het karakter van iets of ie-
mand(Longman 2008). Mensen kunnen intrinsiek gemotiveerd zijn om een taak uit
te voeren, omdat ze het leuk vinden om te doen of omdat ze geven om het resultaat
van de uitvoering van de taak. De motivatie van mensen om aan de slag te gaan in
de publieke sector kan op dezelfde wijze onderverdeeld worden. Perry en Hondeghem
(2008b: 3) maken een bruikbaar onderscheid. Ten eerste onderscheiden ze public
sector motivation, dat zijn meer extrinsieke redenen om in de publieke sector aan de
slag te gaan zoals bijvoorbeeld de mogelijkheden om arbeid en zorg te combineren,
baanzekerheid, sociale voorzieningen, scholing en de sociale status van ambtenaren.
Ten tweede onderscheiden ze public service motivation, dat meer raakt aan het
begrip intrinsieke motivatie. Perry en Wise (1990: 368) deniëren de motivatie voor
de publieke zaak als een individus predispositie om te appelleren aan motieven
die primair aanwezig zijn in het werk in publieke instituties of organisaties. Perry
(1996: 20) toont aan dat motivatie voor de publieke zaak vier onderliggende dimen-
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sies kent, namelijk de aantrekkingskracht die beleid maken uitoefent op sommigen,
betrokkenheid bij het publieke belang, compassie en zelf-opo¤ering. De eerste di-
mensie kan gezien worden als een speciale vorm van intrinsieke motivatie, namelijk
de vreugde die ontleend wordt aan de aard van het werk zelf. De overige vormen
appelleren meer aan het begrip altruïsme, zoals economen dat vaak gebruiken.
Altruïsme is de wens om anderen te helpen zonder directe voordelen voor jezelf.
Of, meer formeel uitgedrukt, altruïsme is een voorkeur voor het welzijn van an-
deren en de daden die dit bewerkstelligen (Kolm 2006: 8). Altruïsme is een erg
breed begrip. Een eerste onderscheid dat we kunnen maken is gebaseerd op het
onderwerp van het altruïsme. Sommige mensen hebben altruïstische gevoelens voor
iedereen, terwijl anderen vooral deze gevoelens koesteren voor degenen in nood of
mensen voor wie ze empathische gevoelens, of gevoelens van compassie of sympathie
koesteren. Altruïsme kan zich dus richten tot iedereen in de maatschappij, maar
ook beperken tot een groep mensen met wie men zich het meest verwant voelt, zoals
familie, vrienden en kennissen (zie ook Baron et al. 2009, Kolm 2006). Een tweede
onderscheid is tussen altruïsme in zijn zuivere en in zijn onzuivere vorm. Zuivere
altruïsten, ook wel output-georienteerde altruïsten, geven om het niveau van welzijn
van anderen, zonder dat het daarbij uitmaakt of zijzelf of derden daar aan bijdragen.
Onzuiver altruïsme houdt in dat men graag zelf een bijdrage levert aan het welzijn
van anderen. Dat betekent dat mensen warme gevoelens ondervinden van het geven
op zichzelf (Andreoni 1989, Francois en Vlassopoulos 2008). In een werkomgeving
betekent dit dat onzuivere altruïsten vreugde ontlenen aan het leveren van inspan-
ningen in de publieke sector, zelfs als ze zich realiseren dat als zij stoppen met hun
werk en iemand anders hun plaats inneemt, het totale aanbod aan publieke diensten
constant blijft. Door deze inspanningen genieten zij naast hun loon ook inkomsten
die niet in geld uit te drukken zijn. Deze niet-monetaire voordelen van het werken in
de publieke sector hangen nauw samen met het begrip actie-georienteerd altruïsme,
zoals dat door Francois en Vlassopoulis (2008) geïntroduceerd is. Het verschil tussen
een ambtenaar die om zuiver altruïstische redenen in de publieke sector werkt en een
die om onzuiver altruïstische redenen in de publieke sector werkt, is dat de eerste
alleen voor zon baan zou kiezen als zijn eigen bijdrage leidt tot een hoger welzi-
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jnsniveau dan de bijdrage van anderen. Bijvoorbeeld, als hij meer talent heeft om
een bepaalde dienst te leveren of meer inspanningen zal uitoefenen. Iemand met
onzuiver altruïstische gevoelens zal kiezen voor een baan in de publieke sector als
zijn vreugde van het uitoefenen van dit werk samen met het loon meer nut oplevert
dan inkomsten elders. Dat betekent dat zo iemand ook voor een baan in de pub-
lieke sector zal kiezen als er andere, beter geschikte, kandidaten zijn. Een laatste
onderscheid in verschijningsvormen van altruïsme dat we hier onder de aandacht
willen brengen, is het verschil tussen altruïsme waarbij men puur kijkt naar het nut
dat anderen ontlenen aan acties, afgezet tegen een meer paternalistische vorm van
altruïsme, waarbij men nut ontleent aan de toewijzing van een bepaald goed aan
iemand.
Al deze verschillende vormen van altruïsme kunnen naast elkaar voorkomen.
Dat wil zeggen dat sommige ambtenaren vooral gemotiveerd zullen zijn door zuiver
altruïstische motieven, terwijl anderen vooral de warme gevoelens die hun werk
oplevert waarderen en een laatste groep aan beide zaken tegelijkertijd motivatie
ontleent.
Samenvatting van de resultaten
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift vullen we de bestaande literatuur over publieke
sector motivatie aan door gebruik te maken van een unieke dataset met gegevens over
daadwerkelijke keuzes die werknemers maken bij de ontvangst van een beloning voor
het invullen van een enqûete. De respondenten konden kiezen tussen een staatslot
(risicovolle keuze), een donatie aan een goed doel naar keuze (altruïstische optie) en
een VVV-bon (de veilige en egoistische keuze). Met behulp van deze gegevens stellen
we vast of ambtenaren een sterkere geneigdheid hebben om anderen te dienen en meer
risico-avers zijn dan werknemers in de publieke sector.
De resultaten van onze multinomiale logistische regressie tonen aan dat werkne-
mers in de publieke sector signicant minder vaak de voorkeur geven aan het staatslot
ten opzichte van de kadobon in vergelijking met werknemers in de private sector.
Aan het begin van hun carrière zijn ze meer geneigd dan werknemers in de private
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sector om te kiezen voor een donatie aan een goed doel in plaats van een kadobon.
Maar naarmate hun dienstverband langer duurt, verdwijnt dit verschil tussen pub-
lieke en private sector werknemers. Sterker, het draait zelfs om. In de private sector
zien we geen daling van de geneigdheid om voor het goede doel te kiezen over de tijd
heen. Bovendien heeft in geen van beide sectoren de lengte van het dienstverband
invloed op de keuze voor het staatslot ten opzichte van de kadobon. Het e¤ect van
de duur van het dienstverband op de keuze voor het goede doel in de publieke sector
hangt niet samen met enig leeftijdsspeciek e¤ect in de publieke sector. Na het con-
troleren voor dergelijke e¤ecten blijft het e¤ect van de duur van het dienstverband
zichtbaar.
Onze data stellen ons alleen in staat om iets te zeggen over risicoaversie en
altruïsme aan de marge, want de beloning voor het invullen van de enqûete verschaft
de respondenten additionele middelen om aan een goed doel of lot te besteden. We
weten niet hoeveel risico mensen in hun dagelijks leven nemen of hoeveel ze al aan een
goed doel geven. Misschien kiezen de ambtenaren niet voor de donatie aan een goed
doel, omdat ze menen dat ze in het dagelijks leven al meer voor de publieke zaak doen
dan de plicht van hen vraagt. Helaas hebben we geen informatie over de risicos die
mensen lopen in het dagelijks leven. Wel weten we iets over de mate waarin mensen
bijdragen aan de publieke zaak tijdens hun werk. Eén van de vragen in de enqûete
informeert of de respondenten van mening zijn dat hun salaris voldoende is voor het
werk dat zij doen. Afgaand op de antwoorden op deze vraag kunnen we aeiden
dat veel mensen in de publieke sector hun beloning niet aan het goede doel doneren,
omdat zij vinden dat ze op het werk al meer dan genoeg voor de maatschappij doen
voor te weinig loon.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift omvat hoofdstuk drie en vier en bestudeert
zowel theoretisch als empirisch de e¤ecten van altruïstische gevoelens voor cliënten
onder publieke dienstverleners. Veel dienstverleners in de publieke sector (zoals bij-
standsconsulenten) hebben de tweeledige taak van het enerzijds stra¤en van cliën-
ten en anderzijds helpen. In hoofdstuk drie ontwerpen we een model voor zon
soort publieke organisatie en bestuderen de e¤ecten van het personeelsbeleid op de
zelf-selectie en beslissingen van ambtenaren die verschillen in niet-observeerbare mo-
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tivatie richting hun cliënten. Als deze werknemers een vast salaris ontvangen dan
geven ze geen sancties en kiezen de meest altruïstische types voor een baan bij de
instelling.
De aantrekkingskracht van de baan hangt niet alleen af van het basissalaris dat
de werknemers ontvangen, maar ook van de samenstelling van de cliëntenpopulatie.
Als er veel cliënten zijn die hulp nodig hebben dan beleven de werknemers van de
instelling veel meer vreugde aan het werk, dat wil zeggen meer niet-monetaire voor-
delen. Dat betekent dat het loon in zon instelling lager kan zijn dan in een instelling
met weinig hulpbehoevende cliënten om toch evenveel werknemers aan te trekken.
Het kan ook voordelig zijn om niet alle cliënten te helpen als de instelling de
enige vragende partij op de arbeidsmarkt is. Dat betekent namelijk dat de in-
stelling, door de vraag naar werknemers laag te houden, het salaris voor al zijn
werknemers laag kan houden. De uitgespaarde loonkosten wegen op tegen het nadeel
dat niet elke cliënt geholpen wordt. Dus ons model geeft een verklaring voor het
vaak waargenomen e¤ect dat in dergelijke instellingen de werknemers vaak te maken
hebben met een overvolle caseload.
Resultaatafhankelijke bonussen verleiden de werknemers om cliënten te sanc-
tioneren indien nodig, maar tegelijkertijd brengen ze een verhoging van het loon
met zich mee om te compenseren voor de negatieve gevoelens die de werknemers
ervaren als ze sancties moeten uitdelen. Als het te kostbaar is om alle werknemers
over te halen om te sanctioneren, dan ontstaat een tweedeling in het personeel.
Een deel is zeer altruïstisch en zal niet sanctioneren. Een ander deel is minder al-
truïstisch, sanctioneert wel en vraagt meer compensatie voor het uitdelen van deze
sancties. Als tenslotte het sanctioneren van cliënten sterk gewaardeerd wordt door
de instelling en veel oplevert, dan kan de instelling alle werknemers overhalen om te
sanctioneren door via een combinatie van bonus en basissalaris een hoog inkomen
aan ze te verscha¤en en ze zo meer te betalen, dan ze op alternatieve wijze kunnen
verdienen. Een dergelijke baan is echter alleen aantrekkelijk voor mensen aan de
onderkant van de altruïsme verdeling. De monetaire en niet-monetaire voordelen
van een baan hebben dus een grote invloed op het type werknemer dat zich tot zon
baan aangetrokken voelt.
145
In hoofdstuk vier bouwen we voort op dit thema door eerst een selectiemodel te
ontwikkelen waarin de werknemers niet alleen verschillen in hun niet-observeerbare
motivatie richting cliënten, maar ook in hun observeerbare talent om met deze cliën-
ten te werken. Dit model passen we toe op een speciek voorbeeld: De selectie
van leraren in scholen in de binnenstad. De scholen in de binnensteden, of ook wel
scho-len met veel zorgleerlingen, hebben vaak moeite met het aantrekken van vol-
doende gekwaliceerd personeel. Als zeer gemotiveerde leraren schaars zijn en de
kosten van het werken met zorgleerlingen gemiddeld, dan voorspelt het model dat
scholen met veel zorgleerlingen de groep leraren met een grote motivatie en aller-
lei talent aantrekt en de groep leraren met een lage motivatie en weinig talent. In
dit geval verwachten we een positieve correlatie tussen de motivatie en het talent
van de leraren op scholen met veel zorgleerlingen. Indien de kosten van het werken
met deze leerlingen heel hoog zijn, dan willen leraren hier liever niet werken. Dan
verwachten we dus geen selectie op basis van motivatie. Op deze scholen belanden
dan uiteindelijk vooral de leraren met weinig talent.
In het tweede gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk testen we de empirische predicties met
behulp van Nederlandse enqûetegegevens uit 2006 over de motivatie en het talent
van leraren. Talent meten we hierbij door middel van de hoogst afgeronde oplei-
ding van leraren en hun ervaring in jaren. De data laten zien dat de selectie van
leraren in het voorgezet onderwijs in Nederland vooral overeen lijkt te komen met
de situatie van hoge kosten van het werken met zorgleerlingen. Dat wil zeggen dat
de leraren liever werken op scholen met weinig zorgleerlingen en deze scholen het
liefst leraren met veel zichtbaar talent, in dit geval opleiding, aannemen. We zien
geen signicant e¤ect van motivatie of ervaring op de selectie van leraren in het
voortgezet onderwijs. Het e¤ect van opleiding blijft zichtbaar na het beperken van
de steekproef tot leraren met minder dan vijf jaar ervaring op hun huidige school, na
het beperken van de steekproef tot leraren die alleen les geven in de onderbouw, en
na het beperken van de steekproef tot de grote steden. Binnen schooltypes kunnen
we geen bewijs vinden voor selectie van leraren op basis van hun hoogst genoten
opleiding in scholen met veel zorgleerlingen. Mogelijk komt dit doordat er weinig
variatie is in het aandeel zorgleerlingen binnen schooltypes. Onder leraren in het
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basisonderwijs zijn de resultaten niet eenduidig.
Vervolgonderzoek
Dit proefschrift voegt nieuw bewijs toe aan de bestaande literatuur over publieke
sector motivatie. Hierbij maken we in tegenstelling tot de bestaande studies geen
gebruik van zelfverklaarde voorkeuren of zelfverklaard gedrag, maar waargenomen
gedrag. Dat wil zeggen daadwerkelijke keuzes. Ook op basis van dit onderzoek
kunnen we concluderen dat er onder een deel van de ambtenaren inderdaad een
voorkeur voor pro-sociale keuzes aanwezig is, maar lang niet onder alle ambtenaren
in dezelfde mate. Met name interessant zijn onze bevindingen dat het pro-sociale
gedrag van ambtenaren gedurende de looptijd van het dienstverband lijkt te ver-
dwijnen. Hoewel soortgelijke bevindingen over het verdwijnen van de motivatie
voor de publieke zaak onder ambtenaren zijn gevonden in artikelen van Blau (1960),
Van Maanen (1975), Moynihan en Panday(2007) en Cooman et al. (2009), is hoofd-
stuk twee het eerste onderzoek, naar wij weten, dat verschil laat zien in de motivatie
over de loop van het dienstverband tussen publieke en private sector werknemers.
Deze afname van motivatie voor de publieke zaak roept twee belangrijke vragen.
Allereerst, wat veroorzaakt dit? Ten tweede, wat zijn de gevolgen ervan? De laat-
ste vraag is momenteel des te belangrijker, omdat door de nanciele crisis en de
daaruit voortvloeiende budgettaire tekorten veel overheden hun budgettaire proble-
men proberen op te lossen door het aantal mensen dat in de publieke sector werkt
terug te dringen. Dit kan leiden tot vacaturestops of ontslagen volgens de last
in-rst-outmethode. Dat betekent dat de lengte van het dienstverband van het
zittende personeel waarschijnlijk zal toenemen.
Het verdwijnen van altruïstische neigingen bij ambtenaren gedurende het dienst-
verband is opmerkelijk. Het is echter onduidelijk waardoor dit veroorzaakt wordt.
Het kan komen doordat ambtenaren aan het begin van hun dienstverband naïeve
ideeen hebben over de toestand in de wereld, die door hun werkervaring als ambte-
naar bijgesteld worden. Een ambtenaar die begint als werknemer in de publieke sec-
tor denkt dat zijn monetaire en niet-monetaire inkomsten uit de baan opwegen tegen
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de alternatieve inkomsten die hij zou kunnen vergaren. Een groene bijstands-
consulent kan er van overtuigd zijn dat de vreugde van het werken met cliënten die
een hoge nood hebben en ondersteuning verdienen samen met zijn salaris opwegen
tegen elk alternatief. Een beleidsmaker op een ministerie kan aan het begin van zijn
carrière verwachten dat hij door het veranderen van de regels de zwakkeren in deze
samenleving kan helpen. Maar na verloop van tijd zullen zowel de bijstandsconsulent
als de beleidsmaker ontdekken dat de mensen die zij proberen te helpen niet altijd
zo noodruftig waren als zij dachten, noch altijd hun ondersteuning verdienden. Een
bijstandsconsulent zal niet alleen cliënten ontmoeten die graag aan het werk willen
en een duwtje in de rug nodig hebben, maar ook cliënten die niet op zoek naar
een baan willen. Deze groep kan groter zijn dan de bijstandsconsulent zich aan het
begin van zijn carrière had voorgesteld. De dossiervreter op het ministerie kan een
zelfde soort ervaring hebben als hij ontdekt, via bijvoorbeeld onderzoeksrapporten,
dat er cliënten zijn die zijn regels niet in acht nemen door bijvoorbeeld te frauderen
met hun uitkering of belastingen te ontduiken. Door dergelijke ervaringen kan de
ambtenaar ontdekken dat de cliënten waarvoor hij zijn werk verricht andere zijn
dan hij voor ogen had bij de start van zijn dienstverband. Dit kan ertoe leiden dat
uiteindelijk ook zijn pro-sociale gedrag verandert.
Een andere verklaring voor dit desillussie e¤ect is dat zowel de dossiervreters
als de dienstverlenende ambtenaren andere niet-monetaire vreugden ondervinden
van het helpen van cliënten, zoals bijvoorbeeld dankbaarheid. Maar in de praktijk
zullen cliënten lang niet altijd dankbaar zijn, want hun beroep op de overheid is door-
gaans groter dan de budgetten kunnen toestaan. Dus in plaats van dankbaarheid
te ontvangen, zullen veel ambtenaren moeten leren omgaan met de teleurstelling die
cliënten ervaren, of erger, met de verwijten die cliënten tot hen richten, omdat ze
vinden dat ze niet voldoende geholpen zijn door deze ambtenaren. Dit kan ook lei-
den tot minder pro-sociaal gedrag bij de ambtenaren. In de vorige paragraaf stelden
ambtenaren hun beeld van het werk bij, omdat ze ontdekten dat cliënten niet altijd
zo noodlijdend waren als ze dachten. In deze paragraaf stellen ze hun gedrag bij,
omdat ze minder dankbaarheid ontvangen dan gedacht. In beide gevallen is het
ervaring dat er toe leidt dat de naïeve ambtenaren hun wereldbeeld bijstellen. Dit
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kan er toe leiden dat ze ook de opbrengsten van hun baan in een ander licht zien en
van beroep willen veranderen. Hoewel de eerder genoemde studies van Blau (1960),
Van Maanen (1975) en Cooman et al. (2009) kwalitatief bewijs leveren voor de
mechanismen die hier boven beschreven worden, zijn er nog geen studies verschenen
met een meer formele bestudering van dit mechanisme. Het zou dan ook een inte-
ressante stap voor vervolgonderzoek zijn om deze problematiek te bestuderen met
behulp van principaal-agent modellen en speltheorie. Ook hierbij is niet alleen de
vraag wie er voor de overheid wil werken interessant, maar ook wie zou de overheid
moeten inhuren. Moet de overheid de naïeve, gemotiveerde ambtenaar inhuren of
ambtenaren met relatief weinig motivate en een realistische kijk op de wereld? Als
verlies van naïeviteit leidt tot verloop, dan is de overheid misschien beter af door
van te voren ambtenaren beter te te selecteren en de minder naïeve sollicitanten aan
te nemen of degenen die vooral voor een carrière in de ambtenarij kiezen vanwege
de extrinsieke voordelen, zoals baanzekerheid. Dit is waarschijnlijk des te meer het
geval naarmate de ervaring binnen het dienstverband leidt tot betere prestaties of
het inhuren van nieuwe werknemers erg veel energie kost.
Om de vraag wie men het beste kan inhuren goed te beantwoorden moeten we ook
op een meer formele wijze de consequenties onderzoeken van een verlies aan motivatie
voor de publieke zaak op de inzet van ambtenaren en hun beslissingen. Aangezien
inzet niet of niet volledig observeerbaar is in de publieke sector, kunnen ambtenaren
een deel van de lager dan verwachte niet-monetaire inkomsten compenseren door
hun inzet gelijktijdig terug te dringen. Ook kan het verlies van motivatie voor de
publieke zaak een e¤ect hebben op de beslissingen of toewijzingen die ze maken als de
werkervaring hun gevoelens ten opzichte van cliënten verandert. De overheid kan hier
op reageren door het salaris te verhogen gedurende de jaren of door de ambtenaren
nanciële prikkels te geven. Of dat een optimale reactie is, valt te bezien. Het kan
ook optimaal zijn om de huidige werknemers te vervangen door nieuwe, idealistische
sollicitanten. Het onderzoeken van deze zaken in een theoretisch model kan ons
nieuwe inzichten bieden, die we vervolgens kunnen toetsen in empirische onderzoek.
Het testen van deze voorspellingen is overigens geen sinecure. Een eerste vereiste
voor zon test is het verbeteren van het huidige onderzoek naar de e¤ecten van
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motivatie voor de publieke zaak. Veel van het werk tot nu toe is theoretisch van
aard. Bovendien gebruiken de empirische studies die er nu zijn vooral zelfverklaarde
preferenties en gedrag als maatstaf voor motivatie en enqûetegegevens, dus zelfverk-
laarde prestaties, als maatstaf om het e¤ect te meten (zie bijvoorbeeld Brewer 2008,
Petrovsky 2009). Veel kan dus gewonnen worden door gebruik van geobserveerd
gedrag om motivatie vast te stellen en objectieve prestatiemaatstaven. Hoewel het
natuurlijk niet altijd eenvoudig is om objectieve prestatiemaatstaven te gebruiken
in de publieke sector, kan er ten opzichte van de huidige onderzoeken het nodige
verbeteren. Ten eerste is een deel van de e¤ecten wel degelijk observeerbaar. Denk
bijvoorbeeld aan de voortgang die in het onderwijsonderzoek is geboekt met het
gebruik van maatstaven voor het meten van toegevoegde waarde bij het meten van
de prestaties van leraren (zie onder andere Hanushek en Rivkin 2006) of de presta-
ties van werkconsulenten (zie onder andere Heckman, Smith en Taber 1996). Ten
tweede kunnen we bij moeilijk meetbare prestaties, zoals de prestaties van beleids-
makers, verbetering boeken door niet de zelfverklaarde prestaties van werknemers
te gebruiken, maar de prestaties die hun managers aan hen toedichten.
Het onderzoek in het tweede gedeelte van dit proefschrift laat met behulp van een
theoretisch model zien dat verschillen in de houding van de ambtenaren ten opzichte
van hun cliënten kan leiden tot selectie van werknemers op basis van verschillen in
clientèle bij de werkgevers. Verschillende stylized facts zijn in overeenstemming
met dit gegeven. Het empirische bewijs in dit proefschrift is echter niet helemaal
in overeenstemming met de theorie. Daar kunnen verschillende oorzaken aan ten
grondslag liggen. We maken gebruik van zelfverklaarde motivatie. Ook ontbreken er
het belangrijke variabelen, zoals de plaats waar de docent woont. Een andere oorzaak
zouden kunnen zijn dat de Nederlandse onderwijssector niet geteisterd wordt door
grote verschillen per school in studentenpopulatie en er om die reden weinig selectie
plaatsvindt. Een evidente richting voor vervolgonderzoek is dan ook het nader testen
van de theorie met betere data, voor andere sectoren en zelfs andere landen. Om het
e¤ect van het gebruik van prikkels op selectie, inzet en toewijzingen te onderzoeken
moeten we veldexperimenten uitvoeren en data over een tijdspanne van meerdere
jaren verzamelen.
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